Visually-naïve chicks prefer agents that move as if constrained by a bilateral body-plan.

From the first hours of life, the prompt detection of animate agents allows identification of biologically relevant entities. The motion of most animate agents is constrained by their bilaterally-symmetrical body-plan, and consequently tends to be aligned with the main body-axis. Thus parallelism between the main axis of a moving object and its motion trajectory can signal the presence of animate agents. Here we demonstrated that visually-naïve newborn chicks (Gallus gallus domesticus) are attracted to objects displaying such parallelism, and thus show preference for the same type of motion patterns that elicit perception of animacy in humans. This is the first demonstration of a newborn non-human animal's social preference for a visual cue related to the constraints imposed on behaviour by bilaterian morphology. Chicks also showed preference for rotational movements - a potential manifestation of self-propulsion. Results are discussed in relation to the mechanisms of animacy and agency detection in newborn organisms.

Spontaneous preference for visual cues of animacy in naïve domestic chicks: The case of speed changes.

Animacy perception arises in human adults from motion cues implying an internal energy source to the moving object. The internal energy of the object is often represented by a change in speed. The same features cause preferential attention in infants. We investigated whether speed changes affecting adults' animacy ratings elicit spontaneous social preferences in visually-naïve chicks. Human observers evaluated the similarity between the movement of a red blob stimulus and that of a living creature. The stimulus entered the screen and moved along the azimuth; halfway through its trajectory it could either continue to move at a constant speed or linearly increase in speed. The average speed, the distance covered and the overall motion duration were kept constant. Animacy ratings of humans were higher for accelerating stimuli (Exp. 1). Naïve chicks were then tested for their spontaneous preference for approaching the stimulus moving at a constant speed and trajectory or an identical stimulus, which suddenly accelerated and then decelerated again to the original speed. Chicks showed a significant preference for the 'speed-change stimulus' (Exp. 2). Two additional controls (Exp. 3 and 4) showed that matching the variability of the control 'speed-constant' stimulus to that of the 'speed-change stimulus' did not alter chicks' preference for the latter. Chicks' preference was suppressed by adding two occluders on both displays, positioned along the stimulus trajectory in such a way to occlude the moment of the speed change (Exp. 5). This confirms that, for chicks to show a preference, the moments of speed change need to be visible. Finally, chicks' preference extended to stimuli displaying a direction change, another motion cue eliciting animacy perception in human observers, if the speed- and direction-profile were consistent with each other and resembled what expected for biological entities that invert their motion direction (Exp. 6). Overall, this is the first demonstration of social predispositions for speed changes in any naïve model or non-human animal, indicating the presence of an attentional filter tuned toward one of the general properties of animate creatures. The similarity with human data suggests a phylogenetically old mechanism shared between vertebrates. Finally, the paradigm developed here provides ground for future investigations of the neural basis of these phenomena.

Roots of a social brain: developmental models of emerging animacy-detection mechanisms.

Here, we review evidence of unlearned predispositions to orient toward visual and auditory cues associated with the presence of animate creatures. We concentrate on studies on chicks of galliform species, whose behavioural preferences for social partners are analyzed in a comparative perspective with respect to the human developmental literature. The emerging nature of chicks' social predispositions is discussed in relation to the underlying physiological mechanisms and to the role of genetic and environmental factors in their development. In the second part of the review, we summarize evidence on the neural substrate of the animacy detectors, again focusing on our animal model of election, the domestic chick. On the basis of a substantial amount of indirect evidence, subpallial structures, among which the optic tectum (homologous to the mammalian superior colliculus), seem to comprise the most probable candidates. We also discuss some preliminary evidence of different brain activity, measured by IEG expression, in chicks exposed to predisposed or a non-predisposed stimulus.

Perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion in four-day-old domestic chicks (Gallus gallus).

In the Ebbinghaus size illusion, a central circle surrounded by small circles (inducers) appears bigger than an identical one surrounded by large inducers. Previous studies have failed to demonstrate sensitivity to this illusion in pigeons and baboons, leading to the conclusion that avian species (possibly also nonhuman primates) might lack the neural substrate necessary to perceive the Ebbinghaus illusion in a human-like fashion. Such a substrate may have been only recently evolved in the primate lineage. Here, we show that this illusion is perceived by 4-day-old domestic chicks. During rearing, chicks learnt, according to an observational-learning paradigm, to find food in proximity either of a big or of a small circle. Subjects were then tested with Ebbinghaus stimuli: two identical circles, one surrounded by larger and the other by smaller inducers. The percentage of approaches to the perceptually bigger target in animals reinforced on the bigger circle (and vice versa for the other group) was computed. Over four experiments, we demonstrated that chicks are reliably affected by the illusory display. Subjects reinforced on the small target choose the configuration with big inducers, in which the central target appears perceptually smaller; the opposite is true for subjects reinforced on the big target. This result has important implications for the evolutionary history of the neural substrate involved in the perception of the Ebbinghaus illusion.