Sometimes memory misleads: Variants of the error-speed effect strengthen the evidence for systematically misleading memory signals in recognition memory.

The error-speed effect describes the observation that the speed of recognition errors in a first binary recognition task predicts the response accuracy in a subsequent two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task that comprises the erroneously judged items of the first task. So far, the effect has been primarily explained by the assumption that some error responses result from misleading memory evidence. However, it is also possible that the effect arises because participants remember and use their response times from the binary task to solve the 2AFC task. Furthermore, the phenomenon is quite new and its robustness or generalizability across other recognition tasks (e.g., a confidence-rating task) remains to be demonstrated. The aim of the present study is to address these limitations by introducing a new variant of the error-speed effect, replacing the 2AFC task with a confidence-rating task (Experiment 1), and by reversing task order (Experiment 2) to test whether participants employ a response-time strategy. In both experiments, we collected data using a sequential probability ratio t-test procedure and found evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the speed of binary recognition errors predicts confidence ratings for the same stimulus. These results attest to the robustness and generalizability of the error-speed effect and reveal that at least some errors must be due to systematically misleading memory evidence.

Do moments of inattention during study cause the error-speed effect for targets in recognition-memory tasks?

The error-speed effect - characterized by a decreased performance in a second recognition task for stimuli that elicited fast error responses in a first recognition task - has so far been predominantly interpreted as evidence for the existence of misleading memory information. However, this neglects a possible alternative explanation, namely that the effect may instead be caused by moments of inattention during study. Here, we introduce a manipulation that allowed us to distinguish between words from the study phase that participants most certainly paid attention to and those they did not. We hypothesized that if moments of inattention cause the error-speed effect, this effect should disappear when considering only targets that verifiably received attention during study. However, our results (N = 89) suggest that this is not the case: The error-speed effect still occurs for targets that participants attended to during study and thus indeed seems to be caused by misleading memory evidence rather than by moments of inattention during study.

Does speed of recognition predict two-alternative forced-choice performance? Replicating and extending Starns, Dubé, and Frelinger (2018).

Does the speed of single-item recognition errors predict performance in subsequent two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) trials that include an item with a previous error response? Starns, Dubé, and Frelinger found effects of this kind in two experiments and accounted for them in terms of continuous memory-strength signal guiding recognition decisions. However, the effects of error speed might just as well only reflect an artefact due to an error-correction strategy that uses response latency as a heuristic cue to guide 2AFC responses, elicited through confounding factors in their experimental design such as error-correction instructions and feedback. Using two conditions, a replication condition, replicating the procedure from Starns et al., and an extension condition (each n = 130), controlling for the named shortcomings, we replicated the error speed effect. In both conditions, speed of errors in a single-item recognition task was predictive of subsequent 2AFC performance, including the respective error item. To be more precise, fast errors were associated with decreased 2AFC performance. As there was no interaction with the factor condition, the results support the idea that speed of single-item recognition responses reflects the amount of memory information underlying the respective response rather than being used for a simple error-correction strategy to improve 2AFC performance.

Being In Front Is Good-But Where Is In Front? Preferences for Spatial Referencing Affect Evaluation.

Speakers of English frequently associate location in space with valence, as in moving up and down the "social ladder." If such an association also holds for the sagittal axis, an object "in front of" another object would be evaluated more positively than the one "behind." Yet how people conceptualize relative locations depends on which frame of reference (FoR) they adopt-and hence on cross-linguistically diverging preferences. What is conceptualized as "in front" in one variant of the relative FoR (e.g., translation) is "behind" under another variant (reflection), and vice versa. Do such diverging conceptualizations of an object's location also lead to diverging evaluations? In two studies employing an implicit association test, we demonstrate, first, that speakers of German, Chinese, and Japanese indeed evaluate the object "in front of" another object more positively than the one "behind." Second, and crucially, the reversal of which object is conceptualized as "in front" involves a corresponding reversal of valence, suggesting an impact of linguistically imparted FoR preferences on evaluative processes.

Variability in the Alignment of Number and Space Across Languages and Tasks.

While the domains of space and number appear to be linked in human brains and minds, their conceptualization still differs across languages and cultures. For instance, frames of reference for spatial descriptions vary according to task, context, and cultural background, and the features of the mental number line depend on formal education and writing direction. To shed more light on the influence of culture/language and task on such conceptualizations, we conducted a large-scale survey with speakers of five languages that differ in writing systems, preferences for spatial and temporal representations, and/or composition of number words. Here, we report data obtained from tasks on ordered arrangements, including numbers, letters, and written text. Comparing these data across tasks, domains, and languages indicates that, even within a single domain, representations may differ depending on task characteristics, and that the degree of cross-domain alignment varies with domains and culture.

The joint flanker effect and the joint Simon effect: On the comparability of processes underlying joint compatibility effects.

Previous studies observed compatibility effects in different interference paradigms such as the Simon and flanker task even when the task was distributed across two co-actors. In both Simon and flanker tasks, performance is improved in compatible trials relative to incompatible trials if one actor works on the task alone as well as if two co-actors share the task. These findings have been taken to indicate that actors automatically co-represent their co-actor's task. However, recent research on the joint Simon and joint flanker effect suggests alternative non-social interpretations. To which degree both joint effects are driven by the same underlying processes is the question of the present study, and it was scrutinized by manipulating the visibility of the co-actor. While the joint Simon effect was not affected by the visibility of the co-actor, the joint flanker effect was reduced when participants did not see their co-actors but knew where the co-actors were seated. These findings provide further evidence for a spatial interpretation of the joint Simon effect. In contrast to recent claims, however, we propose a new explanation of the joint flanker effect that attributes the effect to an impairment in the focusing of spatial attention contingent on the visibility of the co-actor.

Temporal frames of reference in three Germanic languages: Individual consistency, interindividual consensus, and cross-linguistic variability.

A task like "moving a meeting forward" reveals the ambiguity inherent in temporal references. That speakers of U.S. English do not agree on how to solve it is well established: Roughly one half moves the meeting futurewards, the other half pastwards. But the extent to which individual speakers, rather than groups of speakers, consider such phrases as ambiguous has not been scrutinized. Does the split in readings result from a lack of intraindividual consistency or from a lack of interindividual consensus? And how specific is U.S. English in this regard when compared to other closely related Germanic languages? Based on a taxonomy of spatiotemporal frames of reference (FoRs), we conducted two experiments with speakers of Swedish, U.S. English, and German to assess individual preferences for temporal FoRs, intra- and cross-linguistic variability, consistency and long-term stability of these preferences, and possible effects of priming a spatial FoR. The data reveal cross-linguistic differences, both in terms of which temporal FoRs speakers prefer (the absolute FoR in Sweden, the intrinsic FoR in German, and both of these in the US) and in terms of the extent to which these preferences are shared and stable (high consensus and consistency in Sweden and Germany, and low consensus and partial consistency in the US). Overall, no effect of spatial priming was observed; only speakers of U.S. English with a baseline preference for the absolute temporal FoR seemed to be susceptible to spatial priming. Thus, the assumption that temporal references are affected by spatial references is only weakly supported.

Keys and seats: Spatial response coding underlying the joint spatial compatibility effect.

Spatial compatibility effects (SCEs) are typically observed when participants have to execute spatially defined responses to nonspatial stimulus features (e.g., the color red or green) that randomly appear to the left and the right. Whereas a spatial correspondence of stimulus and response features facilitates response execution, a noncorrespondence impairs task performance. Interestingly, the SCE is drastically reduced when a single participant responds to one stimulus feature (e.g., green) by operating only one response key (individual go/no-go task), whereas a full-blown SCE is observed when the task is distributed between two participants (joint go/no-go task). This joint SCE (a.k.a. the social Simon effect) has previously been explained by action/task co-representation, whereas alternative accounts ascribe joint SCEs to spatial components inherent in joint go/no-go tasks that allow participants to code their responses spatially. Although increasing evidence supports the idea that spatial rather than social aspects are responsible for joint SCEs emerging, it is still unclear to which component(s) the spatial coding refers to: the spatial orientation of response keys, the spatial orientation of responding agents, or both. By varying the spatial orientation of the responding agents (Exp. 1) and of the response keys (Exp. 2), independent of the spatial orientation of the stimuli, in the present study we found joint SCEs only when both the seating and the response key alignment matched the stimulus alignment. These results provide evidence that spatial response coding refers not only to the response key arrangement, but also to the-often neglected-spatial orientation of the responding agents.

Moving Forward in Space and Time: How Strong is the Conceptual Link between Spatial and Temporal Frames of Reference?

People often use spatial vocabulary to describe temporal relations, and this increasingly has motivated attempts to map spatial frames of reference (FoRs) onto time. Recent research suggested that speech communities, which differ in how they conceptualize space, may also differ in how they conceptualize time and, more specifically, that the preferences for spatial FoRs should carry over to the domain of time. Here, we scrutinize this assumption (a) by reviewing data from recent studies on temporal references, (b) by comparing data we had collected in previous studies on preferences for spatial and temporal FoRs in four languages, (c) by analyzing new data from dynamic spatial tasks that resemble the temporal tasks more closely, and (d) by assessing the co-variation of individual preferences of English speakers across space and time. While the first set of data paints a mixed picture, the latter three do not support the assumption of a close link between referencing preferences across domains. We explore possible reasons for this lack of consistency and discuss implications for research on temporal references.

Anger elicitation in tonga and Germany: the impact of culture on cognitive determinants of emotions.

The cognitive appraisal of an event is crucial for the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and causal attributions are an integral part of this process. In an interdisciplinary project comparing Tonga and Germany, we examined how cultural differences in attribution tendencies affect emotion assessment and elicitation. Data on appraising causality and responsibility and on emotional responses were collected through questionnaires based on experimentally designed vignettes, and were related to culture-specific values, norms, and the prevailing self-concept. The experimental data support our hypothesis that - driven by culturally defined self-concepts and corresponding attribution tendencies - members of the two cultures cognitively appraise events in diverging manners and consequently differ in their emotional responses. Ascription of responsibility to self and/or circumstances, in line with a more interdependent self-concept, co-varies with higher ratings of shame, guilt, and sadness, whereas ascription of responsibility to others, in line with a less interdependent self-concept, co-varies with higher ratings of anger. These findings support the universal contingency hypothesis and help to explain cultural differences in this domain on a fine-grained level.