Modelling serial position curves with temporal distinctiveness.

We offer a critique of the temporal distinctiveness model of serial position effects (Nairne, Neath, Serra, & Byun, 1997). The temporal distinctiveness model combines a precise definition of stimulus distinctiveness with a memory perturbation process. The critique is empirically motivated-we show that with a more complete analysis, the temporal distinctiveness model does not adequately account for Nairne et al.'s experimental data. To better account for the data, we independently modified two components of Nairne et al.'s model: the mathematical form of the definition of temporal distinctiveness and the mathematical form of the mapping from distinctiveness to free-recall probabilities. Both of these modifications provided for better fits. Yet both Nairne et al.'s definition and our modified definition are fairly arbitrary. We show that a significant challenge to this approach is to find theoretically motivated constraints of the temporal distinctiveness model while providing for adequate fits to data.

Absolute identification with simple and complex stimuli.

It is well known that people can perfectly identify only a handful of distinct unidimensional stimuli, such as line lengths, but can identify thousands of complex stimuli, such as letters and words. This result is consistent with capacity limits in identifying unidimensional stimuli but not complex stimuli. The experiments reported here tested this theoretical dissociation using Luce's (1963) Similarity Choice Model to measure the psychological distance between stimuli in line-length-identification and letter-identification tasks. The psychological distance between line-length stimuli decreased with the number of to-be-identified stimuli; this result is concordant with capacity limits in unidimensional absolute identification. Surprisingly, the opposite result held in letter identification. Psychological distance between letters increased with an increased number of to-be-identified stimuli. This result indicates an opposite type of processing deficit: People process letters more efficiently with more choices.

Bias in conceptual priming.

In recent years, Ratcliff, McKoon, and colleagues have argued that priming in perceptual implicit memory tests is the result of biases in information processing. Three experiments are presented that extend this framework to the conceptual implicit memory domain. Participants studied a list of words before receiving a set of general knowledge questions. For some questions, participants studied the correct answer; for others, they studied a similar but incorrect answer. Although study of a correct answer facilitated performance, study of the similar alternative hurt performance. Costs and benefits of previous study were observed in both production and forced-choice tasks. However, there was no benefit of previous study when participants studied both the correct answer and the similar but incorrect alternative. The pattern of results indicates that participants were biased to respond with previously studied words on the conceptual implicit memory test. This pattern is concordant with the biased information-processing approach to priming.

A diffusion model account of masking in two-choice letter identification.

The diffusion model developed by R. Ratcliff (1978, 1981, 1985, 1988) for 2-choice decisions was applied to data from 2 letter identification experiments. In the experiments, stimulus letters were displayed and then masked, and the stimulus onset asynchrony between letter and mask was manipulated to vary accuracy from near chance to near ceiling. A standard reaction time procedure was used in one experiment and a deadline procedure in the other. Two hypotheses about the effect of masking on the information provided to the decision process were contrasted: (a) The output of perception to the decision process varies with time, so that the information used by the decision process rises and falls, reflecting the stimulus onset and mask onset. (b) The output of perception to the decision is constant over time, reflecting information integrated over the time between the stimulus and mask onsets. The data were well fit by the diffusion model only with the assumption of constant information over time.

Assessing the roles of change discrimination and luminance integration: evidence for a hybrid race model of perceptual decision making in luminance discrimination.

Many models of perceptual processing assume that participants integrate stimulus evidence over time, for example, random walk models. This class of models is tested in a luminance discrimination paradigm in which the onsets of the stimuli are either instantaneous (stepped) or slowly ramped. The ramped portion of ramped stimuli occurs prior to the stepped stimuli onsets. Consequently, there is more luminance energy in ramped stimuli. Therefore, if participants integrate luminance energy, they should perform better to ramped stimuli. This did not occur in 4 experiments. Participants performed better to stepped stimuli than ramped stimuli in earlier foreperiods and the reverse in later foreperiods. A new model is proposed in which participants monitor both integrated luminance energy and quick temporal changes in luminance, but they do so in a serial fashion. First, participants monitor temporal changes in luminance; later, they monitor integrated luminance energy.

A neural network model of implicit memory for object recognition.

People name well-known objects shown in pictures more quickly if they have studied them previously. The most common interpretation of this priming effect is that processing is facilitated by an implicit memory trace in a perceptual representation system. We show that object priming can be explained instead as a bias in information processing, without recourse to an implicit memory system. Assumptions about psychological decision-making processes and bias were added to a neural network model for object identification, and the model accounted for performance both qualitatively and quantitatively in four object identification experiments.

A structural account of global and local processing.

The order of processing, whether global forms are processed prior to local forms or vice versa, has been of considerable interest. Many current theories hold that the more perceptually conspicuous form is identified first. An alternative view is presented here in which the stuctural relations among elements are an important factor in explaining the relative speeds of global and local processing. We equated the conspicuity of the global and local forms in three experiments and still found advantages in the processing of global forms. Subjects were able to process the relations among the elements quickly, even before the elements themselves were identified. According to our alternative view, subjects created equivalence classes of similar and proximate local elements before identifying the constituent elements. The experiments required subjects to decide whether two displays were the same or different, and consequently, the results are relevant to work in higher-level cognition that stresses the importance of comparison processes (e.g., analogy and conceptual combination). We conclude by evaluating related work in higher-level cognition in light of our findings.

A multinomial modeling analysis of the mnemonic benefits of bizarre imagery.

A series of experiments was conducted to explore the cognitive processes that mediate the bizarreness effect, that is, the finding that bizarre or unusual imagery is recalled better than common imagery. In all experiments, subjects were presented with noun pairs that were embedded within bizarre or common sentences in a mixed-list design. None of the experiments produced a bizarreness effect for cued recall; however, for two of the experiments, the bizarre noun pairs were remembered significantly better than the common pairs for free recall. To determine if these differences were due to the storage or retrieval of the items, a multinomial model for the analysis of imagery mediation in paired-associate learning was developed and applied to the data from the experiments. The model revealed that bizarre sentences benefited the retrieval of the noun pairs but not their storage within memory. The empirical and modeling results are discussed relative to previous findings and theories on the bizarreness effect.