Turning a threat into an opportunity: British American Tobacco's weakening of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

BACKGROUND: Previous research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry's views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood. METHODS: Systematic searching and analysis of leaked documents-approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector. FINDINGS: Evidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007-2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol's implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position. CONCLUSIONS: BAT's primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol's ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs' intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments' ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.

Illicit tobacco trade is 'booming': UK newspaper coverage of data funded by transnational tobacco companies.

BACKGROUND: Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have heavily publicised their argument that standardised tobacco packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade. Leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents suggest that the company may have intended to use third parties to promulgate this argument in the UK. METHODS: We examined articles in UK newspapers (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2015) from LexisNexis for presence and nature of tobacco industry data. We also examined documents released by Freedom of Information requests made to Scottish Councils for evidence of how PMI operationalised its third-party strategy. FINDINGS: Two-thirds of newspaper articles (63%, 99/157) mentioned a PMI consultant; 36% of which did not disclose this industry funding. Most articles mentioned counterfeit tobacco, illicit whites or both (72%, 113/157), while few (4%, 7/157) specifically mentioned tobacco industry illicit tobacco and none explained that the latter can include tobacco-company involvement. Freedom of Information documents revealed that the PMI consultant sought to build relationships with Trading Standards officers, conducted undercover test purchases (UTPs) in illicit tobacco 'hotspots' and may have promoted unrepresentative findings in the media. While the data set featured PMI data predominantly, other TTCs also engaged in third-party techniques to promulgate messages on illicit tobacco. INTERPRETATION: PMI engaged a third party, seemingly with the aim of securing media coverage on illicit tobacco positing that standardised packaging would worsen the problem. The predominant focus of articles which featured industry-funded data and information was on counterfeit tobacco despite official data showing tobacco-industry illicit tobacco as the most prevalent. Other jurisdictions considering the policy should anticipate that third parties will promote the illicit-trade argument.

Tobacco industry's elaborate attempts to control a global track and trace system and fundamentally undermine the Illicit Trade Protocol.

BACKGROUND: The Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires a global track and trace (T&T) system to reduce tobacco smuggling. Given the tobacco industry's (TI) historical involvement in tobacco smuggling, it stipulates that T&T 'shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry'. This paper explores the rationale for & nature of the TI's effors to influence the ITP & its T&T system. METHODS: Analysis of leaked TI documents and publicly available data; ,investigation of front groups, trademark and patent ownership. FINDINGS: Growing & diverse sources of evidence indicate that the TI remains involved in tobacco smuggling and that TI cigarettes account for around two-thirds of the illicit cigarette market. The TI therefore has a vested interest in controlling the global T&T system aimed to curtail this behaviour. To this end, Philip Morris International (PMI) adapted its pack marker system, Codentify, to meet T&T requirements, licensed it for free to its three major competitors who then collectively promoted it to governments using front groups and third parties including companies claiming to be independent despite clear TI links. PMI also sought to suggest Codentify was independent by selling some parts of its intellectual property on Codentify while retaining others, leaving a complex web of shared interests. In Africa, British American Tobacco used payments to obtain data suggesting its smaller competitor companies were evading taxes and secure influence with tax authorities. Regulatory capture has been enhanced by a public relations effort involving TI funding for conferences, training, research, and international police and anti-corruption organisations. Collectively this has created public messaging and a powerful network of organisations supportive of the TI's misleading postion on illicit. CONCLUSIONS: Governments should assume the TI seeks to control T&T systems in order to avoid scrutiny and minimise excise tax payments and that any T&T system based on Codentify, on intellectual property currently or previously owned by the TI, or being promoted or implemented by companies with TI links, is incompatible with the ITP and would not serve to reduce illicit trade.

Towards a greater understanding of the illicit tobacco trade in Europe: a review of the PMI funded 'Project Star' report.

BACKGROUND: Following a legal agreement with the European Union (EU), Philip Morris International (PMI) commissions a yearly report ('Project Star', PS) on the European illicit cigarette trade from KPMG, the global accountancy firm. METHODS: Review of PS 2010 report. Comparison with data from independent sources including a 2010 pan-European survey (N=18,056). FINDINGS: Within PS, data covering all 27 EU countries are entered into a model. While the model itself seems appropriate, concerns are identified with the methodologies underlying the data inputs and thus their quality: there is little transparency over methodologies; interview data underestimate legal non-domestic product partly by failing to account for legal cross-border sales; illicit cigarette estimates rely on tobacco industry empty pack surveys which may overestimate illicit; and there is an over-reliance on data supplied by PMI with inadequate external validation. Thus, PMI sales data are validated using PMI smoking prevalence estimates, yet PMI is unable to provide sales (shipment) data for the Greek islands and its prevalence estimates differ grossly from independent data. Consequently, comparisons with independent data suggest PS will tend to overestimate illicit cigarette levels particularly where cross-border shopping is frequent (Austria, Finland, France) and in Western compared with Eastern European countries. The model also provides data on the nature of the illicit cigarette market independent of seizure data suggesting that almost a quarter of the illicit cigarette market in 2010 comprised PMI's own brands compared with just 5% counterfeited PMI brands; a finding hidden in PMI's public representation of the data. CONCLUSIONS: PS overestimates illicit cigarette levels in some European countries and suggests PMI's supply chain control is inadequate. Its publication serves the interests of PMI over those of the EU and its member states. PS requires greater transparency, external scrutiny and use of independent data.

Tobacco explained: The truth about the tobacco industry: in its own words

Thousands of internal tobacco industry documents released through litigation and whistleblowers reveal the most astonishing systematic corporate deceit of all time. What follows is a survey of the documents, 1,200 relevant and revealing quotes grouped under common themes. Chapter 1 Smoking and health Publicly the industry denied and continues to deny that it is clear that smoking causes lung cancer - yet it has understood the carcinogenic nature of its product since the 1950s. It is now clear that the industry's stance on smoking and health is determined by lawyers and public relations concerns. Chapter 2 Nicotine and addiction Until recently the industry has denied its product is addictive. Most recently it has used a definition of addictiveness so broad that it encompasses shopping and the Internet. Internally, it has known since the 1960s that the crucial selling point of its product is the chemical dependence of its customers. Without nicotine addiction there would be no tobacco industry. Nicotine addiction destroys the industry's PR and legal stance that smoking is a matter of choice. Chapter 3 Marketing to children The companies deny that they target the young. The documents reveal the obvious - that the market of young smokers is of central importance to the industry. Many documents reveal the companies' pre-occupation with teenagers and younger children - and the lengths they have gone to in order to influence smoking behaviour in this age group. Chapter 4 Advertising The industry maintains that advertising is used only to fight for brand share and that it does not increase total consumption - academic research shows otherwise. The documents show that advertising is crucial in nurturing the motivation to smoke by creating or projecting the positive values, such as independence, machismo, glamour or intelligence, erroneously associated with the product. Chapter 5 Cigarette design The documents show that the companies initially hoped to make safer cigarettes, but then abandoned the enterprise when it recognised that this would expose their existing products as 'unsafe'. The industry has deliberately promoted 'low-tar' cigarettes knowing that they would offer false reassurance without health benefits. It has manipulated nicotine and introduced additives to change the delivery of nicotine. It recognises the cigarette as a drug delivery device. Chapter 6 Second-hand smoke The industry is challenged by second-hand smoke in two ways. First, measures to protect non-smokers will reduce the opportunities to smoke and contribute to its social unacceptability. Second, the 'freedom to smoke' arguments are confounded if non-smokers are harmed. The industry has refused to accept the now overwhelming consensus regarding the harm caused by second-hand smoke - instead it has denied and obfuscated, and sought to influence debate by buying up scientists on a spectacular scale. Chapter 7 "Emerging markets" Faced with reducing levels of smoking in the West and an insatiable need for money, the companies have moved aggressively into developing countries and Eastern Europe. The documents reveal an arrogance and fanaticism that has imperialist echoes values, such as independence, machismo, glamour or intelligence, erroneously associated with the product. Chapter 5 Cigarette design The documents show that the companies initially hoped to make safer cigarettes, but then abandoned the enterprise when it recognised that this would expose their existing products as 'unsafe'. The industry has deliberately promoted 'low-tar' cigarettes knowing that they would offer false reassurance without health benefits. It has manipulated nicotine and introduced additives to change the delivery of nicotine. It recognises the cigarette as a drug delivery device. Chapter 6 Second-hand smoke The industry is challenged by second-hand smoke in two ways. First, measures to protect non-smokers will reduce the opportunities to smoke and contribute to its social unacceptability. Second, the 'freedom to smoke' arguments are confounded if non-smokers are harmed. The industry has refused to accept the now overwhelming consensus regarding the harm caused by second-hand smoke - instead it has denied and obfuscated, and sought to influence debate by buying up scientists on a spectacular scale. Chapter 7 "Emerging markets" Faced with reducing levels of smoking in the West and an insatiable need for money, the companies have moved aggressively into developing countries and Eastern Europe. The documents reveal an arrogance and fanaticism that has imperialist echoes.(AU)