The puzzle of wrongless injustice: Reflections on Kürthy and Sousa.

The Database of Exemplars (DOE) account of moral cognition emerged in part to explain how wrongless harms could arise (Royzman & Borislow, 2022; henceforth, RB) in spite of being denied by most traditional models (Schein & Gray, 2018; Turiel, 1983; Shweder, 1997; Haidt, 2012). Herein, we defend this account against a set of results that have been claimed to disprove it (Kurthy & Sousa, this issue; henceforth, KS). We argue that DOE is in line with all the findings KS perceive as uniquely supportive of their own account (appraising an act as unjust engenders a judgment of wrong) while RB's findings (Royzman & Borislow, 2022, Studies 2 and 3) do challenge KS under varied conceptions of what it would take for an agent to be or appear unjust in his or her treatment of others, affirming that wrongless injustice is an empirical fact that one must strive to explain and that DOE helps us explain.

Disciplining the disciplined: Making sense of the gender gap that lies at the core of puritanical morals.

Because suppression of sex has been and is at the core of puritanical morals, a proper account thereof would need to explain why suppression of sex has been largely directed towards the human female. Not only do the authors not account for this pattern, but their general model would seem to predict the reverse - that is, greater suppression/control of the male libido.

The puzzle of wrongless harms: Some potential concerns for dyadic morality and related accounts.

There is wide-ranging consensus that harm or perceptions of harm play a significant role in judgments of moral wrongdoing. On one prominent view, the pattern that makes up the "essence" (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012) of acts of moral wrongdoing is "harm caused by an agent" (Schein, Goranson, & Gray, 2015, p. 983). According to Gray, Schein, and colleagues, events matching this pattern-a thinking/intentional agent inflicting some manner of harm (i.e., emotional/physical pain) upon a suffering patient-will be perceived as immoral. With this proposal in mind, we argue two basic points: (1) the current specification of the dyadic template would need to be further refined or "fortified" to withstand some obvious counter-examples; (2) this "fortified" formulation is still unfit to address the underlying concern: for any general pattern that is supposed to link perceptions of harm and wrongdoing, there are a number of cases (the "wrongless harms" of the title) that match the pattern quite well but are not viewed as immoral. We show this in four studies and one supplementary study. In our original study, we find, across six vignettes, that people may judge a behavior to be intended, self-serving, as well as foreseeably harmful and yet not judge it immoral. In our subsequent studies, we replicate these results with further checks and controls. With these findings in mind, we argue that moral cognition is far too complex and capricious to be reduced to a template.

Is Opposition to Genetically Modified Food "Morally Absolutist"? A Consequence-Based Perspective.

Genetically modified foods (GMFs) have met with strong opposition for most of their existence. According to one account-the consequence-based perspective (CP)-lay people oppose GMFs because they deem them unsafe as well as of dubious value. The CP is backed by the data and offers a clear solution for easing GMF opposition. However, several scholars have claimed that the CP is faulty, that lay opposition derives from largely nonrational factors and is consequence blind. One recent statement of this, the moral-absolutism perspective (MAP), contends that GMFs' opponents are principled "moral absolutists" who think that GMFs should be banned no matter their value or risk. Herein we critically weigh key arguments for this proposal. We also present five new studies that probed the clearest data that seem to favor the MAP-opponents affirming the statement that GMFs should be "prohibited," no matter their value or risk. These studies jointly show that (a) most presumed absolutists do not understand the key question and/or (b) cannot validly answer it. We show that taking due steps in clarifying the question and screening for those participants who cannot validly answer it cuts down absolutism to near zero. Finally, we demonstrate that helping GMFs' opponents imagine a world wherein GMFs are safe and constructive makes the majority willing to welcome GMFs in this context.

Are thoughtful people more utilitarian? CRT as a unique predictor of moral minimalism in the dilemmatic context.

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis-the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis-high CRT performers' tendency to regard utility-optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the "minimalist" orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.

CAD or MAD? Anger (not disgust) as the predominant response to pathogen-free violations of the divinity code.

The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgust-divinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals' projected response to "pure" (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation-the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity-pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one's own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge's own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.

When sentimental rules collide: "norms with feelings" in the dilemmatic context.

According to a recently prominent account of moral judgment, genuine moral disapprobation is a product of two convergent vectors of normative influence: a strong negative affect that arises from the mere consideration of a given piece of human conduct and a (socially acquired) belief that this conduct is wrong (Nichols, 2002). The existing evidence in favor of this "norms with feelings" proposal is rather mixed, with no obvious route to an empirical resolution. To help shed further light on the situation, we test a previously unexamined prediction that this account logically yields in a novel dilemmatic context: when individuals are faced with a moral dilemma that pits two or more "affectively-charged" moral norms against each other, the norm underwritten by the strongest feeling ought to determine the content of dilemmatic resolution. Across three studies, we find evidence that directly challenges this prediction, offering support for a Kolhberg-style "rationalist" alternative instead. More specifically, we find that it is not the participants' degree of norm-congruent emotion (whether situationally or dispositionally assessed) or its correlates, but rather their appraisal of the relative costs associated with various alternative courses of action that appears to be most predictive of how they resolve the experimentally induced moral conflict. We conclude by situating our studies within an overarching typology of moral encounters, which, we believe, can help guide future research as well as shed light on some current controversies within this literature.

Unsentimental ethics: towards a content-specific account of the moral-conventional distinction.

In this paper, we offer an overview and a critique of the existing theories of the moral-conventional distinction, with emphasis on Nichols's [Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. Cognition, 84, 221-236] neo-sentimentalist approach. After discussing some distinctive features of Nichols's (2002) thesis and situating it within the context of his predecessors' work [Blair, R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the psychopath. Cognition, 57, 1-29; Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press], we review a number of arguments and findings within the developmental literature that, collectively, pose a serious challenge to the proposition that emotion is indispensable for or plays a substantial contributory role in the construction of the moral domain. Furthermore, we report two studies whose results contravene those of Nichols's (2002) Experiments 1 and 2 (the empirical basis for his "norms with feelings" hypothesis), while favoring a version of Turiel's (1983) harm-based approach instead.

Limits of symhedonia: the differential role of prior emotional attachment in sympathy and sympathetic joy.

Seven studies tested the hypothesis that compared with sympathy symhedonia (sympathy for another's good fortune) is inherently more contingent on prior emotional attachment to its targets. As predicted, Studies 1-4 found that reported attachment was higher for past episodes of symhedonia than for those of sympathy and that recalled incidence of sympathy exceeded that of symhedonia when the target was a stranger. Study 5 showed that whereas symhedonia was significantly higher for high- versus low-attachment targets sympathy was not. Study 6 found that sympathy is more likely than symhedonia when a relationship is strained. Study 7 found that both sympathy and symhedonia are weaker for nonclose (vs. close) others, but the disparity is significantly smaller for sympathy than for symhedonia.