Diminished State Space Theory of Human Aging.

Many new technologies, such as smartphones, computers, or public-access systems (like ticket-vending machines), are a challenge for older adults. One feature that these technologies have in common is that they involve underlying, partially observable, structures (state spaces) that determine the actions that are necessary to reach a certain goal (e.g., to move from one menu to another, to change a function, or to activate a new service). In this work we provide a theoretical, neurocomputational account to explain these behavioral difficulties in older adults. Based on recent findings from age-comparative computational- and cognitive-neuroscience studies, we propose that age-related impairments in complex goal-directed behavior result from an underlying deficit in the representation of state spaces of cognitive tasks. Furthermore, we suggest that these age-related deficits in adaptive decision-making are due to impoverished neural representations in the orbitofrontal cortex and hippocampus.

Neural evidence for age-related deficits in the representation of state spaces.

Under high cognitive demands, older adults tend to resort to simpler, habitual, or model-free decision strategies. This age-related shift in decision behavior has been attributed to deficits in the representation of the cognitive maps, or state spaces, necessary for more complex model-based decision-making. Yet, the neural mechanisms behind this shift remain unclear. In this study, we used a modified 2-stage Markov task in combination with computational modeling and single-trial EEG analyses to establish neural markers of age-related changes in goal-directed decision-making under different demands on the representation of state spaces. Our results reveal that the shift to simpler decision strategies in older adults is due to (i) impairments in the representation of the transition structure of the task and (ii) a diminished signaling of the reward value associated with decision options. In line with the diminished state space hypothesis of human aging, our findings suggest that deficits in goal-directed, model-based behavior in older adults result from impairments in the representation of state spaces of cognitive tasks.

Resource-rational approach to meta-control problems across the lifespan.

Over the last decade, research on cognitive control and decision-making has revealed that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in or refraining from control and that whether and how they engage in these cost-benefit analyses may change across development and during healthy aging. In the present article, we examine how lifespan age differences in cognitive abilities affect the meta-control of behavioral strategies across the lifespan and how motivation affects these trade-offs. Based on accumulated evidence, we highlight two hypotheses that may explain the existing results better than current models. In contrast to previous theoretical accounts, we assume that age differences in the engagement in cost-benefit trade-offs reflect a resource-rational adaptation to internal and external constraints that arise across the lifespan. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Development and Aging Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.

Concurrent Validity of the Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT): Socio-cognitive and Verbal Skills in 18-Month-Old Infants.

The Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT) is a screening questionnaire for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Previous findings have confirmed the M-CHAT's sensitivity and specificity across several cultures, yet few studies have considered M-CHAT scores as a distributed trait in a sample of typical infants. The current study examined how the M-CHAT predicts concurrent word learning (experiment 1) as well as socio-emotional understanding (experiment 2) in 18-month-old infants. Results demonstrated that the number of items endorsed on the M-CHAT negatively correlated with the proportion of trials on which infants looked at a toy named by the experimenter as well as performance on the word learning task. In experiment 2, high scores on the M-CHAT correlated with less instrumental helping, less imitation, and a smaller productive vocabulary size.

The eyes know it: Toddlers' visual scanning of sad faces is predicted by their theory of mind skills.

The current research explored toddlers' gaze fixation during a scene showing a person expressing sadness after a ball is stolen from her. The relation between the duration of gaze fixation on different parts of the person's sad face (e.g., eyes, mouth) and theory of mind skills was examined. Eye tracking data indicated that before the actor experienced the negative event, toddlers divided their fixation equally between the actor's happy face and other distracting objects, but looked longer at the face after the ball was stolen and she expressed sadness. The strongest predictor of increased focus on the sad face versus other elements of the scene was toddlers' ability to predict others' emotional reactions when outcomes fulfilled (happiness) or failed to fulfill (sadness) desires, whereas toddlers' visual perspective-taking skills predicted their more specific focusing on the actor's eyes and, for boys only, mouth. Furthermore, gender differences emerged in toddlers' fixation on parts of the scene. Taken together, these findings suggest that top-down processes are involved in the scanning of emotional facial expressions in toddlers.

The many routes of mental navigation: contrasting the effects of a detailed and gist retrieval approach on using and forming spatial representations.

Navigated routes can be recalled by remembering a schematic layout or with additional sensory and perceptual details, engaging episodic memory processes. In this study, we contrasted the effects of these remembering approaches on retrieving real-world navigated routes, the impact on flexibly using familiar route information and on learning new spatial representations. In a within-subjects design, participants were oriented to recall familiar routes under two remembering conditions-a detail condition that promoted episodic memory processes and a gist condition in which routes were recalled via schematic processes. In each condition, participants performed two subsequent navigation tasks. They first described solutions to navigation problems that involved the recalled familiar route (e.g., navigating around a road block or to a new destination) and then learned and recalled a route within a novel spatial environment. All navigation descriptions were scored for the number of spatial references, entities, and sensory descriptions. We report the following findings. First, when describing the familiar routes, more details were generated in the detail condition, but a higher proportion of these details were spatial references in the gist condition. Route descriptions in the gist condition also relied more on egocentric spatial representations than in the detail condition. Next, when solving navigation problems in the familiar environment, solution routes were described with more details in the detail condition and deviated less from the familiar route than in the gist condition. Finally, the detail condition led to the preferential encoding of entity and sensory descriptive details of new spatial representations. These findings suggest that activating episodic processes at retrieval has distinct effects on how familiar information can be flexibly used and how new spatial representations are formed.