Five-year-olds' sensitivity to knowledge discrepancies about object identity during online language comprehension.

In everyday communication, children experience situations where their knowledge or perspectives differ from those of their communicative partner. The current study examined this issue in the context of real-time language comprehension, focusing on 5-year-old children's ability to manage knowledge discrepancies about the identity of mutually visible objects. In Experiment 1, we examined 5-year-olds' ability to manage privileged knowledge about an object's identity. Using a referential communication task, we tested children (N = 60) in either a shared knowledge condition, where both the child and the speaker knew the identity of a visually misleading object (e.g., a candle that looks like an apple), or a privileged knowledge condition, where only the child knew the identity of the visually misleading object. Of interest was whether children could suppress private knowledge while processing a phonologically related word (e.g., "Look at the candy"). Results showed that children did not inhibit this knowledge during the early moments of referential interpretation. In Experiment 2 (N = 30), we contrasted the privileged knowledge condition in Experiment 1 with the more traditional scenario used to test common ground use, where the child knows the speaker cannot see certain display objects. Results confirmed a stronger ability to manage discrepancies in the latter case. Together, the findings demonstrate differences in children's ability to manage distinct types of knowledge discrepancies during real-time language comprehension.

Theory of Mind after Pediatric Traumatic Brain Injury: A Scoping Review.

This scoping review aims to synthesize existing literature regarding theory of mind (ToM) outcomes, the neuropathology associated with ToM outcomes, and the relationship between ToM outcomes and social functioning in children and adolescents with traumatic brain injury (TBI). We searched MEDLINE® and PsycINFO databases to identify all literature that examined ToM following pediatric TBI until July 2019. A total of 29 articles met inclusion and exclusion criteria and were included in the results. These articles examined a variety of aspects of ToM, which could be broadly grouped into those focused on cognitive, cognitive-affective, and pragmatic factors. The existing literature suggests that children and adolescents with TBI, compared with their typically developing peers and peers with orthopedic injuries, are more likely to have deficits in ToM. The evidence further shows that the age at which brain injury occurs contributes to ToM disruption. Neuroimaging techniques have offered crucial insights into how TBI may impact ToM performance in children and adolescents. Finally, this review provides evidence that disruption in ToM plays a role in the difficulties in social functioning demonstrated by children and adolescents with TBI. Limitations and gaps in the existing literature warrant future research in this field.

Preschoolers use helpful and harmful interactions to predict social category membership.

A core question in social categorization research focuses on how children organize social categories. We examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds: (a) identify the social category membership of a person based on relational interactions between that person and a known category member; and (b) use these social categories to guide inferences about certain shared properties. Preschoolers (n = 229) were introduced to 2 novel social categories (comprised of diverse individuals), each possessing a distinct property (e.g., dancing vs. singing). During test trials, children witnessed members from each category direct helpful, harmful, or neutral actions toward ambiguous characters. In Experiment 1, when a member of a category exhibited helpful actions toward an ambiguous character, children inferred that the ambiguous character belonged to the same category as the helper. In contrast, when a group member directed harmful actions toward the ambiguous character, children inferred that ambiguous character belonged to the alternate category. In neither case did children extend category properties to the new member. In Experiment 2, category properties were introduced as mutually exclusive social conventions. Here, children used helpful and harmful actions to identify the social category of an ambiguous character and generalize the property. In Experiment 3, when social categories were introduced using only shared physical location and shared activity as a marker of category membership, children did not use helpful or harmful behavior to predict category membership. Together findings indicate that children can identify social category membership based on observed social interactions when meaningful category information is available. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Not speaking the same language: 17-month-olds shift their perception of novel labels following brief exposure to non-native language.

We examined if and when English-learning 17-month-olds would accommodate Japanese forms as labels for novel objects. In Experiment 1, infants (n = 22) who were habituated to Japanese word-object pairs looked longer at switched test pairs than familiar test pairs, suggesting that they had mapped Japanese word forms to objects. In Experiments 2 (n = 44) and 3 (n = 22), infants were presented with a spoken passage prior to habituation to assess whether experience with a different language would shift their perception of Japanese word forms. Here, infants did not demonstrate learning of Japanese word-object pairs. These findings offer insight into the flexibility of the developing perceptual system. That is, when there is no evidence to the contrary, 17-month-olds will accommodate forms that vary from their typical input but will efficiently constrain their perception when cued to the fact that they are not listening to their native language.

The object of my desire: Five-year-olds rapidly reason about a speaker's desire during referential communication.

Two experiments examined whether 5-year-olds draw inferences about desire outcomes that constrain their online interpretation of an utterance. Children were informed of a speaker's positive (Experiment 1) or negative (Experiment 2) desire to receive a specific toy as a gift before hearing a referentially ambiguous statement ("That's my present") spoken with either a happy or sad voice. After hearing the speaker express a positive desire, children (N=24) showed an implicit (i.e., eye gaze) and explicit ability to predict reference to the desired object when the speaker sounded happy, but they showed only implicit consideration of the alternate object when the speaker sounded sad. After hearing the speaker express a negative desire, children (N=24) used only happy prosodic cues to predict the intended referent of the statement. Taken together, the findings indicate that the efficiency with which 5-year-olds integrate desire reasoning with language processing depends on the emotional valence of the speaker's voice but not on the type of desire representations (i.e., positive vs. negative) that children must reason about online.

Words are not enough: how preschoolers' integration of perspective and emotion informs their referential understanding.

When linguistic information alone does not clarify a speaker's intended meaning, skilled communicators can draw on a variety of cues to infer communicative intent. In this paper, we review research examining the developmental emergence of preschoolers' sensitivity to a communicative partner's perspective. We focus particularly on preschoolers' tendency to use cues both within the communicative context (i.e. a speaker's visual access to information) and within the speech signal itself (i.e. emotional prosody) to make on-line inferences about communicative intent. Our review demonstrates that preschoolers' ability to use visual and emotional cues of perspective to guide language interpretation is not uniform across tasks, is sometimes related to theory of mind and executive function skills, and, at certain points of development, is only revealed by implicit measures of language processing.

Authentic Gettier cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman.

Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking 'authentic evidence' Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between 'authentic evidence' and 'apparent evidence'. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.

Thinking about a reader's mind: fostering communicative clarity in the compositions of youth with autism spectrum disorders.

A critical component of effective communication is the ability to consider the knowledge state of one's audience, yet individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have difficulty representing the mental states of others. In the present study, youth with high-functioning ASD were trained to consider their reader's knowledge states in their compositions using a novel computer-based task. After two training trials, participants who received visual feedback from a confederate demonstrated significantly greater communicative clarity on the training measure compared to a control group. The improvements from training transferred to similar and very different tasks, and were maintained approximately 6 weeks post-intervention. These results provide support for the sustained efficacy of a rapid and motivating communication intervention for youth with high-functioning ASD.

Bridging the gap between implicit and explicit understanding: how language development promotes the processing and representation of false belief.

Recent advancements in the field of infant false-belief reasoning have brought into question whether performance on implicit and explicit measures of false belief is driven by the same level of representational understanding. The success of infants on implicit measures has also raised doubt over the role that language development plays in the development of false-belief reasoning. In the current paper, we argue that children's performance on disparate measures cannot be used to infer similarities in understanding across different age groups. Instead, we argue that development must continue to occur between the periods when children can reason implicitly and then explicitly about false belief. We then propose mechanisms by which language associated with false-belief tasks facilitates this transition by assisting with both the processes of elicited response selection and the formation of metarepresentational understanding.

Perception and presupposition in real-time language comprehension: insights from anticipatory processing.

Recent studies have shown that listeners use verbs and other predicate terms to anticipate reference to semantic entities during real-time language comprehension. This process involves evaluating the denoted action against relevant properties of potential referents. The current study explored whether action-relevant properties are readily available to comprehension systems as a result of the embodied nature of linguistic and conceptual representations. In three experiments, eye movements were monitored as listeners followed instructions to move depicted objects on a computer screen. Critical instructions contained the verb return (e.g., Now return the block to area 3), which presupposes the previous displacement of its complement object--a property that is not reflected in perceptible or stable characteristics of objects. Experiment 1 demonstrated that predictions for previously displaced objects are generated upon hearing return, ruling out the possibility that anticipatory effects draw directly on static affordances in perceptual symbols. Experiment 2 used a referential communication task to evaluate how communicative relevance constrains the use of perceptually derived information. Results showed that listeners anticipate previously displaced objects as candidates upon hearing return only when their displacement was known to the speaker. Experiment 3 showed that the outcome of the original act of displacement further modulates referential predictions. The results show that the use of perceptually grounded information in language interpretation is subject to communicative constraints, even when language denotes physical actions performed on concrete objects.