A core component of psychological therapy causes adaptive changes in computational learning mechanisms.

BACKGROUND: Cognitive distancing is an emotion regulation strategy commonly used in psychological treatment of various mental health disorders, but its therapeutic mechanisms are unknown. METHODS: 935 participants completed an online reinforcement learning task involving choices between pairs of symbols with differing reward contingencies. Half (49.1%) of the sample was randomised to a cognitive self-distancing intervention and were trained to regulate or 'take a step back' from their emotional response to feedback throughout. Established computational (Q-learning) models were then fit to individuals' choices to derive reinforcement learning parameters capturing clarity of choice values (inverse temperature) and their sensitivity to positive and negative feedback (learning rates). RESULTS: Cognitive distancing improved task performance, including when participants were later tested on novel combinations of symbols without feedback. Group differences in computational model-derived parameters revealed that cognitive distancing resulted in clearer representations of option values (estimated 0.17 higher inverse temperatures). Simultaneously, distancing caused increased sensitivity to negative feedback (estimated 19% higher loss learning rates). Exploratory analyses suggested this resulted from an evolving shift in strategy by distanced participants: initially, choices were more determined by expected value differences between symbols, but as the task progressed, they became more sensitive to negative feedback, with evidence for a difference strongest by the end of training. CONCLUSIONS: Adaptive effects on the computations that underlie learning from reward and loss may explain the therapeutic benefits of cognitive distancing. Over time and with practice, cognitive distancing may improve symptoms of mental health disorders by promoting more effective engagement with negative information.

Transdiagnostic computations of uncertainty: towards a new lens on intolerance of uncertainty.

People radically differ in how they cope with uncertainty. Clinical researchers describe a dispositional characteristic known as "intolerance of uncertainty", a tendency to find uncertainty aversive, reported to be elevated across psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions. Concurrently, recent research in computational psychiatry has leveraged theoretical work to characterise individual differences in uncertainty processing. Under this framework, differences in how people estimate different forms of uncertainty can contribute to mental health difficulties. In this review, we briefly outline the concept of intolerance of uncertainty within its clinical context, and we argue that the mechanisms underlying this construct may be further elucidated through modelling how individuals make inferences about uncertainty. We will review the evidence linking psychopathology to different computationally specified forms of uncertainty and consider how these findings might suggest distinct mechanistic routes towards intolerance of uncertainty. We also discuss the implications of this computational approach for behavioural and pharmacological interventions, as well as the importance of different cognitive domains and subjective experiences in studying uncertainty processing.

Dopamine promotes instrumental motivation, but reduces reward-related vigour.

We can be motivated when reward depends on performance, or merely by the prospect of a guaranteed reward. Performance-dependent (contingent) reward is instrumental, relying on an internal action-outcome model, whereas motivation by guaranteed reward may minimise opportunity cost in reward-rich environments. Competing theories propose that each type of motivation should be dependent on dopaminergic activity. We contrasted these two types of motivation with a rewarded saccade task, in patients with Parkinson's disease (PD). When PD patients were ON dopamine, they had greater response vigour (peak saccadic velocity residuals) for contingent rewards, whereas when PD patients were OFF medication, they had greater vigour for guaranteed rewards. These results support the view that reward expectation and contingency drive distinct motivational processes, and can be dissociated by manipulating dopaminergic activity. We posit that dopamine promotes goal-directed motivation, but dampens reward-driven vigour, contradictory to the prediction that increased tonic dopamine amplifies reward expectation.