Punishments and the dominance identity in networks.

In this study, we examine the effects of the structure of a network, the dominance identity of the actors, and the actors' ability to reward or punish on the use of punishment and the development of social bonds in a network. As expected, we find that peripheral rather than central actors in a network use punishment more, as do those with a high dominance identity. We also find that persons use punishment to increase or decrease their perceived level of dominance when their dominance identity is not verified. However, the patterns of interaction that develop in the network are an interactive function of network position, actor's dominance identity, and punishment use. We discuss how the social psychological drive to control one's identity interacts with social structural factors in the network to create different cultures of dyadic interaction.

Status and competitive choice.

In this paper, we extend the logic of existing sociological theory on status to explain how status processes can inform selection in competitive choice situations. We argue that in the absence of knowledge about the specific abilities of others and assuming a desire to win, when given the opportunity to "pick their battles," people will draw on overt status differences as a basis for selecting a competitor from a pool of possible competitors. Results from three studies indicate that, as predicted, status differences affect competitor selection, with individuals choosing to compete against those who are relatively lower status based on diffuse characteristics. Moreover, consistent with expectation state theories, results from two studies show that the expectations that people form for their potential competitors based on status differences mediate this relationship. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research.

The fairness identity and the emergence of inequality.

Social exchange theories explain how differences in structural power can generate inequalities in exchange networks. We argue here that even in the absence of structural power differences, inequality can emerge out of the identity process. We posit that when structurally equivalent actors are uncertain about the resource levels available for distribution, different levels of the fairness identity and responses to identity non-verification will influence how they negotiate for resources. Results from an experiment that varies the fairness identity level and the identity verification of actors in two different equal power exchange networks confirm this. Absent structural power differences, the level of the fairness identity, identity non-verification, and structure of the network mutually influence the distribution of resources such that some dyads earn as much as two and a half times more than others. We discuss our findings as they pertain to unearthing the processes by which group inequalities arise and persist.

Status, Faction Sizes, and Social Influence: Testing the Theoretical Mechanism.

With two experiments the authors test and find support for the argument that in small, collectively oriented task groups, status affects social influence the most when the distribution of opinions reduces the least uncertainty. Moreover, they demonstrate that people use the distribution of both status and opinions to reduce uncertainty about the task on which they are working and that this, in turn, promotes social influence. Experiment 1 illustrates that, regardless of the group's sex composition, basis for status differentiation, or size of the group, uncertainty reduction mediates a significant share of the effect of status and opinions on social influence. Experiment 2 confirms that the effect of the distribution of both status and opinions on social influence is weaker as the task becomes more certain. These findings inform discussion about how status affects certainty in task groups and what this potentially means for organizational settings and sociological theory more generally.

Predicting social influence with faction sizes and relative status.

Building on a recent theoretical development in the field of sociological social psychology, we develop a formal mathematical model of social influence processes. The extant theoretical literature implies that factions and status should have non-linear effects on social influence, and yet these theories have been evaluated using standard linear statistical models. Our formal model of influence includes these non-linearities, as specified by the theories. We evaluate the fit of the formal model using experimental data. Our results indicate that a one-parameter mathematical model fits the experimental data. We conclude with the implications of our research and a discussion of how it may be used as an impetus for further work on social influence processes.