A Comparison of Two Neurobiological Models of Fear and Anxiety: A "Construct Validity" Application?

The main focus of this article is on an application of "construct validity," although it is better thought of as a construct-progressivity assessment (CPA) for reasons developed in the article and related to the concepts of "truth" and "validity" in science. The specific example presented involves the recent LeDoux and Pine two-system model (TSM) and the more traditional fear-center model (FCM), two important constructs in even broader debates in recent fear research. The focal point of the TSM-FCM dispute is arguably the contrasting interpretation of four empirical "findings" that are summarized in a section on findings of this article and then explored later in depth as "empirical arguments." This notion of an empirical argument is closely related to Kane's "argument-based" analysis of construct validity. In addition, it is essential to describe and then apply what are called "epistemic values" to the TSM-FCM example. The CPA in the present article ultimately tilts in favor of the TSM and against the FCM, on empirical as well as on more general epistemic-value grounds, with the caveat that any CPA is temporally contingent and may reach a different conclusion later, depending on future instruments and advances.

The First Neuroethics Meeting: Then and Now.

It wasn't until 2002 that more than 150 neuroscientists, bioethicists, doctors of psychiatry and psychology, philosophers, and professors of law and public policy came together to chart the boundaries, define the issues, and raise some of the ethical implications tied to advances in brain research. On the 15 th anniversary of the Neuroethics: Mapping the Field conference in San Francisco, we asked three of the original speakers to reflect on how far the neuroethics field has come in 15 years-and where the field may be going in the next 15.

Rendering clinical psychology an evidence-based scientific discipline: a case study.

RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: Both modern neuroscience and clinical psychology taken as separate fields have failed to reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. The evidence acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology, clinical psychology and psychopathology are deeply insufficient in terms of their validity, reliability and utility. Further, no effective trans-disciplinary connections have been developed between them. ARGUMENT: In this context, our case study aims at illustrating some specific facets of clinical psychology as a crucial discipline for explaining and understanding mental disorder. The methods employed in clinical psychology are scrutinized using the exemplar case of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). We demonstrate that a clinical interview and a clinical psychological rating scale consist of the same kind of cognitive content. The provisional difference can be described in terms of its having two comparable complementary cognitive structures. The test is composed of self-evaluation reports (items) formulated as questions or statements. The psychopathological structured interview is formulated in terms of subjective experience indicated as symptoms (these are self-reports recorded by the physician), complemented with the so-called 'signs' or the presumably 'objective' observations of the overt behaviours of the patient. However, the cognitive content of clinical judgment is beyond any doubt as subjective as the narrative of the patient. None of the components of the structured psychopathological interview is independent of the inter-subjective system created in the situation of clinical assessment. CONCLUSION: Therefore, the protocols from various clinicians that serve to sustain the reliability claim of the 'scientific' Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders cannot be regarded as independent measurements of the cognitive content and value of the psychological rating scales or vice versa.