Critical self-reflection and self-perceived altruism: when self-reward fails.

Social learning theory has produced a three-step model of prosocial development: In the young child, prosocial behavior is elicited by material rewards; in the older child, it is elicited also by social rewards; and in the morally mature adult, it is elicited by self-rewards based on an internalized perception of oneself as a kind, caring, altruistic individual. Self-perception theory has complicated this social learning model by demonstrating that once the third step is reached, the continued presence of material and social rewards may undermine intrinsic prosocial motivation based on self-rewards, producing moral regression. We propose a further complication. Critical self-reflection--the desire to know thyself, warts and all--may introduce a self-deprecating attributional bias that can undermine self-perceived altruism, even following helping for which one receives only intrinsic self-rewards. Two experiments are reported in which we manipulated critical self-reflection on one's reasons for helping. Results indicated that self-reflection undermined self-perceived altruism, especially when the salience of the self-rewards for helping was high. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that, as predicted, this self-reflection effect was most apparent for individuals who valued self-knowledge more highly than concern for others. Moral consequences of critical self-reflection are discussed.

Distress and empathy: two qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational consequences.

The construct of empathy may be located conceptually at several different points in the network of interpersonal cognition and emotion. We discuss one specific form of emotional empathy--other-focused feelings evoked by perceiving another person in need. First, evidence is reviewed suggesting that there are at least two distinct types of congruent emotional responses to perceiving another in need: feelings of personal distress (e.g., alarmed, upset, worried, disturbed, distressed, troubled, etc.) and feelings of empathy (e.g., sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, softhearted, etc.). Next, evidence is reviewed suggesting that these two emotional responses have different motivational consequences. Personal distress seems to evoke egoistic motivation to reduce one's own aversive arousal, as a traditional Hullian tension-reduction model would propose. Empathy does not. The motivation evoked by empathy may instead be altruistic, for the ultimate goal seems to be reduction of the other's need, not reduction of one's own aversive arousal. Overall, the recent empirical evidence appears to support the more differentiated view of emotion and motivation proposed long ago by McDougall, not the unitary view proposed by Hull and his followers.