A model of dual attitudes.

When an attitude changes from A1 to A2, what happens to A1? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object: an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the explicit attitude and whether this overrides their implicit attitude. A number of literatures consistent with these hypotheses are reviewed, and the implications of the dual-attitude model for attitude theory and measurement are discussed. For example, by including only explicit measures, previous studies may have exaggerated the ease with which people change their attitudes. Even if an explicit attitude changes, an implicit attitude can remain the same.

Cues, frequency, and the disturbing nature of intrusive thoughts: patterns seen in rescue workers after the crash of Flight 427.

Intrusive thoughts have been identified as key elements of chronic or traumatic stress, but many questions remain about how they operate and what causes persistence of disturbing intrusions. The present study considers these questions, examining the impact of having intrusive thoughts that are cued by stimuli in one's environment as opposed to uncued intrusions that seem to "come out of the blue." In addition, this research evaluates the extent to which distress accompanying intrusive thoughts shortly after a traumatic event predicts persistence of intrusions over time. Rescue workers who responded to the crash of Flight 427 were studied 4 to 8 weeks, and 6, 9, and 12 months after the disaster. Participants who reported crash-related thoughts that were not prompted by cues showed higher levels of distress than those reporting only cued thoughts or those reporting neither. The magnitude of distress that these thoughts caused in the first 2 months after the crash was important in predicting subsequent frequency of unwanted thoughts. The presence or absence of cues and their role in the maintenance of distress also is discussed.

Verbal overshadowing of visual memories: some things are better left unsaid.

It is widely believed that verbal processing generally improves memory performance. However, in a series of six experiments, verbalizing the appearance of previously seen visual stimuli impaired subsequent recognition performance. In Experiment 1, subjects viewed a videotape including a salient individual. Later, some subjects described the individual's face. Subjects who verbalized the face performed less well on a subsequent recognition test than control subjects who did not engage in memory verbalization. The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 and further clarified the effect of memory verbalization by demonstrating that visualization does not impair face recognition. In Experiments 3 and 4 we explored the hypothesis that memory verbalization impairs memory for stimuli that are difficult to put into words. In Experiment 3 memory impairment followed the verbalization of a different visual stimulus: color. In Experiment 4 marginal memory improvement followed the verbalization of a verbal stimulus: a brief spoken statement. In Experiments 5 and 6 the source of verbally induced memory impairment was explored. The results of Experiment 5 suggested that the impairment does not reflect a temporary verbal set, but rather indicates relatively long-lasting memory interference. Finally, Experiment 6 demonstrated that limiting subjects' time to make recognition decisions alleviates the impairment, suggesting that memory verbalization overshadows but does not eradicate the original visual memory. This collection of results is consistent with a recording interference hypothesis: verbalizing a visual memory may produce a verbally biased memory representation that can interfere with the application of the original visual memory.