Improved memory for error feedback.

Surprising feedback in a general knowledge test leads to an improvement in memory for both the surface features and the content of the feedback (Psychon Bull Rev 16:88-92, 2009). Based on the idea that in cognitive tasks, error is surprising (the orienting account, Cognition 111:275-279, 2009), we tested whether error feedback would be better remembered than correct feedback. Colored words were presented as feedback signals in a flanker task, where the color indicated the accuracy. Subsequently, these words were again presented during a recognition task (Experiment 1) or a lexical decision task (Experiments 2 and 3). In all experiments, memory was improved for words seen as error feedback. These results are compared to the attentional boost effect (J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 39:1223-12231, 2013) and related to the orienting account for post-error slowing (Cognition 111:275-279, 2009).

No pain, no gain: the affective valence of congruency conditions changes following a successful response.

The cognitive control theory of Botvinick, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356-366 (2007) integrates cognitive and affective control processes by emphasizing the aversive nature of cognitive conflict. Using an affective priming paradigm, we replicate earlier results showing that incongruent trials, relative to congruent trials, are indeed perceived as more aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer, Brain and Cognition, 78(2), 94-98 (2012)). Importantly, however, in two experiments we demonstrate that this effect is reversed following successful responses; correctly responding to incongruent trials engendered relatively more positive affect than correctly responding to congruent trials. The results are discussed in light of a recent computational model by Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5:75 (2011) where it is assumed that outcome expectancies are more negative for incongruent trials than congruent trials. Consequently, the intrinsic reward (prediction error) following successful completion is larger for incongruent than congruent trials. These findings divulge a novel perspective on 'cognitive' adaptations to conflict.

Conscious and unconscious context-specific cognitive control.

A key feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to deal with an ever-changing environment. One prototypical example is the observation that we adjust our information processing depending on the conflict-likelihood of a context (context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC, Crump etal., 2006). Recently, empirical studies started to question the role of consciousness in these strategic adaptation processes (for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde etal., 2012). However, these studies have not yielded unequivocal results (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Heinemann etal., 2009; Van Gaal etal., 2010a; Desender etal., 2013; Reuss etal., 2014). In the present study, we aim at replicating the experiment of Heinemann etal. (2009) in which the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials between different contexts was varied in a masked priming task. Their results showed a reduction of the congruency effect for the context with more incongruent trials. However, this CSPC effect was only observed when the prime-target conflict was conscious, rather than unconscious, suggesting that context-specific control operates within the boundaries of awareness. Our replication attempt however contrasts these findings. In the first experiment we found no evidence for a CSPC effect in reaction times (RTs), neither in the conscious nor in the unconscious condition. The error rate analysis did show a CSPC effect, albeit not one modulated by consciousness. In the second experiment we found an overall CSPC effect in RTs, independent of consciousness. The error rates did not display a CSPC pattern. These mixed results seem to nuance the findings of Heinemann etal. (2009) and highlight the need for replication studies in psychology research.

The role of the striatum in effort-based decision-making in the absence of reward.

Decision-making involves weighing costs against benefits, for instance, in terms of the effort it takes to obtain a reward of a given magnitude. This evaluation process has been linked to the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the striatum, with activation in these brain structures reflecting the discounting effect of effort on reward. Here, we investigate how cognitive effort influences neural choice processes in the absence of an extrinsic reward. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we used an effort-based decision-making task in which participants were required to choose between two options for a subsequent flanker task that differed in the amount of cognitive effort. Cognitive effort was manipulated by varying the proportion of incongruent trials associated with each choice option. Choice-locked activation in the striatum was higher when participants chose voluntarily for the more effortful alternative but displayed the opposite trend on forced-choice trials. The dACC revealed a similar, yet only trend-level significant, activation pattern. Our results imply that activation levels in the striatum reflect a cost-benefit analysis, in which a balance is made between effort discounting and the intrinsic motivation to choose a cognitively challenging task. Moreover, our findings indicate that it matters whether this challenge is voluntarily chosen or externally imposed. As such, the present findings contrast with classical findings on effort discounting that found reductions in striatum activation for higher effort by finding enhancements of the same neural circuits when a cognitively challenging task is voluntarily selected and does not entail the danger of losing reward.

Context-specific control and context selection in conflict tasks.

This study investigated whether participants prefer contexts with relatively little cognitive conflict and whether this preference is related to context-specific control. A conflict selection task was administered in which participants had to choose between two categories that contained different levels of conflict. One category was associated with 80% congruent Stroop trials and 20% incongruent Stroop trials, while the other category was associated with only 20% congruent Stroop trials and 80% incongruent Stroop trials. As predicted, participants selected the low-conflict category more frequently, indicating that participants avoid contexts with high-conflict likelihood. Furthermore, we predicted a correlation between this preference for the low-conflict category and the control implementation associated with the categories (i.e., context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC effect). Results however did not show such a correlation, thereby failing to support a relationship between context control and context selection.

Dopaminergic medication counteracts conflict adaptation in patients with Parkinson's disease.

OBJECTIVE: We tested the role of dopamine in conflict-induced behavioral adjustments by evaluating the effect of dopaminergic medication on conflict adaptation in Parkinson's disease (PD) patients. METHOD: Nine PD patients performed a vocal Stroop task on two separate testing occasions: once on their regular medication and once after overnight withdrawal. RESULTS: In line with previous studies (e.g., Bonnin, Houeto, Gil, & Bouquet, 2010), patients displayed no conflict adaptation when tested on medication. However, the same patients tested off of their medication did display a conflict adaptation effect in that the size of the interference effect was reduced after incongruent trials compared with after congruent trials. CONCLUSIONS: This difference is discussed in terms of an inverted U-shaped relation between dopamine and performance, according to which dopaminergic medication has detrimental effects on PD patients' performance by overdosing brain regions that are relatively spared in the initial stage of the disease, including the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex.

The effect of alcohol and placebo on post-error adjustments.

Several studies have shown detrimental effects of alcohol on post-error adjustments. In contrast to previous studies, which focused on only one aspect of post-error adaptive behavior, we compared the effect of alcohol and placebo on post-error slowing (PES), post-error reduction of interference (PERI) and post-error improvement of accuracy (PIA). Moreover, we used a between-subjects design (N = 45) comparing a control condition to both an alcohol and an alcohol-placebo condition as to disentangle physiological and expectancy effects of alcohol. In a standard Stroop congruency task, we found that intoxicated participants as well as participants with the incorrect belief of being intoxicated showed significant decreased PES compared to a control group. Furthermore, we found evidence for a condition-independent post-error increase of interference and post-error decrease of accuracy. The underlying mechanisms of the post-error adaptation effects are discussed in terms of the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009).

Conflict: run! Reduced Stroop interference with avoidance responses.

Conflict has been hypothesized to be aversive, triggering avoidance behaviour (Botvinick, 2007). To test this hypothesis, a standard Stroop task was modified such that avoiding was part of the response set. More precisely, participants were asked to move a manikin towards or away from Stroop stimuli, depending on the colour of the words. Results showed that the type of response (approach versus avoidance) modulated the Stroop congruency effect. Specifically, the reaction time analysis revealed that the stimulus congruency effect disappeared with avoidance responses, contrary to approach responses where a stimulus congruency effect was present. Moreover, the error data showed a reduction of the general congruency effect when avoiding. These results suggest that in the face of conflict, avoidance is the predominant response.