Emotions before actions: When children see costs as causal.

Adults expect people to be biased by sunk costs, but young children do not. We tested between two accounts for why children overlook the sunk cost bias. On one account, children do not see sunk costs as causal. The other account posits that children see sunk costs as causal, but unlike adults, think future actions cannot make up for sunk costs. These accounts make opposing predictions about whether children should see sunk costs as affecting emotions. Across three experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 320) and adults (total N = 429) saw stories about characters who collected items that were easy or difficult to obtain, and predicted characters' emotions and actions. At all ages, participants anticipated that characters would feel sadder about high-cost objects, but only adults predicted that characters would keep high-cost objects. Our findings show that children see incurred costs as causal, and that costs are integrated children's and adults' theory of emotions. Moreover, the findings suggest that developmental differences in sunk cost reasoning may rest in children's incomplete mental accounting. We also discuss children's reasoning about rational and irrational action.

Local or foreign? Flexibility in children's preference for similar others.

Children have a robust social preference for people similar to them, like those who share their language, accent, and race. In the present research, we show that this preference can diminish when children consider who they want to learn about. Across three experiments, 4- to 6-year-olds (total N = 160; 74 female, 86 male, from the Waterloo region in Canada, a predominantly White and middle-class region) and adults (N = 103) saw pairs of characters. One character was from nearby and had characteristics typical of the participating child's location (e.g., playing soccer), whereas the other character was from far away and had characteristics atypical of children's location (e.g., playing hurling). In Experiment 1, children had no preference when judging who they liked better, but preferred foreign characters when judging who they wanted to learn about. Experiments 2 and 3 followed up by using procedures where participants were not told anything about the characters besides whether they were local or foreign. Children and adults preferred local characters when choosing who they liked, but preferred local characters less when choosing who to learn about. These findings show that children's preferences for similar others are flexible and depend on the judgment they are making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The social network: How people infer relationships from mutual connections.

People infer that individuals are socially related if they have overlapping preferences, beliefs, and choices. Here we examined whether people also infer relationships by attending to social network information. In five preregistered experiments, participants were shown the social networks of two target people and their friends or acquaintances within a group, and judged if the targets were socially related to one another. In the first three experiments, adults (total N = 528) were more likely to judge that individuals were friends when a high rather than low proportion of their friendships were mutual. Adults also considered other factors when inferring friendships, such as the number of friends each individual had. In the final two experiments, 5-7-year-olds (total N = 135) were also sensitive to the proportion of mutual relationships. Together, our work suggests that people use proportional information and statistical inferences when assessing whether individuals are socially related. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Novelty preferences depend on goals.

People are sometimes drawn to novel items, but other times prefer familiar ones. In the present research we show, though, that both children's and adults' preferences for novel versus familiar items depend on their goals. Across four experiments, we showed 4- to 7-year-olds (total N = 498) and adults (total N = 659) pairs of artifacts where one was familiar and the other was novel (e.g., a four-legged chair and ten-legged chair). In Experiment 1, children wanted to have familiar artifacts, but to learn about novel ones. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern using a simpler procedure, and found the same pattern in adults. In Experiment 3, 4- to 6-year-olds and adults more strongly preferred familiar items when choosing which they would rather have than when choosing which they would rather try using. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated adults' preferences to have familiar items and learn about novel ones with an additional set of items. Together these findings show that preferences for novelty depend on people's goals. We suggest these effects arise because children and adults are motivated both by the promise of information and the desire for safe options in high commitment decisions that entail risk.

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices.

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others' irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.

Investigating the Role of Inattention and/or Hyperactivity/impulsivity in Language and Social Functioning Using a Dimensional Approach.

The current study parsed out the distinct components of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptomatology to examine differential relations with language and social ability. Using a research domain criteria (RDoC) framework, we administered standardized tests and previously developed and validated questionnaires to assess levels of inattention and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity symptomatology, language, social responsivity and social competency in 98 young adults. Those with higher inattention and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity symptomatology had reduced language comprehension, social responsivity, and social competency. Inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity both predicted language comprehension, but not language production. Interestingly, inattention uniquely contributed to social responsiveness and social competency, but hyperactivity/impulsivity did not. Findings suggest that inattention and/or hyperactivity/impulsivity symptoms, inattention in particular, may be especially important for social skills programs geared towards individuals with attention limitations.