The role of cultural group selection in explaining human cooperation is a hard case to prove.

We believe cultural group selection is an elegant theoretical framework to study the evolution of complex human behaviours, including large-scale cooperation. However, the empirical evidence on key theoretical issues - such as levels of within- and between-group variation and effects of intergroup competition - is so far patchy, with no clear case where all the relevant assumptions and predictions of cultural group selection are met, to the exclusion of other explanations.

Inter-Group Conflict and Cooperation: Field Experiments Before, During and After Sectarian Riots in Northern Ireland.

The idea that cooperative groups out-compete less cooperative groups has been proposed as a theoretical possibility for the evolution of cooperation through cultural group selection. Previous studies have found an association between increased cooperation and exposure to inter-group violence, but most have not been able to identify the specific target of cooperation and are based on correlational data making it difficult to establish causality. In this study we test the hypothesis that inter-group conflict promotes parochial altruism (i.e., in-group altruism and out-group hostility) by using longitudinal data of a real-world measure of cooperation-charity and school donations-sampled before, during and after violent sectarian riots between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. We find that conflict is associated with reductions in all types of cooperation, with reduced donations to a neutral charity, and both in-group and out-group primary schools. After the conflict, both in-group and out-group donations increased again. In this context we find no evidence that inter-group conflict promotes parochial altruism.

Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland.

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group's success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict-Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.

Sequential sampling of Bemisia tuberculata (Bondar, 1923) (Hemiptera: Aleyrodidae) on cassava crop.

Estimate efficiently of the whitefly population (Bemisia tuberculata Bondar) in cassava, to assist in decision making of pest control is one of the advantages of sequential sampling plans. Therefore, the objective of this study was to determine a sequential sampling plan according to two methods of pest management, using biological and/or chemical control. Samples were obtained in a commercial field of 2.500,00 m2, divided into 100 plots. The visualization method was used for sampling of the upper leaves by counting the number of adults. In total 15 samples were taken weekly from January to April 2012. The spatial distribution model which best fit to the behavior of B. tuberculata adults was the negative binomial distribution. Levels adapted for biological and chemical control were five and twenty adults per plant, respectively. Sampling plans resulted in two decisions for each proposed method. Thus, for population control the upper limit was defined as S1 = 4.2056 + 2.1540n (biological) and S1 = 20.219 + 10.4306n (chemical); and the lower limit where the pest control is not recommended was defined by S0 = -4.2056 + 2.1540n (biological) and S0 = -20.219 + 10.4306n (chemical). Sequential sampling estimated the maximum number of sample units necessary for decision-making of three samples with 1.34 adults for biological control and 3.85 sample units with 7.39 adult pests for chemical control.

Lost letter measure of variation in altruistic behaviour in 20 neighbourhoods.

Altruistic behaviour varies across human populations and this variation is likely to be partly explained by variation in the ecological context of the populations. We hypothesise that area level socio-economic characteristics will determine the levels of altruism found in individuals living in an area and we use a lost letter experiment to measure altruism across 20 neighbourhoods with a wide range of income deprivation scores in London, UK. The results show a strong negative effect of neighbourhood income deprivation on altruistic behaviour, with letters dropped in the poorest neighbourhoods having 91% lower odds of being returned than letters dropped in the wealthiest neighbourhoods. We suggest that measures of altruism are strongly context dependant.