Egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment underlies social inferences about known others varying in similarity and familiarity.

How do people infer the content of another person's mind? One documented strategy-at least when inferring the minds of strangers-entails anchoring on the content of one's own mind and serially adjusting away from this egocentric anchor. Yet, many social inferences concern known others in existing social relationships. In eight experiments with four sets of stimuli, we tested whether an egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism underlies social inferences about known targets, and whether it varies based on the target's similarity and familiarity to oneself. In Experiments 1-7, participants (Ntotal = 4,790) rated themselves and a known target on various characteristics (e.g., preferences, habits, traits), and response times for the target ratings were recorded. An integrative data analysis revealed that, consistent with egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment, the more discrepant the target ratings were from participants' self ratings, the longer participants took to provide target ratings. Importantly, this pattern of anchoring-and-adjustment was stronger for similar (vs. dissimilar) and familiar (vs. unfamiliar) targets, but it emerged in all experimental conditions. Experiment 8 (N = 549) suggested that these results were unlikely to be explained solely by a memory search process. We discuss implications for anchoring-and-adjustment as a mechanism underlying social inferences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Perspective taking reduces intergroup bias in visual representations of faces.

Intergroup biases shape most aspects of person construal, including lower-level visual representations of group members' faces. Specifically, ingroup members' faces tend to be represented more positively than outgroup members' faces. Here, we used a reverse-correlation paradigm to test whether engaging in perspective taking (i.e., actively imagining another person's mental states) can reduce these biased visual representations. In an initial image-generation experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a minimal group and then composed a narrative essay about an ingroup or an outgroup target person, either while adopting the person's perspective or while following control instructions. Afterward, they generated an image of the person's face in a reverse-correlation image-classification task. Subsequent image-assessment experiments using an explicit rating task, a sequential priming task, and an economic trust game with separate samples of participants revealed that ingroup faces elicited more likability and trustworthiness than did outgroup faces. Importantly, this pattern of intergroup bias was consistently weaker in faces created by perspective takers. Additional image-assessment experiments identified the mouth (i.e., smiling cues) as a critical facial region wherein the interactive effects of group membership and perspective taking emerged. These findings provide initial evidence that perspective taking may be an effective strategy for attenuating, though not for eliminating, intergroup biases in visual representations of what group members look like.

The goal-dependence of level-1 and level-2 visual perspective calculation.

Does tracking another agent's visual perspective depend on having a goal-albeit a remote one-to do so? In 5 experiments using indirect measures of visual perspective taking with a cartoon avatar, we examined whether and how adult perceivers' processing goals shape the incidental tracking of what objects the avatar sees (Level-1 perspective taking) and how the avatar sees those objects (Level-2 perspective taking). Process dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate calculation of the avatar's perspective as the process of focal interest, revealed that both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective calculation were consistently weaker when the avatar's perspective was less relevant for participants' own processing goals. This pattern of goal-dependent perspective tracking was also evident in behavioral analyses of interference from the avatar's differing perspective when reporting one's own perspective (i.e., altercentric interference). These results suggest that, although Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective calculation may operate unintentionally, both also appear to depend on perceivers' processing goals. More generally, these findings advance understanding of processes underlying visual perspective taking and the conditional automaticity with which those processes operate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Category salience and racial bias in weapon identification: A diffusion modeling approach.

Stereotypes linking Black Americans with guns can have life-altering outcomes, making it important to identify factors that shape such weapon identification biases and how they do so. We report 6 experiments that provide a mechanistic account of how category salience affects weapon identification bias elicited by male faces varying in race (Black, White) and age (men, boys). Behavioral analyses of error rates and response latencies revealed that, when race was salient, faces of Black versus White males (regardless of age) facilitated the classification of objects as guns versus tools. When a category other than race was salient, racial bias in behavior was reduced, though not eliminated. In Experiments 1-4, racial bias was weaker when participants attended to a social category besides race (i.e., age). In Experiments 5 and 6, racial bias was weaker when participants attended to an applicable, yet nonsubstantive category (i.e., the color of a dot on the face). Across experiments, process analyses using diffusion models revealed that, when race was salient, seeing Black versus White male faces led to an initial bias to favor the "gun" response. When a category besides race (i.e., age, dot color) was salient, racial bias in the relative start point was reduced, though not eliminated. These results suggest that the magnitude of racial bias in weapon identification may differ depending on what social category is salient. The collective findings also highlight the utility of diffusion modeling for elucidating how category salience shapes processes underlying racial biases in behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Are Black Women and Girls Associated With Danger? Implicit Racial Bias at the Intersection of Target Age and Gender.

We investigated whether stereotypes linking Black men and Black boys with violence and criminality generalize to Black women and Black girls. In Experiments 1 and 2, non-Black participants completed sequential-priming tasks wherein they saw faces varying in race, age, and gender before categorizing danger-related objects or words. Experiment 3 compared task performance across non-Black and Black participants. Results revealed that (a) implicit stereotyping of Blacks as more dangerous than Whites emerged across target age, target gender, and perceiver race, with (b) a similar magnitude of racial bias across adult and child targets and (c) a smaller magnitude for female than male targets. Evidence for age bias and gender bias also emerged whereby (d) across race, adult targets were more strongly associated with danger than were child targets, and (e) within Black (but not White) targets, male targets were more strongly associated with danger than were female targets.

Time pressure disrupts level-2, but not level-1, visual perspective calculation: A process-dissociation analysis.

Reasoning about other people's mental states has long been assumed to require active deliberation. Yet, evidence from indirect measures suggests that adults and children commonly display behavior indicative of having incidentally calculated both what other agents see (level-1 perspective taking) and how they see it (level-2 perspective taking). Here, we investigated the efficiency of such perspective calculation in adults. In four experiments using indirect measures of visual perspective taking, we imposed time pressure to constrain processing opportunity, and we used process-dissociation analyses to isolate perspective calculation as the process of focal interest. Results revealed that time pressure weakened level-2, but not level-1, perspective calculation-a pattern that was not evident in error-rate analyses. These findings suggest that perspective calculation may operate more efficiently in level-1 than in level-2 perspective taking. They also highlight the utility of the process-dissociation framework for unmasking processes that otherwise may go under-detected in behavior-level analyses.

Intergroup visual perspective-taking: Shared group membership impairs self-perspective inhibition but may facilitate perspective calculation.

Reasoning about what other people see, know, and want is essential for navigating social life. Yet, even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults make perspective-taking errors. Here, we examined how the group membership of perspective-taking targets (ingroup vs. outgroup) affects processes underlying visual perspective-taking. In three experiments using two bases of group identity (university affiliation and minimal groups), interference from one's own differing perspective (i.e., egocentric intrusion) was stronger when responding from an ingroup versus an outgroup member's perspective. Spontaneous perspective calculation, as indexed by interference from another's visual perspective when reporting one's own (i.e., altercentric intrusion), did not differ across target group membership in any of our experiments. Process-dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate automatic processes underlying altercentric-intrusion effects, further revealed negligible effects of target group membership on perspective calculation. Meta-analytically, however, there was suggestive evidence that shared group membership facilitates responding from others' perspectives when self and other perspectives are aligned.

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults.

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.

Active perspective taking induces flexible use of self-knowledge during social inference.

Social life hinges on the ability to infer others' mental states. By default, people often recruit self-knowledge during social inference, particularly for others who are similar to oneself. How do people's active perspective-taking efforts-deliberately imagining another's perspective-affect self-knowledge use? In 2 experiments, we test the flexible self-application hypothesis: that the application of self-knowledge to a perspective-taking target differs based on that person's similarity to oneself. We found consistent evidence that, when making inferences about dissimilar others, perspective taking increased the projection of one's own traits and preferences to those targets, relative to a control condition. When making inferences about similar others, however, perspective taking decreased projection. These findings suggest that self-target similarity critically shapes the inferential processes triggered by active perspective-taking efforts. (PsycINFO Database Record

Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task.

Reasoning about other people's mental states is central to social life. Yet, even neuro-typical adults sometimes have perspective-taking difficulties, particularly when another's perspective conflicts with their own. In two experiments, we examined the cognitive mechanisms underlying an affective factor known to hinder perspective taking in adults: anxiety. Using a level-1 visual perspective-taking task, we found that incidentally experiencing anxiety, relative to neutral feelings and anger, impaired the spontaneous calculation of what another social agent can see. Feeling anxious did not, however, impede perspective calculation with a non-social entity, suggesting that anxiety's disruptive effects may be particularly pronounced for social aspects of cognition. These findings help elucidate the mechanisms underlying the effects of incidental emotions on perspective taking and inform debates about "implicit" forms of mentalizing.