ABSTRACT
Understanding when it is acceptable to interrupt a joint activity is an important part of understanding what cooperation entails. Philosophical analyses have suggested that we should release our partner from a joint activity anytime the activity conflicts with fulfilling a moral obligation. To probe young children's understanding of this aspect, we investigated whether 3-year-old children (N = 60) are sensitive to the legitimacy of motives (selfish condition vs. moral condition) leading agents to intentionally interrupt their joint activity. We measured whether children protested or released their partner by scoring their reactions. Our results indicate that children did not manifest different reactions when the motive behind their partner leaving was moral than when the motive was selfish. However, our data showed a stable pattern: regardless of the partner's motives, some 3-year-olds take initiatives to release their partners from joint activity, suggesting that measuring release is a valuable tool for investigating joint action.
Subject(s)
Morals , Motivation , Drive , Moral ObligationsABSTRACT
A considerable body of research has documented the emergence of what appears to be instrumental helping behavior in early childhood. The current study tested the hypothesis that one basic psychological mechanism motivating this behavior is a preference for completing unfinished actions. To test this, a paradigm was implemented in which 2-year-olds (n = 34, 16 females/18 males, mostly White middle-class children) could continue an adult's action when the adult no longer wanted to complete the action. The results showed that children continued the adult's actions more often when the goal had been abandoned than when it had been reached (OR = 2.37). This supports the hypothesis that apparent helping behavior in 2-year-olds is motivated by a preference for completing unfinished actions.
Subject(s)
Helping Behavior , Motivation , Adult , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Previous research has established that goal tracking emerges early in the first year of life and rapidly becomes increasingly sophisticated. However, it has not yet been shown whether young children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time. The current study investigated this by probing young children's (24- to 30-month-olds; N = 24) ability to differentiate between goal-directed actions that have been halted because the goal was interrupted and those that have been halted because the goal was abandoned. To test whether children are sensitive to this distinction, we manipulated the experimenter's reason for not completing a goal-directed action; his initial goal was either interrupted by an obstacle or abandoned in favor of an alternative. We measured whether children's helping behavior was sensitive to the experimenter's reason for not completing his goal-directed action by recording whether children completed the experimenter's initial goal or the alternative goal. The results showed that children helped to complete the experimenter's initial goal significantly more often after this goal had been interrupted than after it had been abandoned. These results support the hypothesis that children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time by 2 years of age and specifically that they differentiate between abandoned and interrupted goals.
Subject(s)
Goals , Motivation , Child , Child, Preschool , HumansABSTRACT
Although there is considerable evidence that at least some helping behavior is motivated by genuine concern for others' well-being, sometimes we also help solely out of a sense of obligation to the persons in need. Our sense of obligation to help may be particularly strong when there is common knowledge between the helper and the helpee that the helpee needs help. To test whether children's helping behavior is affected by having common knowledge with the recipient about the recipient's need, 6-year-olds faced a dilemma: They could either collect stickers or help an experimenter. Children were more likely to help when they and the experimenter had common knowledge about the experimenter's plight (because they heard it together) than when they each had private knowledge about it (because they heard it individually). These results suggest that already in young children common knowledge can heighten the sense of obligation to help others in need.
Subject(s)
Helping Behavior , Knowledge , Motivation , Child , Communication , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
The aim of the present research was to investigate the relationship between oxytocin and maternal affect attunement, as well as the role of affect attunement in the relationship between oxytocin and infant social engagement during early mother-infant interactions. Forty-three mother-infant dyads participated in the present study when infants were 4 months. They were observed during (1) a situation where no communication took place and (2) a natural interaction between mother and infant. During this procedure, three saliva samples from mothers and their infants were collected to determine their levels of oxytocin at different time points. Maternal affect attunement (maintaining attention, warm sensitivity) and infant interactive behaviors (gaze, positive, and negative affect) were coded during the natural interaction. Results indicated that overall maternal oxytocin functioning was negatively related to her warm sensitivity, while infant oxytocin reactivity together with maternal affect attunement were associated with infant positive social engagement with their mothers. Specifically, infant oxytocin reactivity was significantly related to their gazes at mother, but only for infants of highly attuned mothers. These results point to the complex role oxytocin plays in parent-infant interactions while emphasizing the need to analyze both overall oxytocin functioning as well as reactivity as different indices of human affiliative behavior.
Subject(s)
Affect/physiology , Mother-Child Relations/psychology , Mothers/psychology , Oxytocin/physiology , Adult , Female , Humans , Infant , Infant Behavior/physiology , Infant Behavior/psychology , Male , Maternal Behavior/physiology , Maternal Behavior/psychology , Oxytocin/analysis , Saliva/chemistry , Saliva/physiologyABSTRACT
Everyone agrees that joint attention is a key feature of human social cognition. Yet, despite over 40 years of work and hundreds of publications on this topic, there is still surprisingly little agreement on what exactly joint attention is, and how the jointness in it is achieved. Part of the problem, we propose, is that joint attention is not a single process, but rather it includes a cluster of different cognitive skills and processes, and different researchers focus on different aspects of it. A similar problem applies to common knowledge. Here we present a new approach: We outline a typology of social attention levels which are currently all referred to in the literature as joint attention (from monitoring to common, mutual, and shared attention), along with corresponding levels of common knowledge. We consider cognitive, behavioral, and phenomenological aspects of the different levels as well as their different functions, and a key distinction we make in all of this is second-personal vs. third-personal relations. While we focus mainly on joint attention and common knowledge, we also briefly discuss how these levels might apply to other 'joint' mental states such as joint goals.
Subject(s)
Attention , Goals , Interpersonal Relations , Social Perception , HumansABSTRACT
Making commitments to cooperate facilitates cooperation. There is a long-standing theoretical debate about how promissory obligations come into existence, and whether linguistic acts (such as saying "I promise") are a necessary part of the process. To inform this debate we experimentally investigated whether even minimal, nonverbal behavior can be taken as a commitment to cooperate, as long as it is communicative. Five- to 7-year-old children played a Stag Hunt coordination game in which they needed to decide whether to cooperate or play individually. During the decision-making phase, children's partner made either ostensive, communicative eye contact or looked non-communicatively at them. In Study 1 we found that communicative looks produced an expectation of collaboration in children. In Study 2 we found that children in the communicative look condition normatively protested when their partner did not cooperate, thus showing an understanding of the communicative looks as a commitment to cooperate. This is the first experimental evidence, in adults or children, that in the right context, communicative, but not non-communicative, looks can signal a commitment.