ABSTRACT
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1017/ash.2023.473.].
ABSTRACT
In this overview, we articulate research needs and opportunities in the field of infection prevention that have been identified from insights gained during operative infection prevention work, our own research in healthcare epidemiology, and from reviewing the literature. The 10 areas of research need are: 1) Transmissions and interruptions, 2) personal protective equipment and other safety issues in occupational health, 3) climate change and other crises, 4) device, diagnostic, and antimicrobial stewardship, 5) implementation and deimplementation, 6) healthcare outside the acute care hospital, 7) low- and middle-income countries, 8) networking with the "neighbors," 9) novel research methodologies, and 10) the future state of surveillance. An introduction and chapters 1-5 are presented in part I of the article and chapters 6-10 and the discussion in part II. There are many barriers to advancing the field, such as finding and motivating the future IP workforce including professionals interested in conducting research, a constant confrontation with challenges and crises, the difficulty of performing studies in a complex environment, the relative lack of adequate incentives and funding streams, and how to disseminate and validate the often very local quality improvement projects. Addressing research gaps now (i.e., in the post-pandemic phase) will make healthcare systems more resilient when facing future crises.
ABSTRACT
In this overview, we articulate research needs and opportunities in the field of infection prevention that have been identified from insights gained during operative infection prevention work, our own research in healthcare epidemiology, and from reviewing the literature. The 10 areas of research need are: 1) transmissions and interruptions, 2) personal protective equipment and other safety issues in occupational health, 3) climate change and other crises, 4) device, diagnostic, and antimicrobial stewardship, 5) implementation and de-implementation, 6) health care outside the acute care hospital, 7) low- and middle-income countries, 8) networking with the "neighbors", 9) novel research methodologies, and 10) the future state of surveillance. An introduction and chapters 1-5 are presented in part I of the article, and chapters 6-10 and the discussion in part II. There are many barriers to advancing the field, such as finding and motivating the future IP workforce including professionals interested in conducting research, a constant confrontation with challenges and crises, the difficulty of performing studies in a complex environment, the relative lack of adequate incentives and funding streams, and how to disseminate and validate the often very local quality improvement projects. Addressing research gaps now (i.e., in the postpandemic phase) will make healthcare systems more resilient when facing future crises.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: To increase reliability of the algorithm used in our fully automated electronic surveillance system by adding rules to better identify bloodstream infections secondary to other hospital-acquired infections. METHODS: Intensive care unit (ICU) patients with positive blood cultures were reviewed. Central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) determinations were based on 2 sources: routine surveillance by infection preventionists, and fully automated surveillance. Discrepancies between the 2 sources were evaluated to determine root causes. Secondary infection sites were identified in most discrepant cases. New rules to identify secondary sites were added to the algorithm and applied to this ICU population and a non-ICU population. Sensitivity, specificity, predictive values, and kappa were calculated for the new models. RESULTS: Of 643 positive ICU blood cultures reviewed, 68 (10.6%) were identified as central line-associated bloodstream infections by fully automated electronic surveillance, whereas 38 (5.9%) were confirmed by routine surveillance. New rules were tested to identify organisms as central line-associated bloodstream infections if they did not meet one, or a combination of, the following: (I) matching organisms (by genus and species) cultured from any other site; (II) any organisms cultured from sterile site; (III) any organisms cultured from skin/wound; (IV) any organisms cultured from respiratory tract. The best-fit model included new rules I and II when applied to positive blood cultures in an ICU population. However, they didn't improve performance of the algorithm when applied to positive blood cultures in a non-ICU population. CONCLUSION: Electronic surveillance system algorithms may need adjustment for specific populations.
