Neuroscience: A bottom-up mechanism for cognitive control?

Cognitive control is often conceived of as occurring top-down, with prefrontal cortical areas exerting control over other parts of the brain. A new study demonstrates what might be considered a 'bottom-up' mechanism for cognitive control, involving the disinhibition of orbitofrontal cortex by subcortical regions.

Cracking and Packing Information about the Features of Expected Rewards in the Orbitofrontal Cortex.

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is crucial for tracking various aspects of expected outcomes, thereby helping to guide choices and support learning. Our previous study showed that the effects of reward timing and size on the activity of single units in OFC were dissociable when these attributes were manipulated independently ( Roesch et al., 2006). However, in real-life decision-making scenarios, outcome features often change simultaneously, so here we investigated how OFC neurons in male rats integrate information about the timing and identity (flavor) of reward and respond to changes in these features, according to whether they were changed simultaneously or separately. We found that a substantial number of OFC neurons fired differentially to immediate versus delayed reward and to the different reward flavors. However, contrary to the previous study, selectivity for timing was strongly correlated with selectivity for identity. Taken together with the previous research, these results suggest that when reward features are correlated, OFC tends to "pack" them into unitary constructs, whereas when they are independent, OFC tends to "crack" them into separate constructs. Furthermore, we found that when both reward timing and flavor were changed, reward-responsive OFC neurons showed unique activity patterns preceding and during the omission of an expected reward. Interestingly, this OFC activity is similar and slightly preceded the ventral tegmental area dopamine (VTA DA) activity observed in a previous study ( Takahashi et al., 2023), consistent with the role of OFC in providing predictive information to VTA DA neurons.

Optogenetic Inhibition of Rat Anterior Cingulate Cortex Impairs the Ability to Initiate and Stay on Task.

Our prior research has identified neural correlates of cognitive control in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), leading us to hypothesize that the ACC is necessary for increasing attention as rats flexibly learn new contingencies during a complex reward-guided decision-making task. Here, we tested this hypothesis by using optogenetics to transiently inhibit the ACC, while rats of either sex performed the same two-choice task. ACC inhibition had a profound impact on behavior that extended beyond deficits in attention during learning when expected outcomes were uncertain. We found that ACC inactivation slowed and reduced the number of trials rats initiated and impaired both their accuracy and their ability to complete sessions. Furthermore, drift-diffusion model analysis suggested that free-choice performance and evidence accumulation (i.e., reduced drift rates) were degraded during initial learning-leading to weaker associations that were more easily overridden in later trial blocks (i.e., stronger bias). Together, these results suggest that in addition to attention-related functions, the ACC contributes to the ability to initiate trials and generally stay on task.

Dopaminergic prediction errors in the ventral tegmental area reflect a multithreaded predictive model.

Dopamine neuron activity is tied to the prediction error in temporal difference reinforcement learning models. These models make significant simplifying assumptions, particularly with regard to the structure of the predictions fed into the dopamine neurons, which consist of a single chain of timepoint states. Although this predictive structure can explain error signals observed in many studies, it cannot cope with settings where subjects might infer multiple independent events and outcomes. In the present study, we recorded dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area in such a setting to test the validity of the single-stream assumption. Rats were trained in an odor-based choice task, in which the timing and identity of one of several rewards delivered in each trial changed across trial blocks. This design revealed an error signaling pattern that requires the dopamine neurons to access and update multiple independent predictive streams reflecting the subject's belief about timing and potentially unique identities of expected rewards.

Neuroscience: Action history and the orbitofrontal cortex.

Decisions are often made in the absence of instructive cues, based instead on memories of previous actions and outcomes. A new study sheds light on how orbitofrontal cortex tracks action history to adjust actions over time.

Orbitofrontal State Representations Are Related to Choice Adaptations and Reward Predictions.

Animals can categorize the environment into "states," defined by unique sets of available action-outcome contingencies in different contexts. Doing so helps them choose appropriate actions and make accurate outcome predictions when in each given state. State maps have been hypothesized to be held in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), an area implicated in decision-making and encoding information about outcome predictions. Here we recorded neural activity in OFC in 6 male rats to test state representations. Rats were trained on an odor-guided choice task consisting of five trial blocks containing distinct sets of action-outcome contingencies, constituting states, with unsignaled transitions between them. OFC neural ensembles were analyzed using decoding algorithms. Results indicate that the vast majority of OFC neurons contributed to representations of the current state at any point in time, independent of odor cues and reward delivery, even at the level of individual neurons. Across state transitions, these representations gradually integrated evidence for the new state; the rate at which this integration happened in the prechoice part of the trial was related to how quickly the rats' choices adapted to the new state. Finally, OFC representations of outcome predictions, often thought to be the primary function of OFC, were dependent on the accuracy of OFC state representations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A prominent hypothesis proposes that orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) tracks current location in a "cognitive map" of state space. Here we tested this idea in detail by analyzing neural activity recorded in OFC of rats performing a task consisting of a series of states, each defined by a set of available action-outcome contingencies. Results show that most OFC neurons contribute to state representations and that these representations are related to the rats' decision-making and OFC reward predictions. These findings suggest new interpretations of emotional dysregulation in pathologies, such as addiction, which have long been known to be related to OFC dysfunction.

Prior Cocaine Use Alters the Normal Evolution of Information Coding in Striatal Ensembles during Value-Guided Decision-Making.

Substance use disorders (SUDs) are characterized by maladaptive behavior. The ability to properly adjust behavior according to changes in environmental contingencies necessitates the interlacing of existing memories with updated information. This can be achieved by assigning learning in different contexts to compartmentalized "states." Though not often framed this way, the maladaptive behavior observed in individuals with SUDs may result from a failure to properly encode states because of drug-induced neural alterations. Previous studies found that the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) is important for behavioral flexibility and state encoding, suggesting the DMS may be an important substrate for these effects. Here, we recorded DMS neural activity in cocaine-experienced male rats during a decision-making task where blocks of trials represented distinct states to probe whether the encoding of state and state-related information is affected by prior drug exposure. We found that DMS medium spiny neurons (MSNs) and fast-spiking interneurons (FSIs) encoded such information and that prior cocaine experience disrupted the evolution of representations both within trials and across recording sessions. Specifically, DMS MSNs and FSIs from cocaine-experienced rats demonstrated higher classification accuracy of trial-specific rules, defined by response direction and value, compared with those drawn from sucrose-experienced rats, and these overly strengthened trial-type representations were related to slower switching behavior and reaction times. These data show that prior cocaine experience paradoxically increases the encoding of state-specific information and rules in the DMS and suggest a model in which abnormally specific and persistent representation of rules throughout trials in DMS slows value-based decision-making in well trained subjects.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Substance use disorders (SUDs) may result from a failure to properly encode rules guiding situationally appropriate behavior. The dorsomedial striatum (DMS) is thought to be important for such behavioral flexibility and encoding that defines the situation or "state." This suggests that the DMS may be an important substrate for the maladaptive behavior observed in SUDs. In the current study, we show that prior cocaine experience results in over-encoding of state-specific information and rules in the DMS, which may impair normal adaptive decision-making in the task, akin to what is observed in SUDs.

Dopamine neuron ensembles signal the content of sensory prediction errors.

Dopamine neurons respond to errors in predicting value-neutral sensory information. These data, combined with causal evidence that dopamine transients support sensory-based associative learning, suggest that the dopamine system signals a multidimensional prediction error. Yet such complexity is not evident in the activity of individual neurons or population averages. How then do downstream areas know what to learn in response to these signals? One possibility is that information about content is contained in the pattern of firing across many dopamine neurons. Consistent with this, here we show that the pattern of firing across a small group of dopamine neurons recorded in rats signals the identity of a mis-predicted sensory event. Further, this same information is reflected in the BOLD response elicited by sensory prediction errors in human midbrain. These data provide evidence that ensembles of dopamine neurons provide highly specific teaching signals, opening new possibilities for how this system might contribute to learning.

Rat Orbitofrontal Ensemble Activity Contains Multiplexed but Dissociable Representations of Value and Task Structure in an Odor Sequence Task.

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has long been implicated in signaling information about expected outcomes to facilitate adaptive or flexible behavior. Current proposals focus on signaling of expected value versus the representation of a value-agnostic cognitive map of the task. While often suggested as mutually exclusive, these alternatives may represent extreme ends of a continuum determined by task complexity and experience. As learning proceeds, an initial, detailed cognitive map might be acquired, based largely on external information. With more experience, this hypothesized map can then be tailored to include relevant abstract hidden cognitive constructs. The map would default to an expected value in situations where other attributes are largely irrelevant, but, in richer tasks, a more detailed structure might continue to be represented, at least where relevant to behavior. Here, we examined this by recording single-unit activity from the OFC in rats navigating an odor sequence task analogous to a spatial maze. The odor sequences provided a mappable state space, with 24 unique "positions" defined by sensory information, likelihood of reward, or both. Consistent with the hypothesis that the OFC represents a cognitive map tailored to the subjects' intentions or plans, we found a close correspondence between how subjects were using the sequences and the neural representations of the sequences in OFC ensembles. Multiplexed with this value-invariant representation of the task, we also found a representation of the expected value at each location. Thus, the value and task structure co-existed as dissociable components of the neural code in OFC.

Expectancy-Related Changes in Dopaminergic Error Signals Are Impaired by Cocaine Self-Administration.

Addiction is a disorder of behavioral control and learning. While this may reflect pre-existing propensities, drug use also clearly contributes by causing changes in outcome processing in prefrontal and striatal regions. This altered processing is associated with behavioral deficits, including changes in learning. These areas provide critical input to midbrain dopamine neurons regarding expected outcomes, suggesting that effects on learning may result from changes in dopaminergic error signaling. Here, we show that dopamine neurons recorded in rats that had self-administered cocaine failed to suppress firing on omission of an expected reward and exhibited lower amplitude and imprecisely timed increases in firing to an unexpected reward. Learning also appeared to have less of an effect on reward-evoked and cue-evoked firing in the cocaine-experienced rats. Overall, the changes are consistent with reduced fidelity of input regarding the expected outcomes, such as their size, timing, and overall value, because of cocaine use.

Orbitofrontal neurons signal reward predictions, not reward prediction errors.

Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) fire in anticipation of and during rewards. Such firing has been suggested to encode reward predictions and to account in some way for the role of this area in adaptive behavior and learning. However, it has also been reported that neural activity in OFC reflects reward prediction errors, which might drive learning directly. Here we tested this question by analyzing the firing of OFC neurons recorded in an odor discrimination task in which rats were trained to sample odor cues and respond left or right on each trial for reward. Neurons were recorded across blocks of trials in which we switched either the number or the flavor of the reward delivered in each well. Previously we have described how neurons in this dataset fired to the predictive cues (Stalnaker et al., 2014); here we focused on the firing in anticipation of and just after delivery of each drop of reward, looking specifically for differences in firing based on whether the reward number or flavor was unexpected or expected. Unlike dopamine neurons recorded in this setting, which exhibited phasic error-like responses after surprising changes in either reward number or reward flavor (Takahashi et al., 2017), OFC neurons showed no such error correlates and instead fired in a way that reflected reward predictions.

Effects of inference on dopaminergic prediction errors depend on orbitofrontal processing.

Dopaminergic reward prediction errors in monkeys reflect inferential reward predictions that well-trained animals can make when associative rules change. Here, in a new analysis of previously described data, we test whether dopaminergic error signals in rats are influenced by inferential predictions and whether such effects depend on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Dopamine neurons were recorded from controls or rats with ipsilateral OFC lesions during performance of a choice task in which odor cues signaled the availability of sucrose reward in 2 wells. To induce prediction errors, we manipulated either the timing or number of rewards delivered in each well across blocks of trials. Of importance, a change in reward at 1 well predicted a change in reward at the other on later trials. We compared behavior and neural activity on trials when such inference was possible versus trials involving the same reward change when inference was not possible. Rats responded faster when they could infer an increase in reward compared to when the same reward was coming but they could not infer a change. This inferential prediction was reflected in the firing of dopamine neurons in controls, which changed less to unexpected delivery (or omission) of reward and more to the new high-value cue on inference versus noninference trials. These effects were absent in dopamine neurons recorded in rats with ipsilateral OFC lesions. Thus, dopaminergic error signals recorded in rats are influenced by both experiential and inferential reward predictions, and the effects of inferential predictions depend on OFC. (PsycINFO Database Record

Cholinergic Interneurons Use Orbitofrontal Input to Track Beliefs about Current State.

UNLABELLED: When conditions change, organisms need to learn about the changed conditions without interfering with what they already know. To do so, they can assign the new learning to a new "state" and the old learning to a previous state. This state assignment is fundamental to behavioral flexibility. Cholinergic interneurons (CINs) in the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) are necessary for associative information to be compartmentalized in this way, but the mechanism by which they do so is unknown. Here we addressed this question by recording putative CINs from the DMS in rats performing a task consisting of a series of trial blocks, or states, that required the recall and application of contradictory associative information. We found that individual CINs in the DMS represented the current state throughout each trial. These state correlates were not observed in dorsolateral striatal CINs recorded in the same rats. Notably, DMS CIN ensembles tracked rats' beliefs about the current state such that, when states were miscoded, rats tended to make suboptimal choices reflecting the miscoding. State information held by the DMS CINs also depended completely on the orbitofrontal cortex, an area that has been proposed to signal environmental states. These results suggest that CINs set the stage for recalling associative information relevant to the current environment by maintaining a real-time representation of the current state. Such a role has novel implications for understanding the neural basis of a variety of psychiatric diseases, such as addiction or anxiety disorders, in which patients generalize inappropriately (or fail to generalize) between different environments. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Striatal cholinergic interneurons (CINs) are thought to be identical to tonically active neurons. These neurons have long been thought to have an important influence on striatal processing during reward-related learning. Recently, a more specific function for striatal CINs has been suggested, which is that they are necessary for striatal learning to be compartmentalized into different states as the state of the environment changes. Here we report that putative CINs appear to track rats' beliefs about which environmental state is current. We further show that this property of CINs depends on orbitofrontal cortex input and is correlated with choices made by rats. These findings could provide new insight into neuropsychiatric diseases that involve improper generalization between different contexts.

Orbitofrontal lesions eliminate signalling of biological significance in cue-responsive ventral striatal neurons.

The ventral striatum has long been proposed as an integrator of biologically significant associative information to drive actions. Although inputs from the amygdala and hippocampus have been much studied, the role of prominent inputs from orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are less well understood. Here, we recorded single-unit activity from ventral striatum core in rats with sham or ipsilateral neurotoxic lesions of lateral OFC, as they performed an odour-guided spatial choice task. Consistent with prior reports, we found that spiking activity recorded in sham rats during cue sampling was related to both reward magnitude and reward identity, with higher firing rates observed for cues that predicted more reward. Lesioned rats also showed differential activity to the cues, but this activity was unbiased towards larger rewards. These data support a role for OFC in shaping activity in the ventral striatum to represent the biological significance of associative information in the environment.

What the orbitofrontal cortex does not do.

The number of papers about the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has grown from 1 per month in 1987 to a current rate of over 50 per month. This publication stream has implicated the OFC in nearly every function known to cognitive neuroscience and in most neuropsychiatric diseases. However, new ideas about OFC function are typically based on limited data sets and often ignore or minimize competing ideas or contradictory findings. Yet true progress in our understanding of an area's function comes as much from invalidating existing ideas as proposing new ones. Here we consider the proposed roles for OFC, critically examining the level of support for these claims and highlighting the data that call them into question.

Orbitofrontal neurons acquire responses to 'valueless' Pavlovian cues during unblocking.

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been described as signaling outcome expectancies or value. Evidence for the latter comes from the studies showing that neural signals in the OFC correlate with value across features. Yet features can co-vary with value, and individual units may participate in multiple ensembles coding different features. Here we used unblocking to test whether OFC neurons would respond to a predictive cue signaling a 'valueless' change in outcome flavor. Neurons were recorded as the rats learned about cues that signaled either an increase in reward number or a valueless change in flavor. We found that OFC neurons acquired responses to both predictive cues. This activity exceeded that exhibited to a 'blocked' cue and was correlated with activity to the actual outcome. These results show that OFC neurons fire to cues with no value independent of what can be inferred through features of the predicted outcome.

Orbitofrontal neurons infer the value and identity of predicted outcomes.

The best way to respond flexibly to changes in the environment is to anticipate them. Such anticipation often benefits us if we can infer that a change has occurred, before we have actually experienced the effects of that change. Here we test for neural correlates of this process by recording single-unit activity in the orbitofrontal cortex in rats performing a choice task in which the available rewards changed across blocks of trials. Consistent with the proposal that orbitofrontal cortex signals inferred information, firing changes at the start of each new block as if predicting the not-yet-experienced reward. This change occurs whether the new reward is different in number of drops, requiring signalling of a new value, or in flavour, requiring signalling of a new sensory feature. These results show that orbitofrontal neurons provide a behaviourally relevant signal that reflects inferences about both value-relevant and value-neutral information about impending outcomes.

How did the chicken cross the road? With her striatal cholinergic interneurons, of course.

Recognizing when the world changes is fundamental for normal learning. In this issue of Neuron, Bradfield et al. (2013) show that cholinergic interneurons in dorsomedial striatum are critical to the process whereby new states of the world are appropriately registered and retrieved during associative learning.

Risk-responsive orbitofrontal neurons track acquired salience.

Decision making is impacted by uncertainty and risk (i.e., variance). Activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, an area implicated in decision making, covaries with these quantities. However, this activity could reflect the heightened salience of situations in which multiple outcomes-reward and reward omission-are expected. To resolve these accounts, rats were trained to respond to cues predicting 100%, 67%, 33%, or 0% reward. Consistent with prior reports, some orbitofrontal neurons fired differently in anticipation of uncertain (33% and 67%) versus certain (100% and 0%) reward. However, over 90% of these neurons also fired differently prior to 100% versus 0% reward (or baseline) or prior to 33% versus 67% reward. These responses are inconsistent with risk but fit well with the representation of acquired salience linked to the sum of cue-outcome and cue-no-outcome associative strengths. These results expand our understanding of how the orbitofrontal cortex might regulate learning and behavior.

Reward prediction error signaling in posterior dorsomedial striatum is action specific.

Neural correlates of reward prediction errors (RPEs) have been found in dorsal striatum. Such signals may be important for updating associative action representations within striatum. In order that the appropriate representations can be updated, it might be important for the RPE signal to be specific for the action that led to that error. However, RPEs signaled by midbrain dopamine neurons, which project heavily to striatum, are not action-specific. Here we tested whether RPE-like activity in dorsal striatum is action-specific; we recorded single-unit activity in posterior dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum as rats performed a task in which the reward predictions associated with two different actions were repeatedly violated, thereby eliciting RPEs. We separately analyzed fast firing neurons (FFNs) and phasically firing neurons (total n = 1076). Only among FFNs recorded in posterior dorsomedial striatum did we find a population with RPE-like characteristics (19 of all 196 FFNs, 10%). This population showed a phasic increase in activity during unexpected rewards, a phasic decrease in activity during unexpected omission of rewards, and a phasic increase in activity during cues when they predicted high-value reward. However, unlike a classical RPE signal, this signal was linked to the action that elicited the prediction error, in that neurons tended to signal RPEs only after their anti-preferred action. This action-specific RPE-like signal could provide a mechanism for updating specific associative action representations in posterior dorsomedial striatum.