Toward a Psychology of Ideas Rather Than Demographics: Commentary on Hommel (2024).

The public will rightly not value a science that is more concerned with demographic population matching than with ideas. Taking further steps in the direction of identity politics will reduce public confidence in psychology's conclusions and reduce trust and respect. If psychology embraces demographic quotas, there will be self-selection out of the discipline, and that self-selection will harm our science.

A good architecture for fast and slow thinking, but exclusivity is exclusively in the past.

No doubt older work in the dual-process tradition overemphasized the importance and frequency of the override function, and the working model in this target article provides a useful corrective. The attempt to motivate the model using the so-called exclusivity assumption is unnecessary, because no recent dual-process model in the reasoning literature has rested strongly on this assumption.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement.

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.

The need for intellectual diversity in psychological science: Our own studies of actively open-minded thinking as a case study.

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by questionnaire items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, the sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT has been found to be a strong predictor of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Recently, several studies that have employed short forms of the AOT scale have shown startlingly high negative correlations with religiosity (in the range of -0.50 to -0.70). In a re-analysis of a large dataset, we demonstrate that it was a particular type of AOT item (termed a belief revision item, BR) that accounts for these large correlations. To our consternation, we realized that it was our research team that had introduced these items into the literature two decades ago, but we had heretofore never realized the potential for these items to skew correlations. In a new experiment, we demonstrate how BR items of this type disadvantage religious-minded subjects, and we show that it is possible to construct BR items with parallel content that are not so demographically biased. We also show that unbiased BR items do not sacrifice the predictive power that has previously been shown by AOT scales. We believe this lesson in item construction resulted from the lack of intellectual diversity in our own laboratory (specifically, the overwhelmingly secular composition of our lab personnel). We believe this case study shows the importance of intellectual diversity in psychology, especially when studying such topics as religiosity and political attitudes.

How to Think Rationally about World Problems.

I agree with the target essay that psychology has something to offer in helping to address societal problems. Intelligence has helped meliorate some social problems throughout history, including the period of time that is covered by the Flynn effect, but I agree with Sternberg that other psychological characteristics may be contributing as well, particularly increases in rationality. I also believe that increasing human rationality could have a variety of positive societal affects at levels somewhat smaller in grain size than the societal problems that Sternberg focuses on. Some of the societal problems that Sternberg lists, however, I do not think would be remedied by increases in rationality, intelligence, or wisdom, because remedy might be the wrong word in the context of these issues. Issues such as how much inequality of income to tolerate, how much pollution to tolerate, and how much we should sacrifice economic growth for potential future changes in global temperature represent issues of clashing values, not the inability to process information, nor the lack of information, nor the failure to show wisdom.

Rational thinking and cognitive sophistication: development, cognitive abilities, and thinking dispositions.

We studied developmental trends in 5 important reasoning tasks that are critical components of the operational definition of rational thinking. The tasks measured denominator neglect, belief bias, base rate sensitivity, resistance to framing, and the tendency toward otherside thinking. In addition to age, we examined 2 other individual difference domains that index cognitive sophistication: cognitive ability (intelligence and executive functioning) and thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking, superstitious thinking, and need for cognition). All 5 reasoning domains were consistently related to cognitive sophistication regardless of how it was indexed (age, cognitive ability, thinking dispositions). The implications of these findings for taxonomies of developmental trends in rational thinking tasks are discussed.

Practitioner review: do performance-based measures and ratings of executive function assess the same construct?

BACKGROUND: Both performance-based and rating measures are commonly used to index executive function in clinical and neuropsychological assessments. They are intended to index the same broad underlying mental construct of executive function. The association between these two types of measures was investigated in the current article. METHOD AND RESULTS: We examined the association between performance-based and rating measures of executive function in 20 studies. These studies included 13 child and 7 adult samples, which were derived from 7 clinical, 2 nonclinical, and 11 combined clinical and nonclinical samples. Only 68 (24%) of the 286 relevant correlations reported in these studies were statistically significant, and the overall median correlation was only .19. CONCLUSIONS: It was concluded that performance-based and rating measures of executive function assess different underlying mental constructs. We discuss how these two types of measures appear to capture different levels of cognition, namely, the efficiency of cognitive abilities and success in goal pursuit. Clinical implications of using performance-based and rating measures of executive function are discussed, including the use of these measures in assessing ADHD.

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate.

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

Theory and Metatheory in the Study of Dual Processing: Reply to Comments.

In this article, we respond to the four comments on our target article. Some of the commentators suggest that we have formulated our proposals in a way that renders our account of dual-process theory untestable and less interesting than the broad theory that has been critiqued in recent literature. Our response is that there is a confusion of levels. Falsifiable predictions occur not at the level of paradigm or metatheory-where this debate is taking place-but rather in the instantiation of such a broad framework in task level models. Our proposal that many dual-processing characteristics are only correlated features does not weaken the testability of task-level dual-processing accounts. We also respond to arguments that types of processing are not qualitatively distinct and discuss specific evidence disputed by the commentators. Finally, we welcome the constructive comments of one commentator who provides strong arguments for the reality of the dual-process distinction.

Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot.

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition.

The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Although the CRT has a substantial correlation with cognitive ability, a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled. We conjecture that this is because neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does. We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.

Decision-making and cognitive abilities: A review of associations between Iowa Gambling Task performance, executive functions, and intelligence.

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been used to study decision-making differences in many different clinical and developmental samples. It has been suggested that IGT performance captures abilities that are separable from cognitive abilities, including executive functions and intelligence. The purpose of the current review was to examine studies that have explicitly examined the relationship between IGT performance and these cognitive abilities. We included 43 studies that reported correlational analyses with IGT performance, including measures of inhibition, working memory, and set-shifting as indices of executive functions, as well as measures of verbal, nonverbal, and full-scale IQ as indices of intelligence. Overall, only a small proportion of the studies reported a statistically significant relationship between IGT performance and these cognitive abilities. The majority of studies reported a non-significant relationship. Of the minority of studies that reported statistically significant effects, effect sizes were, at best, small to modest, and confidence intervals were large, indicating that considerable variability in performance on the IGT is not captured by current measures of executive function and intelligence. These findings highlight the separability between decision-making on the IGT and cognitive abilities, which is consistent with recent conceptualizations that differentiate rationality from intelligence.

How teachers would spend their time teaching language arts: the mismatch between self-reported and best practices.

As teacher quality becomes a central issue in discussions of children's literacy, both researchers and policy makers alike express increasing concern with how teachers structure and allocate their lesson time for literacy-related activities as well as with what they know about reading development, processes, and pedagogy. The authors examined the beliefs, literacy knowledge, and proposed instructional practices of 121 first-grade teachers. Through teacher self-reports concerning the amount of instructional time they would prefer to devote to a variety of language arts activities, the authors investigated the structure of teachers' implicit beliefs about reading instruction and explored relationships between those beliefs, expertise with general or special education students, years of experience, disciplinary knowledge, and self-reported distribution of an array of instructional practices. They found that teachers' implicit beliefs were not significantly associated with their status as a regular or special education teacher, the number of years they had been teaching, or their disciplinary knowledge. However, it was observed that subgroups of teachers who highly valued particular approaches to reading instruction allocated their time to instructional activities associated with other approaches in vastly different ways. It is notable that the practices of teachers who privileged reading literature over other activities were not in keeping with current research and policy recommendations. Implications and considerations for further research are discussed.

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability.

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency.

Metarepresentation and the great cognitive divide: a commentary on Henriques' "psychology defined".

I locate the discontinuity between humans and other animals a bit differently than Henriques (this issue)-in metarepresentational abilities. However, I do think that the justification process might have played a critical role in the development of these metarepresentational abilities.

Disciplinary knowledge of K-3 teachers and their knowledge calibration in the domain of early literacy.

Recently, investigators have begun to pay increasing attention to the role of teachers' domain specific knowledge in the area of reading, and its implications for both classroom practice and student learning. The aims of the present study were to assess kindergarten to third-grade teachers' actual and perceived reading-related subject matter knowledge, and to investigate the extent to which teachers calibrate their reading related subject matter knowledge by examining relationships between actual and perceived knowledge. Results indicated that while teachers demonstrated limited knowledge of children's literature, phoneme awareness, and phonics, the majority of these same teachers evaluated their knowledge levels quite positively. Teachers demonstrated some ability to calibrate their own knowledge levels in the area of children's literature, yet they were poorly calibrated in the domains of phoneme awareness and phonics. These findings suggest that teachers tend to overestimate their reading related subject matter knowledge and are often unaware of what they know and do not know. Implications for the design of teacher education at both the preservice and inservice levels are discussed.