The first-member heuristic: Group members labeled "first" influence judgment and treatment of groups.

People often make judgments about a group (e.g., immigrants from a specific country) based on information about a single group member. Seven studies (N = 1,929) tested the hypothesis that people will expect the performance of an arbitrarily ordered group to match that of the group member in the first position of a sequence more closely than that of group members in other positions. This greater perceived diagnosticity of the first member will in turn affect how people treat the group. This pattern of judgment and treatment of groups, labeled the "first-member heuristic," generalized across various performance contexts (e.g., gymnastic routine, relay race, and job performance), and regardless of whether the focal member performed poorly or well (Studies 1-3). Consistent with the notion that first members are deemed most informative, participants were more likely to turn to the member in the first (vs. other) position to learn about the group (Study 4). Further, through their disproportionate influence on the expected performance of other group members, first members' performances also influenced participants' support for policies that would benefit or hurt a group (Study 5) and their likelihood to join a group (Study 6). Finally, perceived group homogeneity moderated the first-member heuristic, such that it attenuated for nonhomogeneous groups (Study 7). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Mental Simulation of Visceral States Affects Preferences and Behavior.

Preferences and behavior are heavily influenced by one's current visceral experience, yet people often fail to anticipate such effects. Although research suggests that this gap is difficult to overcome-to act as if in another visceral state-research on mental simulation has demonstrated that simulations can substitute for experiences, albeit to a weaker extent. We examine whether mentally simulating visceral states can impact preferences and behavior. We show that simulating a specific visceral state (e.g., being cold or hungry) shifts people's preferences for relevant activities (Studies 1a-2) and choices of food portion sizes (Study 3). Like actual visceral experiences, mental simulation only affects people's current preferences but not their general preferences (Study 4). Finally, people project simulated states onto similar others, as is the case for actual visceral experiences (Study 5). Thus, mental simulation may help people anticipate their own and others' future preferences, thereby improving their decision making.

Only one small sin: How self-construal affects self-control.

Past research has shown that self-construal can influence self-control by reducing interdependent people's impulsivity in the presence of peers. We broaden these findings by examining the hypothesis that an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal fosters self-control even in the absence of peers and for non-impulsive decisions. We further explore whether this effect could be mediated by the more interrelated (vs. isolated) processing style of interdependent (vs. independent) people. Such an interrelated (vs. isolated) processing style of temptations makes the impact of a single temptation more salient and can thereby increase self-control. Study 1 demonstrated that more interdependent participants show more self-control behaviour by refraining from chocolate consumption to secure a monetary benefit. Studies 2a and 2b highlighted a link between self-construal and trait self-control via the processing of temptations. Study 3 suggested that an interrelated (vs. isolated) perspective on temptations could mediate the effect of (primed) self-construal on self-control. Taken together, self-construal shapes self-control across various decision contexts.

Being observed magnifies action.

We test the hypothesis that people, when observed, perceive their actions as more substantial because they add the audience's perspective to their own perspective. We find that participants who were observed while eating (Study 1) or learned they were observed after eating (Study 2) recalled eating a larger portion than unobserved participants. The presence of others magnified both desirable and undesirable actions. Thus, observed (vs. unobserved) participants believed they gave both more correct and incorrect answers in a lab task (Study 3) and, moving to a field study, the larger the audience, the larger the contribution badminton players claimed toward their teams' successes as well as failures (Study 4). In contrast to actions, inactions are not magnified, because they are unobservable; indeed, observed (vs. unobserved) participants believed they solved more task problems but did not skip more problems (Study 5). Taken together, these studies show that being observed fundamentally alters the subjective magnitude of one's actions. (PsycINFO Database Record