ABSTRACT
The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task "Maxi and the chocolate" is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: "Maxi puts his chocolate into the green cupboard before going out to play. In his absence, his mother moves the chocolate from the green cupboard to the blue one." The child must then predict where Maxi will pick up the chocolate when he returns. To the child, the question from an adult (a knowledgeable person) may seem surprising and can be understood as a question of his own knowledge of the world, rather than on Maxi's mental representations. In our study, without any modification of the initial task, we disambiguate the context of the question by (1) replacing the adult experimenter with a humanoid robot presented as "ignorant" and "slow" but trying to learn and (2) placing the child in the role of a "mentor" (the knowledgeable person). Sixty-two typical children of 3 years-old completed the first-order false belief task "Maxi and the chocolate," either with a human or with a robot. Results revealed a significantly higher success rate in the robot condition than in the human condition. Thus, young children seem to fail because of the pragmatic difficulty of the first-order task, which causes a difference of interpretation between the young child and the experimenter.
ABSTRACT
The objective of this research was to test for the existence of reasoning strategies in the estimation of the diagnostic probability: P(cause|effect). In two experiments, we show that estimation of this probability can be achieved by two paths that are formally distinct. The most intuitive approach (default strategy) consists in evaluating P(cause|effect) by means of retractable deduction type reasoning based on a retractable Modus Ponens (EFFECT; if EFFECT then CAUSE is probable; thus CAUSE is probable). The second strategy consists in estimating diagnostic probability using abductive reasoning corresponding to the affirmation of consequent argument (EFFECT; if CAUSE then EFFECT is probable; thus CAUSE is probable). In referring to a diagnostic probability estimation bias that is predicted in the structure induction model of Meder, Mayrhofer, and Waldmann (2009, 2014), we show that the choice of strategy is dependent on the empiric predictive probability found in the data: P(effect|cause). When that probability is low, participants prefer a retractable deduction type strategy; however, when P(effect|cause) is high, there is strong support for an abductive strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record
Subject(s)
Cognition/physiology , Inhibition, Psychological , Logic , Models, Psychological , Probability , Adult , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
PURPOSE: Previous reports have indicated that raising a child with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) could be considered a stressful experience. Thus our study aimed to assess the impact of perceived stress (i.e. parental cognitive perception of their child's disorder) and social support (number of people surrounding the subject providing support) on coping strategies-defined as processes of restoring balance between excessive demands and inadequate resources-of parents having a child with GTS. METHODS: Twenty-eight parents of 21 patients with GTS (aged 6 to 16years) completed questionnaires on perceived stress (ALE Scale), social support (SSQ6), coping strategies (WCC-R) and anxiety-depression (HAD). RESULTS: Principal component analysis showed a negative correlation between social support on one side and perceived stress and anxiety/depression on the other. Problem- and emotion-focused coping both correlated with social support, all of them being independent from perceived stress and anxiety/depression. Hierarchical ascendant classification showed three clusters of individuals in our parents' groups: i) those having high scores in perceived stress and anxiety-depression; ii) those having high scores in social support associated with low scores in perceived stress; iii) parents having lower than average scores on both problem- and emotion- focused coping and social support. CONCLUSION: Our results reinforce the need for developing training programs for parents with GTS children to better understand and tolerate the disorder to decrease their stress.
