What are the odds? Preschoolers' ability to distinguish between possible, impossible, and probabilistically distinct future outcomes.

Previous research has suggested that infants are able to distinguish between possible and impossible events and make basic probabilistic inferences. However, much of this research has focused on children's intuitions about past events for which the outcome is already determined but unknown. Here, we investigated children's ability to use probabilistic information to guide their choices and actively shape future events. In two experiments, we examined whether children could successfully direct a marble through a series of tubes, selecting between routes where success was possible, impossible, or guaranteed (i.e., 50% vs. 0%, or 50% vs. 100%; Experiment 1), and routes where success was mutually possible but probabilistically distinct (e.g., 33% vs. 50%; Experiment 2). In total, we tested 136 two- to five-year-old children (76 males), recruited predominantly through a museum in Brisbane, Australia. In Experiment 1, we found that while younger children typically did not perform above chance, the vast majority of 4- and 5-year-olds consistently distinguished between possible and impossible or guaranteed outcomes. In Experiment 2, children of all ages had greater difficulty with distinguishing between two possible outcomes with different likelihoods than between possible and impossible/guaranteed outcomes, although some individual 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated competence when making both distinctions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Consciousness beyond the human case.

There is growing interest in the relationship been AI and consciousness. Joseph LeDoux and Jonathan Birch thought it would be a good moment to put some of the big questions in this area to some leading experts. The challenge of addressing the questions they raised was taken up by Kristin Andrews, Nicky Clayton, Nathaniel Daw, Chris Frith, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters, Susan Schneider, Anil Seth, Thomas Suddendorf, and Marie Vanderkerckhoeve.

Counterfactual choices and moral judgments in children.

When making moral judgments of past actions, adults often think counterfactually about what could have been done differently. Considerable evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking emerges around age 6, but it remains unknown how this development influences children's moral judgments. Across two studies, Australian children aged 4-9 (N = 236, 142 Females) were told stories about two characters who had a choice that led to a good or bad outcome, and two characters who had no choice over a good or bad outcome. Results showed that 4- and 5-year-olds' moral judgments were influenced only by the actual outcome. From age 6, children's moral judgments were also influenced by the counterfactual choices that had been available to the characters.

Creativity and flexibility in young children's use of external cognitive strategies.

A cardinal feature of adult cognition is the awareness of our own cognitive struggles and the capacity to draw upon this awareness to offload internal demand into the environment. In this preregistered study conducted in Australia, we investigated whether 3-8-year-olds (N = 72, 36 male, 36 female, mostly White) could self-initiate such an external metacognitive strategy and transfer it across contexts. Children watched as an experimenter demonstrated how to mark the location of a hidden prize, thus helping them successfully retrieve that prize in the future. Children were then given the opportunity to spontaneously adopt an external marking strategy across six test trials. Children who did so at least once were then introduced to a conceptually similar but structurally distinct transfer task. Although most 3-year-olds deployed the demonstrated strategy in the initial test phase, none of them modified that strategy to solve the transfer task. By contrast, many children aged 4 years and older spontaneously devised more than one previously unseen reminder-setting strategy across the six transfer trials, with this tendency increasing with age. From age 6, children deployed effective external strategies on most trials, with the number, combination, and order of unique strategies used varying widely both within and across the older age groups. These results demonstrate young children's remarkable flexibility in the transferral of external strategies across contexts and point to pronounced individual differences in the strategies children devise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Affective forecasting in Parkinson's disease.

OBJECTIVES: While emotional responses experienced in-the-moment appear to remain intact in Parkinson's disease (PD), no study has tested whether this extends to the prediction of future emotional responses. The present study aimed to provide the first assessment of affective forecasting capacity in this cohort. METHODS: A positively and negatively valenced affective forecasting task and broader clinical battery were completed by a PD group (ns = 28 and 37, respectively) and a demographically matched neurotypical control group (ns = 38 and 39, respectively). RESULTS: No group differences emerged on the two tasks, with the two groups underestimating their level of happiness and overestimating their level of negative affect to a similar degree. Affective forecasting error scores were unrelated to clinical characteristics. CONCLUSIONS: Given that affective forecasting relies on self-projection into the future, a skill shown to often be disrupted in this cohort, impairments were expected. However, this study provides initial evidence that this may not be the case. These findings are potentially important given that how we think about and envisage the future affectively is a major determinant of goal-directed behavior. Further work is now needed to establish whether these findings are robust and generalize to other types of affective stimuli.

Counterfactual thinking elicits emotional change in young children.

Adults often reason about what might have happened had they chosen an alternative course of action in the past, which can elicit the counterfactual emotion of regret. It is unclear whether young children's emotions are similarly impacted by counterfactual thinking about past possibilities. In this study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N = 160) opened one of two boxes, which concealed small and large prizes, respectively. Some children had the means to open either box, whereas other children only had the means to open one box. After seeing that the prize they did not obtain was larger than the one they did obtain, children were significantly more likely to report a negative change in emotion when the non-obtained prize had been a straightforward counterfactual possibility than when it had not. This shows that even young children experience counterfactual emotions following choices, which may ultimately drive them to make better choices in the future. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Archaeological evidence for thinking about possibilities in hominin evolution.

The emergence of the ability to think about future possibilities must have played an influential role in human evolution, driving a range of foresightful behaviours, including preparation, communication and technological innovation. Here we review the archeological evidence for such behavioural indicators of foresight. We find the earliest signs of hominins retaining tools and transporting materials for repeated future use emerging from around 1.8 Ma. From about 0.5 Ma onwards, there are indications of technical and social changes reflecting advances in foresight. And in a third period, starting from around 140 000 years ago, hominins appear to have increasingly relied on material culture to shape the future and to exchange their ideas about possibilities. Visible signs of storytelling, even about entirely fictional scenarios, appear over the last 50 000 years. Although the current evidence suggests that there were distinct transitions in the evolution of our capacity to think about the future, we warn that issues of taphonomy and archaeological sampling are likely to skew our picture of human cognitive evolution. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Young children spontaneously devise an optimal external solution to a cognitive problem.

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.

Do Monkeys and Young Children Understand Exclusive "Or" Relations? A Commentary on Ferrigno et al. (2021).

Ferrigno et al. (2021) claim to provide evidence that monkeys can reason through the disjunctive syllogism (given A or B, not A, therefore B) and conclude that monkeys therefore understand logical "or" relations. Yet their data fail to provide evidence that the baboons they tested understood the exclusive "or" relations in the experimental task. For two mutually exclusive possibilities-A or B-the monkeys appeared to infer that B was true when A was shown to be false, but they failed to infer that B was false when A was shown to be true. In our own research, we recently found an identical response pattern in 2.5- to 4-year-old children, whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated that they could make both inferences. The monkeys' and younger children's responses are instead consistent with an incorrect understanding of A and B as having an inclusive "or" relation. Only the older children provided compelling evidence of representing the exclusive "or" relation between A and B.

An old problem revisited: How sensitive is time-based prospective memory to age-related differences?

Prospective memory (PM) tasks that impose strong demands on strategic monitoring decline more in late adulthood relative to tasks dependent on more automatic cue detection processes. This finding has proven robust to numerous manipulations, with one exception: time-based PM. However, conventional time-based tasks may inadvertently present time-related yet still event-based cues. At the same time, prior studies have failed to consider whether time-based age differences vary according to the degree of deliberate strategic processing required to access these cues. In this study, 53 younger and 40 older participants completed three time-based PM conditions in which a response had to be executed when a sand timer completed a cycle. In one condition, this timer could only be accessed by explicit, deliberate monitoring (by pressing a specific key), in a second, it could also be accessed more perfunctorily (simply by altering ones' visual focus)-and in the third, could not be accessed at all (forcing participants to rely solely on internal temporal estimation processes). Negative age differences emerged in both conditions where participants were able to access the timer, but not in the condition where the timer was hidden. These data provide novel evidence of age-related preservation in at least some aspects of the temporal processing required to support time-based PM. They also suggest that younger and older adults can and do engage in monitoring when given this option, but that only the former group may be able to benefit, even when this monitoring can be conducted relatively perfunctorily. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The implied motion aftereffect changes decisions, but not confidence.

Viewing static images depicting movement can result in a motion aftereffect: people tend to categorise direction signals as moving in the opposite direction relative to the implied motion in still photographs. This finding could indicate that inferred motion direction can penetrate sensory processing and change perception. Equally possible, however, is that inferred motion changes decision processes, but not perception. Here we test these two possibilities. Since both categorical decisions and subjective confidence are informed by sensory information, confidence can be informative about whether an aftereffect probably results from changes to perceptual or decision processes. We therefore used subjective confidence as an additional measure of the implied motion aftereffect. In Experiment 1 (implied motion), we find support for decision-level changes only, with no change in subjective confidence. In Experiment 2 (real motion), we find equal changes to decisions and confidence. Our results suggest the implied motion aftereffect produces a bias in decision-making, but leaves perceptual processing unchanged.

Does Neonatal Imitation Exist? Insights From a Meta-Analysis of 336 Effect Sizes.

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation (d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators (QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

When can young children reason about an exclusive disjunction? A follow up to.

Mody and Carey (2016) investigated children's capacity to reason by the disjunctive syllogism by hiding stickers within two pairs of cups (i.e., there is one sticker in cup A or B, and one in cup C or D) and then showing one cup to be empty. They found that children as young as 3 years of age chose the most likely cup (i.e., not A, therefore choose B; and disregard C and D) and suggested that these children were representing the dependent relationship between A and B by applying the logical operator "or". However, it is possible that children succeeded using simpler strategies, such as avoiding the empty cup and choosing within the manipulated pair. We devised a new version of the task in which a sticker was visibly removed from one of the four cups so that 2.5- to 5-year-old children (N = 100) would fail if they relied on such strategies. We also included a conceptual replication of Mody and Carey's (2016) original condition. Our results replicated their findings and showed that even younger children, 2.5 years of age, could pass above chance levels. Yet, 2.5-, 3- and 4-year-olds failed the new condition. Only 5-year-old children performed above chance in both conditions and so provided compelling evidence of deductive reasoning from the premise "A or B", where "or" is exclusive. We propose that younger children may instead conceive of the relationship between A and B as inclusive "or" across both versions of the task.

Mobile containers in human cognitive evolution studies: Understudied and underrepresented.

Mobile carrying devices-slings, bags, boxes, containers, etc.-are a ubiquitous tool form among recent human communities. So ingrained are they to our present lifeways that the fundamental relationship between mobile containers and foresight is easily overlooked, resulting in their significance in the study of human cognitive development being largely unrecognized. Exactly when this game-changing innovation appeared and became an essential component of the human toolkit is currently unknown. Taphonomic processes are obviously a significant factor in this situation; however, we argue that these devices have also not received the attention that they deserve from human evolution researchers. Here we discuss what the current archeological evidence is for Pleistocene-aged mobile containers and outline the various lines of evidence that they provide for the origins and development of human cognitive and cultural behavior.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition.

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

It's in the bag: mobile containers in human evolution and child development.

Mobile containers are a keystone human innovation. Ethnographic data indicate that all human groups use containers such as bags, quivers and baskets, ensuring that individuals have important resources at the ready and are prepared for opportunities and threats before they materialize. Although there is speculation surrounding the invention of carrying devices, the current hard archaeological evidence only reaches back some 100,000 years. The dearth of ancient evidence may reflect not only taphonomic processes, but also a lack of attention to these devices. To begin investigating the origins of carrying devices we focus on exploring the basic cognitive processes involved in mobile container use and report an initial study on young children's understanding and deployment of such devices. We gave 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 106) the opportunity to spontaneously identify and use a basket to increase their own carrying capacity and thereby obtain more resources in the future. Performance improved linearly with age, as did the likelihood of recognizing that adults use mobile carrying devices to increase carrying capacity. We argue that the evolutionary and developmental origins of mobile containers reflect foundational cognitive processes that enable humans to think about their own limits and compensate for them.

Preparation for certain and uncertain future outcomes in young children and three species of monkey.

This study examined 3-year old children and monkeys' capacities to prepare for immediate future events. In Study 1, children were presented with several tube apparatuses with two exits. When targets were certain to emerge from both, children tended to prepare to catch them by covering each exit. When it was uncertain where targets would emerge, however, they tended to prepare for only one possibility. These results substantiate the claim that simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive possibilities develops relatively late. Study 2 found no evidence for such a capacity in monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi, Cebus apella, Papio hamadryas) given the same tasks.

Individual differences in neonatal "imitation" fail to predict early social cognitive behaviour.

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth - and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition - is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334-1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post-hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal "imitation" predict later-developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object-directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self-recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal "imitation" of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later-developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean rs  = 0.027, 95% CI [-0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a "like me" mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition.