Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains.

Whether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct mental systems that process different domains of moral information (moral pluralism) is an important question for moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent (intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity (e.g. incest), when compared with harm (e.g. poisoning), moral violations is, arguably, some of the strongest experimental evidence for distinct moral systems or 'foundations'. The experiment presented here is a replication attempt of these experimental findings. A pre-registered replication of Experiment 1B from the original article documenting this effect was conducted in a sample of N = 400 participants. Findings from this successful replication are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological implications for approaches to moral cognition.

Attentional efficiency does not explain the mental state × domain effect.

The reduced importance of intent when judging purity (vs. harm) violations is some of the strongest evidence for distinct moral modules or systems: moral pluralism. However, research has indicated that some supposed differences between purity and harm moral domains are due to the relative weirdness of purity vignettes. This weirdness might lead to a failure to attend to or correctly process relevant mental state information. Such attentional failures could offer an alternative explanation (to separate moral systems) for the reduced exculpatory value of innocent intentions for purity violations. We tested if the different role of intent in each domain was moderated by individual differences in attentional efficiency, as measured by the Attention Network Task. If attentional efficiency explains the reduced exculpatory value of innocent intentions in purity (vs. harm) violations, then we would expect those high (vs. low) in attentional efficiency not to show the reduced exculpatory effect of innocent intentions in the purity (vs. harm) domain. Consistent with moral pluralism, results revealed no such moderation. Findings are discussed in relation to various ways of testing domain-general and domain-specific accounts of the mental state × domain effect, so that we might better understand the architecture of our moral minds.

Testing the effect of historical representations on collective identity and action.

Historical representation of collective identity offer means of influencing the extent to which group members engage in activities in line with the collective interests of their group vs. their own individual interests. This research tested the effect of different historical representations of the African people on Africans' perceptions of African social identity and engagement in identity management strategies across two studies. In Study 1 (N = 162), we tested the effect of two historical representations: positive (prestigious precolonial African history and resistance to the colonial power) and negative (inhumane practices of precolonial Africans). In Study 2 (N = 431), we tested the effect of two historical representations: positive (prestigious precolonial African history) and negative factual (inhuman practices of precolonial Africans) while also making salient the ubiquitous historical representation of the African people (negative colonial-perspective) across all history conditions. We predicted that positive (vs. negative) historical representation would lead to more positive perceptions of African identity, which in turn would predict more collectively-oriented identity management strategies. Altogether, results provided no support for these predictions. We highlight methodological (and by extension theoretical) features-such as, psychological reactance and outgroup audience effect-which may have limited the effect of the manipulations to help inform the interpretation of the null findings obtained. We conclude by discussing other limitations and the theoretical implications of our work, before pointing out various avenues for future research to help us better test, and understand, the role of historical representation in the African context.

Climate Justice: High-Status Ingroup Social Models Increase Pro-Environmental Action Through Making Actions Seem More Moral.

Recent work has suggested that our cognitive biases and moral psychology may pose significant barriers to tackling climate change. Here, we report evidence that through status and group-based social influence processes, and our moral sense of justice, it may be possible to employ such characteristics of the human mind in efforts to engender pro-environmental action. We draw on applied work demonstrating the efficacy of social modeling techniques in order to examine the indirect effects of social model status and group membership (through perceptions of efficacy, pro-environmental social identity and moral judgments of how fair it is for individuals to perform particular pro-environmental actions) on pro-environmental action tendencies. We find evidence that high- (vs. low-) status models increase pro-environmental action, in part, through making such actions seem morally fairer to undertake. This effect of high-status models only occurs when they share a meaningful ingroup membership with the target of influence. Further, we find evidence that this conditional effect of high-status models may also have a direct impact on action tendencies. While the exact behaviors that are influenced may vary across student and non-student samples, we argue that a focus on the "justice pathway" to action and the social-cognitive features of models may offer a good opportunity for cognitive and behavioral scientists to integrate insights from basic research with those stemming from more applied research efforts.

Attitudes toward Arab ascendance: Israeli and global perspectives.

Arab nations are decades behind many other previously colonized nations in developing stronger economies, more democratic institutions, and more autonomy and self-government, in part as a result of external interference. The year 2011 brought the potential for greater Arab autonomy through popular uprisings against autocratic governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and through the Palestinian request for state recognition by the United Nations. We examined the psychology of support for Arab ascendancy among adults in 14 nations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Europe, and North America. We predicted and found that people low on social dominance orientation endorsed forming an independent Palestinian state and desired that the Arab uprisings succeed. Rejection of ideologies that legitimize outside interference with Arabs mediated this support. Measures and model results were robust across world regions. We discuss theoretical implications regarding the advent of new ideologies and extending social dominance theory to address international relations.

Admiration regulates social hierarchy: Antecedents, dispositions, and effects on intergroup behavior.

In four studies, we report evidence that admiration affects intergroup behaviors that regulate social hierarchy. We demonstrate that manipulating the legitimacy of status relations affects admiration for the dominant and that this emotion negatively predicts political action tendencies aimed at social change. In addition, we show that greater warmth and competence lead to greater admiration for an outgroup, which in turn positively predicts deferential behavior and intergroup learning. We also demonstrate that, for those with a disposition to feel admiration, increasing admiration for an outgroup decreases willingness to take political action against that outgroup. Finally, we show that when the object of admiration is a subversive "martyr," admiration positively predicts political action tendencies and behavior aimed at challenging the status quo. These findings provide the first evidence for the important role of admiration in regulating social hierarchy.