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2.
Disaster Med Public Health Prep ; 11(6): 720-728, 2017 12.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28659220

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVE: We characterized evacuations related to Hurricane Sandy, which made landfall in New Jersey on October 29, 2012. METHODS: We analyzed data from the 2014 New Jersey Behavioral Risk Factor Survey. The proportion of respondents reporting evacuation was used to estimate the number of New Jersey adults who evacuated. We determined evacuation rates in heavily impacted and less-impacted municipalities, as well as evacuation rates for municipalities under and not under mandatory evacuation orders. We tested associations between demographic and health factors, such as certain chronic health conditions, and evacuation. RESULTS: Among respondents, 12.7% (95% CI: 11.8%-13.6%) reported evacuating, corresponding to approximately 880,000 adults. In heavily impacted municipalities, 17.0% (95% CI: 15.2%-18.7%) evacuated, compared with 10.1% (95% CI: 9.0%-11.2%) in less-impacted municipalities. In municipalities under mandatory evacuation orders, 42.5% (95% CI: 35.1%-49.8%) evacuated, compared with 11.8% (95% CI: 10.9%-12.9%) in municipalities not under mandatory orders. Female gender (odds ratio [OR]: 1.36; 95% CI: 1.14-1.64), unmarried status (OR: 1.22; 95% CI: 1.02-1.46), shorter length of residence (OR: 1.28; 95% CI: 1.03-1.60), and living in a heavily impacted municipality (OR: 1.84; 95% CI: 1.54-2.20) were significantly associated with evacuation. History of stroke (OR: 1.61; 95% CI: 1.02-2.53) was the only chronic condition associated with evacuation. CONCLUSIONS: Approximately 880,000 New Jersey adults evacuated because of Hurricane Sandy. Those in heavily impacted municipalities and municipalities under mandatory evacuation orders had higher evacuation rates; however, still fewer than half evacuated. These findings can be used for future disaster planning. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2017;11:720-728).


Subject(s)
Cyclonic Storms/statistics & numerical data , Psychometrics/statistics & numerical data , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , New Jersey , Psychometrics/instrumentation , Psychometrics/methods , Public Health/methods , Public Health/standards , Risk Factors , Surveys and Questionnaires
3.
Clin Infect Dis ; 55(2): 251-3, 2012 Jul.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-22491504
4.
Clin Infect Dis ; 45(5): 527-33, 2007 Sep 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-17682984

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: In contrast to pharmaceutical manufacturers, compounding pharmacies adhere to different quality-control standards, which may increase the likelihood of undetected outbreaks. In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received reports of cases of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infection occurring in patients who underwent cardiac surgical procedures in Los Angeles, California, and in New Jersey. An investigation was initiated to determine whether there was a common underlying cause. METHODS: A matched case-control study was conducted in Los Angeles. Case record review and environmental testing were conducted in New Jersey. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention performed a multistate case-finding investigation; isolates were compared using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis. RESULTS: Nationally distributed magnesium sulfate solution (MgSO(4)) from compounding pharmacy X was the only significant risk factor for S. marcescens bloodstream infection (odds ratio, 6.4; 95% confidence interval, 1.1-38.3) among 6 Los Angeles case patients and 18 control subjects. Five New Jersey case patients received MgSO(4) from a single lot produced by compounding pharmacy X; culture of samples from open and unopened 50-mL bags in this lot yielded S. marcescens. Seven additional case patients from 3 different states were identified. Isolates from all 18 case patients and from samples of MgSO(4) demonstrated indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Compounding pharmacy X voluntarily recalled the product. Neither the pharmacy nor the US Food and Drug Administration could identify a source of contamination in their investigations of compounding pharmacy X. CONCLUSIONS: A multistate outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection was linked to contaminated MgSO(4) distributed nationally by a compounding pharmacy. Health care personnel should take into account the different quality standards and regulation of compounded parenteral medications distributed in large quantities during investigations of outbreaks of bloodstream infection.


Subject(s)
Bacteremia/epidemiology , Cardiovascular Agents/adverse effects , Disease Outbreaks , Drug Contamination , Magnesium Sulfate/adverse effects , Serratia Infections/etiology , Serratia marcescens/pathogenicity , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Bacteremia/microbiology , Cardiac Surgical Procedures , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./statistics & numerical data , Cross Infection/epidemiology , Cross Infection/microbiology , Drug Compounding/adverse effects , Drug Compounding/standards , Female , Humans , Los Angeles/epidemiology , Male , Middle Aged , New Jersey/epidemiology , Risk Factors , Serratia Infections/epidemiology , Serratia marcescens/isolation & purification , United States
5.
Biosecur Bioterror ; 4(3): 293-300, 2006.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16999590

ABSTRACT

Modernization of electronic communication systems to facilitate infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation became a priority after the 2001 anthrax attacks. However, the extent to which communicable disease investigators are using web-based information resources, e-mail notifications, or secure information exchange systems to facilitate surveillance is unknown. To address this question, we conducted a survey in 2004 of state and local communicable disease investigators responsible for infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation in three states. The majority (70.7%) of the 297 respondents accessed the Internet for information regarding infectious disease surveillance and outbreaks at least weekly. Most (74%) respondents who searched for information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website reported that they found what they were looking for 75-100% of the time, compared with 54% who found the information from their state health department websites 75-100% of the time. One-third of respondents read e-mail notifications regarding outbreaks under investigation in their state less frequently than monthly; 34% of those enrolled in CDC's Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) read e-mail notifications of new reports less frequently than monthly. Forty-seven (18%) respondents read ProMED-mail at least monthly, while 46% indicated they had never consulted MEDLINE/PubMed. Some progress has been made in use of the Internet to facilitate communication in infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation. Addressing barriers to access and usability of new information systems in conjunction with training and technical support could enhance infectious disease surveillance and timely investigation of outbreaks and bioterrorism events.


Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/methods , Disease Outbreaks , Internet , Population Surveillance , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Communication Barriers , Data Interpretation, Statistical , Humans , PubMed , Surveys and Questionnaires , United States
6.
Pediatr Emerg Care ; 21(10): 677-80, 2005 Oct.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16215474

ABSTRACT

We present 2 unrelated cases of tick paralysis presenting within a 2-month period in the greater Philadelphia region, a geographic area in which this disease is highly unusual. Our first patient demonstrated early onset of prominent bulbar palsies, an atypical presentation. Our second patient, residing in a nearby but distinct community, presented with ascending paralysis 2 months after the first. The atypical presentation of our first patient and the further occurrence within a few months of a second patient, both from the Northeastern United States where this diagnosis is rarely made, suggest the need to maintain a high index of suspicion for this disease in patients presenting with acute onset of cranial nerve dysfunction or muscle weakness. Through simple diagnostic and therapeutic measures (ie, careful physical examination to locate and remove the offending tick), misdiagnosis and unnecessary morbidity can be avoided.


Subject(s)
Tick Paralysis/diagnosis , Animals , Ataxia/etiology , Child , Child, Preschool , Dermacentor , Diplopia/etiology , Female , Humans , Risk Factors , Tick Paralysis/complications
7.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 11(3): 216-21, 2005.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-15829834

ABSTRACT

PURPOSE: During 2003, the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, in collaboration with other agencies, began planning and implementing voluntary smallpox vaccination clinics. METHODS: Surveys were distributed to all vaccinees, hospital bioterrorism coordinators, and local health departments to assess clinic experiences. RESULTS: During January-July 2003, 23 clinics were conducted with more than 1,000 participants. Of 670 persons vaccinated, 529 (79%) completed surveys. We received 65 surveys from 68 (77%) of 84 hospitals, and 25 responses from 22 regional health agencies. CONCLUSIONS: Vaccination is one component of preparedness; future initiatives must incorporate multiagency collaboration and developing public health infrastructure.


Subject(s)
Bioterrorism , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Immunization Programs/organization & administration , Smallpox/prevention & control , Health Personnel , Health Plan Implementation , Humans , New Jersey , Program Evaluation
8.
N J Med ; 101(9 Suppl): 45-50; quiz 50-2, 2004 Sep.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-15497734

ABSTRACT

The DHSS and federal agencies have expanded their surveillance efforts to improve existing methods of reporting notifiable communicable diseases and to include additional data sources that might provide a more comprehensive view of disease activity in New Jersey. Currently, the DHSS is evaluating these efforts and recognizes several issues that need to be addressed, including: assessment of the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of surveillance data; validation of surveillance data through comparison with hospital uniform billing data; characterization of the sensitivity of alerts through examination of reasons for identified aberrations in disease activity; evaluation of DHSS staffs and LINCS epidemiologists' follow-up efforts in response to alerts; evaluation of cumulative data trends to determine patterns in baseline disease activity (e.g., variations in disease activity attributed to seasonality); development of methods to integrate data from all surveillance efforts to provide timely, comprehensive, and coordinated summaries of disease activity and to distribute these summaries regularly to all New Jersey public health partners to better inform public health and clinical management; and development of a coordinated multi-agency response plan in conjunction with adjacent states. Though the DHSS hopes that these surveillance efforts will contribute to the early detection of sentinel events that might represent possible bioterrorist or emerging infectious disease threats, the DHSS will also need to engage the medical community more fully in surveillance activities. In previous experiences, astute clinicians were responsible for the identification of the first cases of West Nile virus, anthrax, and SARS. Therefore, to further ensure the success of its surveillance efforts, the DHSS will also need to continue educating clinicians about its surveillance activities and the importance of timely reporting of patients with illness patterns that might suggest an unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with bioterrorism or emerging infectious diseases.


Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/standards , Communicable Diseases/epidemiology , Disease Notification/standards , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Population Surveillance/methods , Communicable Disease Control/trends , Communicable Diseases/diagnosis , Female , Humans , Incidence , Male , New Jersey/epidemiology , Public Health Practice , Risk Assessment , Risk Management
9.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol ; 24(11): 848-52, 2003 Nov.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-14649774

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVE: To characterize risk factors for invasive pneumococcal infection in a nursing home outbreak. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation, case-control study. SETTING: A 114-bed nursing home in New Jersey. PARTICIPANTS: Case-patients were nursing home residents hospitalized with febrile respiratory illness and radiographic findings consistent with pneumonia, and either sputum specimens positive for diplococci or blood cultures positive for Streptococcus pneumoniae, with illness onset during April 3-24, 2001. Control-patients were selected randomly from remaining residents without respiratory symptoms. METHODS: Chart reviews were performed for case-patients and control-patients. Serotyping and susceptibility testing were performed on S. pneumoniae isolates. Long-term-care facilities (LTCFs) were surveyed to assess compliance with a state regulation mandating pneumococcal vaccination of residents 65 years and older. RESULTS: Nine case-patients were identified, with a median age of 86 years (range, 78 to 100 years). The median age of control-patients was 86 years (range, 58 to 95 years). No case-patients versus 9 (50%) control-patients received pneumococcal vaccine before the outbreak (OR, 0; CI95, 0-0.7). Recent antibiotic use, pneumonia history, and physical functioning were not associated with illness. Illness attack rate was 16% among all unvaccinated residents versus 0 among vaccinated residents. S. pneumoniae serotype 14, included in pneumococcal vaccine, was isolated from blood cultures of 7 case-patients. Of 361 LTCFs (42%) that replied to the survey, 28 (8%) were not complying with state immunization regulations. CONCLUSIONS: This outbreak occurred in an LTCF with low vaccine coverage. Implementing standing order programs, enforcing regulations, documenting vaccinations, and providing education might increase coverage among nursing home residents.


Subject(s)
Cross Infection/epidemiology , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Mandatory Programs/legislation & jurisprudence , Nursing Homes/standards , Pneumococcal Vaccines/administration & dosage , Pneumonia, Pneumococcal/epidemiology , Vaccination/statistics & numerical data , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Case-Control Studies , Cross Infection/microbiology , Cross Infection/transmission , Female , Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice , Humans , Infection Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Infection Control/statistics & numerical data , Male , New Jersey/epidemiology , Nursing Homes/legislation & jurisprudence , Pneumonia, Pneumococcal/microbiology , Pneumonia, Pneumococcal/prevention & control , Risk Factors , Serotyping , Streptococcus pneumoniae/isolation & purification , Streptococcus pneumoniae/pathogenicity , Vaccination/legislation & jurisprudence
10.
Emerg Infect Dis ; 8(10): 1073-7, 2002 Oct.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-12396918

ABSTRACT

In October 2001, two inhalational anthrax and four cutaneous anthrax cases, resulting from the processing of Bacillus anthracis-containing envelopes at a New Jersey mail facility, were identified. Subsequently, we initiated stimulated passive hospital-based and enhanced passive surveillance for anthrax-compatible syndromes. From October 24 to December 17, 2001, hospitals reported 240,160 visits and 7,109 intensive-care unit admissions in the surveillance area (population 6.7 million persons). Following a change of reporting criteria on November 8, the average of possible inhalational anthrax reports decreased 83% from 18 to 3 per day; the proportion of reports requiring follow-up increased from 37% (105/286) to 41% (47/116). Clinical follow-up was conducted on 214 of 464 possible inhalational anthrax patients and 98 possible cutaneous anthrax patients; 49 had additional laboratory testing. No additional cases were identified. To verify the limited scope of the outbreak, surveillance was essential, though labor-intensive. The flexibility of the system allowed interim evaluation, thus improving surveillance efficiency.


Subject(s)
Anthrax/epidemiology , Bioterrorism/statistics & numerical data , Population Surveillance , Postal Service , Adult , Anthrax/diagnosis , Bacillus anthracis , Coroners and Medical Examiners , Delaware/epidemiology , Equipment Contamination , Female , Hospitals , Humans , Inhalation Exposure , New Jersey/epidemiology , Pennsylvania/epidemiology , Respiratory Tract Infections/diagnosis , Respiratory Tract Infections/epidemiology , Respiratory Tract Infections/microbiology , Skin Diseases, Bacterial/diagnosis , Skin Diseases, Bacterial/epidemiology , Skin Diseases, Bacterial/microbiology , Time Factors
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