A networking model. The case of the International Center for Genetic Epistemology / Um modelo de rede. O caso do Centro Internacional de Epistemologia Genética / Un modelo de red. El caso del Centro Internacional de Epistemología Genética

The article reviews the process of conformation of the International Center for Genetic Epistemology (CIEG), which functioned at the University of Geneva between 1955 and 1986. This Center led by Jean Piaget had the collaboration of hundreds of researchers from around the world and from different disciplines. We will here review the configuration of the centripetal circuits that led to the constitution of an institution with a double centrality. On the one hand, taking into account the history of international scientific circulations, it is feasible to recognize in the CIEG a reference point from which the radial journeys of social exchanges with different scientific communities can be reconstructed. On the other hand, we can identify a research program that positioned psychology at the core of epistemological debates. To contribute to the historical analysis of this double movement of centration, geography and theory, we examine the development of a series of strategies tending to the start-up of the Center, deployed during the first years of the 1950s.(AU)

O artigo analisa o processo de constituição do Centro Internacional de Epistemologia Genética (CIEG), localizado na Universidade de Genebra entre 1955 e 1986. Este centro liderado por Jean Piaget contava com a colaboração de centenas de pesquisadores de todo o mundo e de diferentes disciplinas. Aqui, revisaremos a configuração dos circuitos centrípetos que levaram à constituição de uma instituição com dupla centralidade. Por um lado, levando em conta a história das circulações científicas internacionais, é viável reconhecer no CIEG um ponto de referência a partir do qual as viagens radiais de trocas sociais com diferentes comunidades científicas podem ser reconstruídas. Por outro lado, podemos identificar um programa de pesquisa que posicionou a psicologia no centro dos debates epistemológicos. Para contribuir com a análise histórica desse duplo movimento de centralização, geografia e teoria, examinamos o desenvolvimento de uma série de estratégias, do Centro, implantadas nos primeiros anos da década de 1950.(AU)

El artículo revisa el proceso de conformación del Centro Internacional de Epistemología Genética (CIEG), radicado en la Universidad de Ginebra entre 1955 y 1986. Este Centro liderado por Jean Piaget contó con la colaboración de cientos de investigadores de todo el mundo y de diversas disciplinas. Aquí, nos ocuparemos de revisar la configuración de los circuitos centrípetos que desembocaron en la constitución de una institución con una doble centralidad. Por un lado, atendiendo a la historia de las circulaciones científicas internacionales, es factible reconocer en el CIEG un lugar de referencia desde el cual pueden reconstruirse los trayectos radiales de intercambios sociales con diferentes comunidades científicas. Por otra parte, podemos identificar un programa de investigación que posicionó a la psicología en el núcleo de los debates epistemológicos. Para contribuir al análisis histórico de este doble movimiento de centralización, geográfica y teórica, examinamos el desarrollo de una serie de estrategias tendientes a la puesta en marcha del Centro, desplegadas durante los primeros años de la década de 1950.(AU)

Between physics and metaphysics: structure as a boundary concept.

The notion of structure is found to be used in a great number of theories, scientific research programs and world views. However, its uses and definitions are as diverse as the objects of the scientific disciplines where it can be found. Without trying to recreate the structuralist aspiration from the mid XX century, which believed to have found in this notion a common transdisciplinary language, I discuss a specific aspect of this concept that could be considered a constant in different perspectives. This aspect refers to the location of the notions of structure as boundaries in the different scientific theories. With this, I try to argue that the definition or presentation of a structure configures in itself the frontier for scientific knowledge, defining at the same time implied ontological assumptions. In order to discuss this hypothesis, and taking into consideration the double origin of contemporary notions of structure -the mathematical and linguistic line-, I revise several theoretical perspectives which made explicit the relation between structures and knowledge, and their relation with the real: the arguments on physical knowledge by Eddington, structural anthropology, structural linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Piaget's genetic psychology.