Judicial Discomfort over 'Innovative' Treatment for Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria.

Medical treatment for adolescents with gender dysphoria has attracted considerable attention in recent years, with continuing court involvement in Australia and recent judicial review proceedings in the UK. In Re Imogen [No 6], the Family Court of Australia held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of an adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the adolescent's capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. In this article, we examine the Family Court's rationale for preserving its welfare jurisdiction in gender dysphoria cases. We analyse case law developments in Australia and more recently in the UK and identify a thread of judicial discomfort in gender dysphoria jurisprudence about adolescents consenting to medical treatment that the court perceives to be 'innovative', 'experimental', 'unique', or 'controversial'. We explore whether treatment for gender dysphoria can be characterised as 'innovative' and identify four factors that appear to be influencing courts in Australia and the UK. We also consider how such a characterisation might impact (if at all) on an adolescent's capacity to consent to gender dysphoria treatment. We critique the ongoing role of courts in these cases and recommend a robust decision-making framework for gender dysphoria treatment to minimise court involvement in the future.

The Discriminatory Legal Barrier of Partner Consent in Victorian ART Law: EHT18 v Melbourne IVF.

In September 2018, the Federal Court of Australia found that a Victorian woman did not need her estranged husband's consent to undergo in vitro fertilisation treatment (IVF) using donor sperm. The woman, who was 45 years of age, made an urgent application to the Court for permission to undergo IVF using donor sperm. In a single judge ruling, Griffiths J held that the requirement in the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ('ART Act') for a married woman to obtain the consent of her husband discriminated against the woman in question on the basis of her marital status in contravention of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ('SD Act'). His Honour declared the Victorian law in this instance 'invalid and inoperable' by operation of section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution to the extent it was inconsistent with the Commonwealth law. Although the declarations by the Federal Court were limited in their terms to the circumstances of the case, the judgment raises broader issues about equity of access to assisted reproductive treatment (ART) in Victoria. The issue of partner consent as a barrier to access to ART was specifically raised by an independent review of the ART Act in Victoria. The Victorian Government released an interim report late last year as a first stage of the review, which canvasses some options for reform. This raises a broader question as to whether prescriptive legislation imposing detailed access requirements for ART is necessary or even helpful.