Prescribing vegetarian or flexitarian diets leads to sustained reduction in meat intake.

Many people agree that reducing the consumption of meat has good ends (e.g., for animal welfare, the environment, and human health). However, the question of which advocacy strategies are most effective in enabling wide-spread meat reduction remains open. We explored this by prescribing four different meat reduction diets to omnivorous participants for a seven-day adherence period, and studied their meat consumption over time. The diets included a Vegetarian diet, and three flexitarian diets (Climatarian - limit beef and lamb consumption; One Step for Animals - eliminate chicken consumption; Reducetarian - reduce all meat consumption). Results showed pronounced differences between groups in meat consumption during the adherence period, where the Vegetarian group ate significantly less meat than the flexitarian groups. All groups decreased their meat intake in the weeks following the adherence period compared to baseline, however, there were no significant group differences in the level of decrease over time. Participants also changed their attitudes toward meat and animals from pre-to post-intervention, and decreases in commitment toward and rationalization of meat-eating partially mediated change in meat intake. These findings reveal that the diet assignments had some impact on participants' meat consumption and attitudes even after the prescribed adherence period had ended. However, the sustained decrease in consumption did not vary depending on what meat reduction strategy was originally used.

Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and humans for the greater good.

Most people hold that it is wrong to sacrifice some humans to save a greater number of humans. Do people also think that it is wrong to sacrifice some animals to save a greater number of animals, or do they answer such questions about harm to animals by engaging in a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation? Across 10 studies (N = 4,662), using hypothetical and real-life sacrificial moral dilemmas, we found that participants considered it more permissible to harm a few animals to save a greater number of animals than to harm a few humans to save a greater number of humans. This was explained by a reduced general aversion to harm animals compared with humans, which was partly driven by participants perceiving animals to suffer less and to have lower cognitive capacity than humans. However, the effect persisted even in cases where animals were described as having greater suffering capacity and greater cognitive capacity than some humans, and even when participants felt more socially connected to animals than to humans. The reduced aversion to harming animals was thus also partly due to speciesism-the tendency to ascribe lower moral value to animals due to their species-membership alone. In sum, our studies show that deontological constraints against instrumental harm are not absolute but get weaker the less people morally value the respective entity. These constraints are strongest for humans, followed by dogs, chimpanzees, pigs, and finally inanimate objects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).