Emotional distress regulation takes precedence over impulse control: if you feel bad, do it!

Why do people's impulse controls break down during emotional distress? Some theories propose that distress impairs one's motivation or one's ability to exert self-control, and some postulate self-destructive intentions arising from the moods. Contrary to those theories, Three experiments found that believing that one's bad mood was frozen (unchangeable) eliminated the tendency to eat fattening snacks (Experiment 1), seek immediate gratification (Experiment 2), and engage in frivolous procrastination (Experiment 3). The implication is that when people are upset, they indulge immediate impulses to make themselves feel better, which amounts to giving short-term affect regulation priority over other self-regulatory goals.

If you can't join them, beat them: effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior.

Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responseswere specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion

Longitudinal improvement of self-regulation through practice: building self-control strength through repeated exercise.

This study examined the results of repeated exercises of self-control in relation to self-regulatory strength over time. A sample of 69 U.S. college students spent 2 weeks doing 1 of 3 self-control exercises: monitoring and improving posture, regulating mood, or monitoring and recording eating. Compared with a no-exercise control group, the participants who performed the self-control exercises showed significant improvement in self-regulatory capacity as measured by quitting faster on a hand-grip exercise task following a thought-suppression exercise.

Ego depletion: is the active self a limited resource?

Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. In Experiment 2, making a meaningful personal choice to perform attitude-relevant behavior caused a similar decrement in persistence. In Experiment 3, suppressing emotion led to a subsequent drop in performance of solvable anagrams. In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.

Self-control as limited resource: regulatory depletion patterns.

If self-regulation conforms to an energy or strength model, then self-control should be impaired by prior exertion. In Study 1, trying to regulate one's emotional response to an upsetting movie was followed by a decrease in physical stamina. In Study 2, suppressing forbidden thoughts led to a subsequent tendency to give up quickly on unsolvable anagrams. In Study 3, suppressing thoughts impaired subsequent efforts to control the expression of amusement and enjoyment. In Study 4, autobiographical accounts of successful versus failed emotional control linked prior regulatory demands and fatigue to self-regulatory failure. A strength model of self-regulation fits the data better than activation, priming, skill, or constant capacity models of self-regulation.

When ego threats lead to self-regulation failure: negative consequences of high self-esteem.

The tendency for people with high self-esteem to make inflated assessments and predictions about themselves carries the risk of making commitments that exceed capabilities, thus leading to failure. Ss chose their performance contingencies in a framework where larger rewards were linked to a greater risk of failure. In the absence of ego threat, Ss with high self-esteem showed superior self-regulation: They set appropriate goals and performed effectively. Ego threat, however, caused Ss with high self-esteem to set inappropriate, risky goals that were beyond their performance capabilities so they ended up with smaller rewards than Ss with low self-esteem. The results indicate the danger of letting egotistical illusions interfere with self-regulation processes.

Self-concept change and self-presentation: the looking glass self is also a magnifying glass.

Studies 1 and 2 showed that identical behaviors had greater impact on the self-concept when performed publicly rather than privately. That is, the self-concept is more likely to change by internalizing public behavior than by internalizing behavior that is identical but lacks the interpersonal context. The self-concept change extends even to behavioral changes and occurs even when participants are unaware of being observed. In addition, those who are high in self-monitoring are more likely to internalize their behavior than those who are low in self-monitoring. Study 3 provided evidence about what components of a public situation affect the internalization of behavior. Choice about making the self-portrayal, drawing on episodes from one's own past rather than relying on a yoked script, and expecting future interaction with the audience all increased the internalization of a public behavior.

Feeling-of-knowing in temporal lobe epilepsy: monitoring knowledge inaccessible to conscious recall.

Feeling-of-Knowing was compared in left temporal, right temporal, and control subjects. Seizure patients, like controls, demonstrate knowledge of information that is not accessible to conscious recall, but they are less accurate in FOK judgements. Furthermore, there are significant differences between seizure patients and controls in the relationship between Feeling-of-Knowing and object level memory scores: (1) Controls spend more time searching memory for inaccessible information that is correctly identified on a later recognition test than they do for information that is incorrectly recognized. (2) Latency of correct recognition decreases as strength of FOK increases among controls, suggesting that controls correctly anticipate the outcome of memory search. These patterns of performance, which are consistent with an efficient memory search termination device, were not observed among seizure patients. The findings suggest that inaccurate Feeling-of-Knowing may play a role in inefficient memory search mechanisms in temporal lobe epilepsy.

Two kinds of identity crisis.

In order to outline a model of identity crisis, it is necessary to distinguish two types. In an identity deficit ("motivation crisis"), the individual experiences a lack of guiding commitments but struggles to establish personal goals and values. In an identity conflict ("legitimation crisis"), the person has several commitments which prescribe conflicting behavioral imperatives in some situations, such that at least one commitment may have to be betrayed. The literature on identity crisis is reviewed in connection with this distinction, and an attempt is made to delineate the causes, the subjective experiences, behavioral consequences, and modes of resolution of each type of crisis.