ABSTRACT
Economic decision biases can reflect emotion and emotion dysfunction. Economic paradigms thus provide a solid framework for analysis of brain processes related to emotion and its disorders. Importantly for economic decisions, goal-conflict activates different negative motivational processes than pure loss; generating negative decision biases linked to anxiety and fear, respectively. Previously, right frontal goal-conflict specific EEG rhythmicity (GCSR) was shown to reflect anxiety processing. Here, we assessed GCSR in a forced-choice, economic decision-making task. Ninety participants were tested in three key conditions where gain:loss ratios of left mouse clicks were set to 75:25 (GAIN), 50:50 (CONFLICT) and 25:75 (LOSS). Right clicks produced no monetary consequences and skipped the current trial. The participants were not told the different conditions but could learn about them by associating the background stimulus color with the specific payoff. Goal-conflict was defined as the mathematical contrast of activity in CONFLICT minus the average of that in GAIN and LOSS. Replicating previous findings with somewhat different conditions, right frontal GCSR was detected. Importantly, greater right frontal GCSR significantly predicted a preference for economic safety in CONFLICT but not in GAIN or LOSS; but did not predict trait anxiety or neuroticism. We conclude that goal-conflict has unique neuroeconomics effects on choice biases; and that these reflect anxiety processing that is not effectively captured by trait anxiety or neuroticism.
ABSTRACT
This paper reports on three experiments investigating the contribution of different sensory modalities to the tracking of objects moved in total darkness. Participants sitting in the dark were exposed to a brief, bright flash which reliably induced a positive visual afterimage of the scene so illuminated. If the participants subsequently move their hand in the darkness, the visual afterimage of that hand fades or disappears; this is presumably due to conflict between the illusory visual afterimage (of the hand in its original location) and other information (e.g., proprioceptive) from a general mechanism for tracking body parts. This afterimage disappearance effect also occurs for held objects which are moved in the dark, and some have argued that this represents a case of body schema extension, i.e. the rapid incorporation of held external objects into the body schema. We demonstrate that the phenomenon is not limited to held objects and occurs in conditions where incorporation into the body schema is unlikely. Instead, we propose that the disappearance of afterimages of objects moved in darkness comes from a general mechanism for object tracking which integrates input from multiple sensory systems. This mechanism need not be limited to tracking body parts, and thus we need not invoke body schema extension to explain the afterimage disappearance. In this series of experiments, we test whether auditory feedback of object movement can induce afterimage disappearance, demonstrate that the disappearance effect scales with the magnitude of proprioceptive feedback, and show that tactile feedback alone is sufficient for the effect. Together, these data demonstrate that the visual percept of a positive afterimage is constructed not just from visual input of the scene when light reaches the eyes, but in conjunction with input from multiple other senses.
