ABSTRACT
This work is concerned with the decay of communicative abilities after head trauma. A protocol composed of 16 videotaped scenes was devised in order to investigate the comprehension of several types of communicative actions realized with extralinguistic means, like pointing or clapping. The protocol was administered to 30 closed-head-injured individuals. The results showed that performance decreased from simple standard acts to complex standard acts, deceits, and ironies. The subjects' performance was worse with the scenes reproducing failing, rather than successful, communicative actions. The results are compared with those we previously obtained with a linguistic protocol. A theory of the cognitive processes underlying intentional communication is outlined and used to explain the results.
Subject(s)
Communication Disorders/diagnosis , Communication Disorders/etiology , Head Injuries, Closed/complications , Linguistics , Adolescent , Adult , Cognition Disorders/diagnosis , Cognition Disorders/epidemiology , Female , Humans , Male , Neuropsychological Tests , Severity of Illness IndexABSTRACT
Cognitive pragmatics is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I discuss a few issues that may help clarify the relationship between this area and the broader cognitive science and the contribution that they give, or might give, to each other. Rather than dwelling on the many technicalities of the various theories of communication that have been advanced, I focus on the different conceptions of the nature and the architecture of the mind/brain that underlie them. My aims are, first, to introduce and defend mentalist views of communication in general; second, to defend one such view, namely that communication is a cognitive competence, that is, a faculty, and the underlying idea that the architecture of the mind/brain is domain-specific; and, third, to review the (scarce) neuropsychological evidence that bears on these issues.
Subject(s)
Brain/physiology , Cognition/physiology , Communication , Humans , LinguisticsABSTRACT
We are interested in the validation of a cognitive theory of human communication, grounded in a speech acts perspective. The theory we refer to is outlined, and a number of predictions are drawn from it. We report a series of protocols administered to 13 brain-injured subjects and to a comparable control group. The tasks included direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceits, failures of communication, and theory of mind inferences. All the predicted trends of difficulty are consistently verified; in particular, difficulty increases form direct/indirect speech acts to irony, from irony to deceits, and from deceits to failure recovery. This trend symmetrically shows both in the successful situation and in the failure situation. Further, failure situations prove more difficult to handle than the relevant successful situation. In sharp contrast with previous literature, there is no difference between the subjects' comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts. The results are discussed in the light of our theoretical approach.
