Evolution of influenza A viruses in exhibition swine and transmission to humans, 2013-2015.

AIMS: Swine are a mixing vessel for the emergence of novel reassortant influenza A viruses (IAV). Interspecies transmission of swine-origin IAV poses a public health and pandemic risk. In the United States, the majority of zoonotic IAV transmission events have occurred in association with swine exposure at agricultural fairs. Accordingly, this human-animal interface necessitates mitigation strategies informed by understanding of interspecies transmission mechanisms in exhibition swine. Likewise, the diversity of IAV in swine can be a source for novel reassortant or mutated viruses that pose a risk to both swine and human health. METHODS AND RESULTS: In an effort to better understand those risks, here we investigated the epidemiology of IAV in exhibition swine and subsequent transmission to humans by performing phylogenetic analyses using full genome sequences from 272 IAV isolates collected from exhibition swine and 23 A(H3N2)v viruses from human hosts during 2013-2015. Sixty-seven fairs (24.2%) had at least one pig test positive for IAV with an overall estimated prevalence of 8.9% (95% CI: 8.3-9.6, Clopper-Pearson). Of the 19 genotypes found in swine, 5 were also identified in humans. There was a positive correlation between the number of human cases of a genotype and its prevalence in exhibition swine. Additionally, we demonstrated that A(H3N2)v viruses clustered tightly with exhibition swine viruses that were prevalent in the same year. CONCLUSIONS: These data indicate that multiple genotypes of swine-lineage IAV have infected humans, and highly prevalent IAV genotypes in exhibition swine during a given year are also the strains detected most frequently in human cases of variant IAV. Continued surveillance and rapid characterization of IAVs in exhibition swine can facilitate timely phenotypic evaluation and matching of candidate vaccine strains to those viruses present at the human-animal interface which are most likely to spillover into humans.

Shortening Duration of Swine Exhibitions to Reduce Risk for Zoonotic Transmission of Influenza A Virus.

Reducing zoonotic influenza A virus (IAV) risk in the United States necessitates mitigation of IAV in exhibition swine. We evaluated the effectiveness of shortening swine exhibitions to <72 hours to reduce IAV risk. We longitudinally sampled every pig daily for the full duration of 16 county fairs during 2014-2015 (39,768 nasal wipes from 6,768 pigs). In addition, we estimated IAV prevalence at 195 fairs during 2018-2019 to test the hypothesis that <72-hour swine exhibitions would have lower IAV prevalence. In both studies, we found that shortening duration drastically reduces IAV prevalence in exhibition swine at county fairs. Reduction of viral load in the barn within a county fair is critical to reduce the risk for interspecies IAV transmission and pandemic potential. Therefore, we encourage fair organizers to shorten swine shows to protect the health of both animals and humans.

Estimating Risk to Responders Exposed to Avian Influenza A H5 and H7 Viruses in Poultry, United States, 2014-2017.

In the United States, outbreaks of avian influenza H5 and H7 virus infections in poultry have raised concern about the risk for infections in humans. We reviewed the data collected during 2014-2017 and found no human infections among 4,555 exposed responders who were wearing protection.

Use of Influenza Risk Assessment Tool for Prepandemic Preparedness.

In 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began to develop an Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT) to methodically capture and assess information relating to influenza A viruses not currently circulating among humans. The IRAT uses a multiattribute, additive model to generate a summary risk score for each virus. Although the IRAT is not intended to predict the next pandemic influenza A virus, it has provided input into prepandemic preparedness decisions.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States, October 1-November 25, 2017.

Influenza activity in the United States was low during October 2017, but has been increasing since the beginning of November. Influenza A viruses have been most commonly identified, with influenza A(H3N2) viruses predominating. Several influenza activity indicators were higher than is typically seen for this time of year. The majority of influenza viruses characterized during this period were genetically or antigenically similar to the 2017-18 Northern Hemisphere cell-grown vaccine reference viruses. These data indicate that currently circulating viruses have not undergone significant antigenic drift; however, circulating A(H3N2) viruses are antigenically less similar to egg-grown A(H3N2) viruses used for producing the majority of influenza vaccines in the United States. It is difficult to predict which influenza viruses will predominate in the 2017-18 influenza season; however, in recent past seasons in which A(H3N2) viruses predominated, hospitalizations and deaths were more common, and the effectiveness of the vaccine was lower. Annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. Multiple influenza vaccines are approved and recommended for use during the 2017-18 season, and vaccination should continue to be offered as long as influenza viruses are circulating and unexpired vaccine is available. This report summarizes U.S. influenza activity* during October 1-November 25, 2017 (surveillance weeks 40-47).†.

Avian Influenza A(H7N2) Virus in Human Exposed to Sick Cats, New York, USA, 2016.

An outbreak of influenza A(H7N2) virus in cats in a shelter in New York, NY, USA, resulted in zoonotic transmission. Virus isolated from the infected human was closely related to virus isolated from a cat; both were related to low pathogenicity avian influenza A(H7N2) viruses detected in the United States during the early 2000s.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States and Worldwide, May 21-September 23, 2017.

During May 21-September 23, 2017,* the United States experienced low-level seasonal influenza virus activity; however, beginning in early September, CDC received reports of a small number of localized influenza outbreaks caused by influenza A(H3N2) viruses. In addition to influenza A(H3N2) viruses, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses were detected during May-September worldwide and in the United States. Influenza B viruses predominated in the United States from late May through late June, and influenza A viruses predominated beginning in early July. The majority of the influenza viruses collected and received from the United States and other countries during that time have been characterized genetically or antigenically as being similar to the 2017 Southern Hemisphere and 2017-18 Northern Hemisphere cell-grown vaccine reference viruses; however, a smaller proportion of the circulating A(H3N2) viruses showed similarity to the egg-grown A(H3N2) vaccine reference virus which represents the A(H3N2) viruses used for the majority of vaccine production in the United States. Also, during May 21-September 23, 2017, CDC confirmed a total of 33 influenza variant virus† infections; two were influenza A(H1N2) variant (H1N2v) viruses (Ohio) and 31 were influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) viruses (Delaware [1], Maryland [13], North Dakota [1], Pennsylvania [1], and Ohio [15]). An additional 18 specimens from Maryland have tested presumptive positive for H3v and further analysis is being conducted at CDC.

Update: Increase in Human Infections with Novel Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Viruses During the Fifth Epidemic - China, October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017.

Among all influenza viruses assessed using CDC's Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT), the Asian lineage avian influenza A(H7N9) virus (Asian H7N9), first reported in China in March 2013,* is ranked as the influenza virus with the highest potential pandemic risk (1). During October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017, the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China; CDC, Taiwan; the Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection; and the Macao CDC reported 759 human infections with Asian H7N9 viruses, including 281 deaths, to the World Health Organization (WHO), making this the largest of the five epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections that have occurred since 2013 (Figure 1). This report summarizes new viral and epidemiologic features identified during the fifth epidemic of Asian H7N9 in China and summarizes ongoing measures to enhance pandemic preparedness. Infections in humans and poultry were reported from most areas of China, including provinces bordering other countries, indicating extensive, ongoing geographic spread. The risk to the general public is very low and most human infections were, and continue to be, associated with poultry exposure, especially at live bird markets in mainland China. Throughout the first four epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections, only low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses were detected among human, poultry, and environmental specimens and samples. During the fifth epidemic, mutations were detected among some Asian H7N9 viruses, identifying the emergence of high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses as well as viruses with reduced susceptibility to influenza antiviral medications recommended for treatment. Furthermore, the fifth-epidemic viruses diverged genetically into two separate lineages (Pearl River Delta lineage and Yangtze River Delta lineage), with Yangtze River Delta lineage viruses emerging as antigenically different compared with those from earlier epidemics. Because of its pandemic potential, candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) were produced in 2013 that have been used to make vaccines against Asian H7N9 viruses circulating at that time. CDC is working with partners to enhance surveillance for Asian H7N9 viruses in humans and poultry, to improve laboratory capability to detect and characterize H7N9 viruses, and to develop, test and distribute new CVV that could be used for vaccine production if a vaccine is needed.

Increase in Human Infections with Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus During the Fifth Epidemic - China, October 2016-February 2017.

During March 2013-February 24, 2017, annual epidemics of avian influenza A(H7N9) in China resulted in 1,258 avian influenza A(H7N9) virus infections in humans being reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) by the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China and other regional sources (1). During the first four epidemics, 88% of patients developed pneumonia, 68% were admitted to an intensive care unit, and 41% died (2). Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) were developed, and vaccine was manufactured based on representative viruses detected after the emergence of A(H7N9) virus in humans in 2013. During the ongoing fifth epidemic (beginning October 1, 2016),* 460 human infections with A(H7N9) virus have been reported, including 453 in mainland China, six associated with travel to mainland China from Hong Kong (four cases), Macao (one) and Taiwan (one), and one in an asymptomatic poultry worker in Macao (1). Although the clinical characteristics and risk factors for human infections do not appear to have changed (2,3), the reported human infections during the fifth epidemic represent a significant increase compared with the first four epidemics, which resulted in 135 (first epidemic), 320 (second), 226 (third), and 119 (fourth epidemic) human infections (2). Most human infections continue to result in severe respiratory illness and have been associated with poultry exposure. Although some limited human-to-human spread continues to be identified, no sustained human-to-human A(H7N9) transmission has been observed (2,3).

Assessing Change in Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus Infections During the Fourth Epidemic - China, September 2015-August 2016.

Since human infections with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus were first reported by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) in March 2013 (1), mainland China has experienced four influenza A(H7N9) virus epidemics. Prior investigations demonstrated that age and sex distribution, clinical features, and exposure history of A(H7N9) virus human infections reported during the first three epidemics were similar (2). In this report, epidemiology and virology data from the most recent, fourth epidemic (September 2015-August 2016) were compared with those from the three earlier epidemics. Whereas age and sex distribution and exposure history in the fourth epidemic were similar to those in the first three epidemics, the fourth epidemic demonstrated a greater proportion of infected persons living in rural areas, a continued spread of the virus to new areas, and a longer epidemic period. The genetic markers of mammalian adaptation and antiviral resistance remained similar across each epidemic, and viruses from the fourth epidemic remained antigenically well matched to current candidate vaccine viruses. Although there is no evidence of increased human-to-human transmissibility of A(H7N9) viruses, the continued geographic spread, identification of novel reassortant viruses, and pandemic potential of the virus underscore the importance of rigorous A(H7N9) virus surveillance and continued risk assessment in China and neighboring countries.

Outbreak of Influenza A(H3N2) Variant Virus Infections Among Persons Attending Agricultural Fairs Housing Infected Swine - Michigan and Ohio, July-August 2016.

On August 3, 2016, the Ohio Department of Health Laboratory reported to CDC that a respiratory specimen collected on July 28 from a male aged 13 years who attended an agricultural fair in Ohio during July 22-29, 2016, and subsequently developed a respiratory illness, tested positive by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) for influenza A(H3N2) variant* (H3N2v). The respiratory specimen was collected as part of routine influenza surveillance activities. The next day, CDC was notified of a child aged 9 years who was a swine exhibitor at an agricultural fair in Michigan who became ill on July 29, 2016, and tested positive for H3N2v virus at the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services Laboratory. Investigations by Michigan and Ohio health authorities identified 18 human infections linked to swine exhibits at agricultural fairs. To minimize transmission of influenza viruses from infected swine to visitors, agricultural fair organizers should consider prevention measures such as shortening the time swine are on the fairgrounds, isolating ill swine, maintaining a veterinarian on call, providing handwashing stations, and prohibiting food and beverages in animal barns. Persons at high risk for influenza-associated complications should be discouraged from entering swine barns.

Infection Risk for Persons Exposed to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A H5 Virus-Infected Birds, United States, December 2014-March 2015.

Newly emerged highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A H5 viruses have caused outbreaks among birds in the United States. These viruses differ genetically from HPAI H5 viruses that previously caused human illness, most notably in Asia and Africa. To assess the risk for animal-to-human HPAI H5 virus transmission in the United States, we determined the number of persons with self-reported exposure to infected birds, the number with an acute respiratory infection (ARI) during a 10-day postexposure period, and the number with ARI who tested positive for influenza by real-time reverse transcription PCR or serologic testing for each outbreak during December 15, 2014-March 31, 2015. During 60 outbreaks in 13 states, a total of 164 persons were exposed to infected birds. ARI developed in 5 of these persons within 10 days of exposure. H5 influenza virus infection was not identified in any persons with ARI, suggesting a low risk for animal-to-human HPAI H5 virus transmission.

Development of Framework for Assessing Influenza Virus Pandemic Risk.

Although predicting which influenza virus subtype will cause the next pandemic is not yet possible, public health authorities must continually assess the pandemic risk associated with animal influenza viruses, particularly those that have caused infections in humans, and determine what resources should be dedicated to mitigating that risk. To accomplish this goal, a risk assessment framework was created in collaboration with an international group of influenza experts. Compared with the previously used approach, this framework, named the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool, provides a systematic and transparent approach for assessing and comparing threats posed primarily by avian and swine influenza viruses. This tool will be useful to the international influenza community and will remain flexible and responsive to changing information.

Timing of influenza A(H5N1) in poultry and humans and seasonal influenza activity worldwide, 2004-2013.

Co-circulation of influenza A(H5N1) and seasonal influenza viruses among humans and animals could lead to co-infections, reassortment, and emergence of novel viruses with pandemic potential. We assessed the timing of subtype H5N1 outbreaks among poultry, human H5N1 cases, and human seasonal influenza in 8 countries that reported 97% of all human H5N1 cases and 90% of all poultry H5N1 outbreaks. In these countries, most outbreaks among poultry (7,001/11,331, 62%) and half of human cases (313/625, 50%) occurred during January-March. Human H5N1 cases occurred in 167 (45%) of 372 months during which outbreaks among poultry occurred, compared with 59 (10%) of 574 months that had no outbreaks among poultry. Human H5N1 cases also occurred in 59 (22%) of 267 months during seasonal influenza periods. To reduce risk for co-infection, surveillance and control of H5N1 should be enhanced during January-March, when H5N1 outbreaks typically occur and overlap with seasonal influenza virus circulation.

Improving pandemic influenza risk assessment.

Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper, faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved pandemic preparedness and response.

Pandemic preparedness and the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT).

Influenza infections have resulted in millions of deaths and untold millions of illnesses throughout history. Influenza vaccines are the cornerstone of influenza prevention and control. Recommendations are made by the World Health Organization (WHO) 6-9 months in advance of the influenza season regarding what changes, if any, should be made in the formulation of seasonal influenza vaccines. This allows time to manufacture, test, distribute, and administer vaccine prior to the beginning of the influenza season. At the same time experts also consider which viruses not currently circulating in the human population, but with pandemic potential, pose the greatest risk to public health. Experts may conclude that one or more of these viruses are of enough concern to warrant development of a high-growth reassortant candidate vaccine virus. Subsequently, national authorities may determine that a vaccine should be manufactured, tested in clinical trials, and even stockpiled in some circumstances. The Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT) was created in an effort to develop a standardized set of elements that could be applied for decision making when evaluating pre-pandemic viruses. The tool is a simple, additive model, based on multi-attribute decision analysis . The ultimate goal is to identify an appropriate candidate vaccine virus and prepare a human vaccine before the virus adapts to infect and efficiently transmit in susceptible human populations. This pre-pandemic preparation allows production of vaccine-a strategy that could save lives and mitigate illness during a pandemic.

Human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus in the United States, 2011-2012.

BACKGROUND. During August 2011-April 2012, 13 human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus were identified in the United States; 8 occurred in the prior 2 years. This virus differs from previous variant influenza viruses in that it contains the matrix (M) gene from the Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic influenza virus. METHODS. A case was defined as a person with laboratory-confirmed H3N2v virus infection. Cases and contacts were interviewed to determine exposure to swine and other animals and to assess potential person-to-person transmission. RESULTS. Median age of cases was 4 years, and 12 of 13 (92%) were children. Pig exposure was identified in 7 (54%) cases. Six of 7 cases with swine exposure (86%) touched pigs, and 1 (14%) was close to pigs without known direct contact. Six cases had no swine exposure, including 2 clusters of suspected person-to-person transmission. All cases had fever; 12 (92%) had respiratory symptoms, and 3 (23%) were hospitalized for influenza. All 13 cases recovered. CONCLUSIONS. H3N2v virus infections were identified at a high rate from August 2011 to April 2012, and cases without swine exposure were identified in influenza-like illness outbreaks, indicating that limited person-to-person transmission likely occurred. Variant influenza viruses rarely result in sustained person-to-person transmission; however, the potential for this H3N2v virus to transmit efficiently is of concern. With minimal preexisting immunity in children and the limited cross-protective effect from seasonal influenza vaccine, the majority of children are susceptible to infection with this novel influenza virus.

Outbreak of influenza A (H3N2) variant virus infection among attendees of an agricultural fair, Pennsylvania, USA, 2011.

During August 2011, influenza A (H3N2) variant [A(H3N2)v] virus infection developed in a child who attended an agricultural fair in Pennsylvania, USA; the virus resulted from reassortment of a swine influenza virus with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. We interviewed fair attendees and conducted a retrospective cohort study among members of an agricultural club who attended the fair. Probable and confirmed cases of A(H3N2)v virus infection were defined by serology and genomic sequencing results, respectively. We identified 82 suspected, 4 probable, and 3 confirmed case-patients who attended the fair. Among 127 cohort study members, the risk for suspected case status increased as swine exposure increased from none (4%; referent) to visiting swine exhibits (8%; relative risk 2.1; 95% CI 0.2-53.4) to touching swine (16%; relative risk 4.4; 95% CI 0.8-116.3). Fairs may be venues for zoonotic transmission of viruses with epidemic potential; thus, health officials should investigate respiratory illness outbreaks associated with agricultural events.

Development of an influenza virologic risk assessment tool.

Influenza pandemics pose a continuous risk to human and animal health and may engender food security issues worldwide. As novel influenza A virus infections in humans are identified, pandemic preparedness strategies necessarily involve decisions regarding which viruses should be included for further studies and mitigation efforts. Resource and time limitations dictate that viruses determined to pose the greatest risk to public or animal health should be selected for further research to fill information gaps and, potentially, for development of vaccine candidates that could be put in libraries, manufactured and stockpiled, or even administered to protect susceptible populations of animals or people. A need exists to apply an objective, science-based risk assessment to the process of evaluating influenza viruses. During the past year, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began developing a tool to evaluate influenza A viruses that are not circulating in the human population but pose a pandemic risk. The objective is to offer a standardized set of considerations to be applied when evaluating prepandemic viruses. The tool under consideration is a simple, additive model, based on multiattribute decision analysis. The model includes elements that address the properties of the virus itself and population attributes, considers both veterinary and human findings, and integrates both laboratory and field observations. Additionally, each element is assigned a weight such that all elements are not considered of equal importance within the model.

Surveillance and control of avian influenza in the New York live bird markets.

A comprehensive avian influenza control program was established for the New York live bird market (LBM) system. Its purpose was to eliminate avian influenza virus (AIV) from the marketing system. The application of science-based surveillance, improved diagnostic performance, voluntary efforts of the LBM owners, and regulatory enforcement have resulted in the elimination of an H7 low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV) that had persisted in the LBM system for 13 yr. Although sporadic introductions of H5N2 LPAIVs have occurred, successful control measures have not allowed this virus to become established within the system.