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1.
HEC Forum ; 35(2): 111-138, 2023 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34251565

ABSTRACT

In an attempt to respond effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic, policy makers and scientific experts who advise them have aspired to present a unified front. Leveraging the authority of science, they have at times portrayed politically favored COVID interventions, such as lockdowns, as strongly grounded in scientific evidence-even to the point of claiming that enacting such interventions is simply a matter of "following the science." Strictly speaking, all such claims are false, since facts alone never yield moral-political conclusions. More importantly, attempts to present a unified front have led to a number of other actions and statements by scientists and policy makers that erode the authority of science. These include actions and statements that: (1) mislead the public about epidemiological matters such as mortality rates, cause of death determinations, and computerized modeling, or fail to correct mainstream media sources that interpret such concepts in misleading ways; (2) incorporate moral-political opinions into ostensible statements of fact; and (3) misrepresent or misuse scientific expertise. The fundamental thesis of the paper is not primarily that such actions and statements have proliferated during the COVID-19 epidemic (though I think they have), but rather that they are unscientific and that presenting them as science undermines the authority of science. In the moral-political realm, the great power of science and the source of its authority derives from its agnosticism about fundamental moral-political claims. Science, for instance, has no built-in presumption that we should respect life, promote freedom, or practice toleration; nor does it tell us which of these values to prioritize when values conflict. Because of this agnosticism, science is recognized across a broad diversity perspectives as morally and politically impartial, and authoritative within its proper sphere. When it is infused with partisan bias, it loses that authority.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , Pandemics , Communicable Disease Control , Morals
2.
J Med Philos ; 45(4-5): 427-440, 2020 07 29.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32726805

ABSTRACT

In the third and subsequent editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress articulate a series of ethical norms that they regard as "derived" from, and hence carrying, the "authority" of the common morality. Although Beauchamp and Childress do not claim that biomedical norms they derive from the common morality automatically become constituents of the common morality, or that every detail of their account carries the authority of the common morality, they regard these derived norms as provisionally binding in a way that does not apply to the norms of mere "particular" moralities. Whereas particular moralities "do not bind other persons or communities," Beauchamp and Childress have designed the norms of Principles of Biomedical Ethics to be "extensions" of the common morality that universally binds other persons and communities. Beauchamp and Childress seem to hold that (1) the norms they articulate in Principles of Biomedical Ethics are derived in an objective way from the common morality, and also that by virtue of being so derived (2) they carry a moral authority that objectively exceeds the authority of norms constituting particular moralities. My thesis in this essay is that both of these claims are false.


Subject(s)
Bioethics , Ethical Theory , Morals , Humans
3.
J Med Philos ; 43(6): 686-709, 2018 Nov 17.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30452673
4.
HEC Forum ; 26(3): 237-55, 2014 Sep.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25129629

ABSTRACT

The concept of autonomy as self-sovereignty is developed in this essay through an examination of the thought of American transcendentalist philosophers Emerson and Thoreau. It is conceived as the quality of living in accordance with one's inner nature or genius. This conception is grounded in a transcendentalist moral anthropology that values independence, self-reliance, spirituality, and the capacity to find beauty in the world. Though still exerting considerable popular and academic influence, both the concept of autonomy as self-sovereignty and the underlying anthropology diverge in important ways from counterparts that are prominent in contemporary bioethics. Autonomy as self-sovereignty calls into question the manifold ways that patients (and citizens) are brought to heel by institutional (and political) values they do not themselves affirm. It also emphasizes the inevitable deep plurality of moral visions of health and appropriate healthcare, rejecting tendencies (strong in mainstream bioethics) to regard "health" as a univocal concept or healthcare as a basic need, to attempt to conform "reasonable" clinical decision-making to a single model, and to appoint government as a guarantor of access to healthcare or a regulator of healthcare standards. Autonomy as self-sovereignty, like its competitors, can justify itself only in question-begging terms. Still, bioethics might do well to recognize it within the mix of moral visions.


Subject(s)
Bioethics , Decision Making/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Philosophy , Humans
5.
J Law Med Ethics ; 40(3): 598-605, 2012.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-23061587

ABSTRACT

This essay argues that no theory or single conception of justice can provide a fundamental grounding for health care reform in the United States. To provide such a grounding, (1) there would need to be widespread support among citizens for a particular conception of justice, (2) citizens would have to apprehend this common conception of justice as providing the strongest available rationale for health care reform, and (3) this rationale would have to overwhelm countervailing values. I argue that neither of the first two conditions is met.


Subject(s)
Health Care Reform/ethics , Healthcare Disparities/ethics , Politics , Public Opinion , Social Justice , Beneficence , Health Care Reform/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Social Values , United States
9.
J Clin Ethics ; 21(4): 294-307, 2010.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-21313863

ABSTRACT

This essay examines the management of ventilatory failure in disaster settings where clinical needs overwhelm available resources. An ethically defensible approach in such settings will adopt a "sufficiency of care" perspective that is: (1) adaptive, (2) resource-driven, and (3) responsive to the values of populations being served. Detailed, generic, antecedently written guidelines for "ventilator triage" or other management issues typically are of limited value, and may even impede ethical disaster response if they result in rescuers' clumsily interpreting events through the lens of the guideline, rather than customizing tactics to the actual context. Especially concerning is the tendency of some expert planners to mistakenly assume that medical treatment of respiratory failure: (1) always requires full-feature mechanical ventilators, (2) will always occur in hospitals, and (3) can be planned in advance without sophisticated public consultation about likely ethical dilemmas.


Subject(s)
Delivery of Health Care/standards , Disasters , Health Resources/supply & distribution , Respiration, Artificial , Standard of Care/ethics , Triage/ethics , Ventilators, Mechanical , Aerosols , Botulinum Toxins/poisoning , Chemical Terrorism , Cyclonic Storms , Delivery of Health Care/ethics , Disaster Planning/trends , Health Resources/ethics , Humans , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Pandemics , Relief Work , Respiration, Artificial/ethics , Respiration, Artificial/instrumentation , Respiratory Insufficiency/etiology , Respiratory Insufficiency/therapy , Standard of Care/standards , Triage/standards , Ventilators, Mechanical/ethics , Ventilators, Mechanical/supply & distribution
10.
J Med Philos ; 34(3): 195-203, 2009 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-19387002

ABSTRACT

The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 2005 purports to articulate universal norms for bioethics. However, this document has met with mixed reviews. Some deny that the elaboration of universal bioethics norms is needed; some deny that UNESCO has the expertise or authority to articulate such norms; some regard the content of the UNESCO document as too vague or general to be useful; and some regard the document as a cog in the effort of like-minded cosmopolitans to codify their particular moral intuitions in international law. This issue examines the potential merits and pitfalls of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.


Subject(s)
Bioethics , Global Health , Human Rights/standards , United Nations/ethics , United Nations/standards , Bioethical Issues , Consensus , Health Status , Humans , Philosophy, Medical , World Health Organization/organization & administration
11.
J Med Philos ; 33(5): 445-60, 2008 Oct.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-18840852

ABSTRACT

Public deliberation about health policy in the United States often hinges on two untenable basic assumptions about political legitimacy. The first assumption, common in public debate throughout the United States, is that federal oversight of health care is justified under a federal compact binding all citizens. This assumption is false because the federal compact precludes such oversight. Indeed, the ascendancy of national government (and demise of federalism) over the past 70 years was engineered through the subversion of the federal compact, creating an expansive legitimation gap. The second assumption--that political legitimacy can be established through appeals to expert consensus about fundamental conceptions of justice or human rights--is prevalent among bioethicists. I argue that this assumption is illicit because it hinges on a weak, rationalistic form of majoritarian democracy that conflates public acquiescence with public approval. If the public mission of academic bioethics involves protecting the integrity of public deliberation, then these two basic assumptions should be challenged.


Subject(s)
Bioethics/trends , Federal Government , Health Policy/trends , Human Rights , Social Justice/trends , Humans , United States
12.
Transplant Rev (Orlando) ; 22(3): 158-62, 2008 Jul.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-18631870

ABSTRACT

A shortage of transplantable organs in the United States can be traced to low rates of donation. Incentives for organ donation might partially remedy these organ shortfalls. Although incentives countervail the dominant philanthropy model, this model is neither well supported by ethical argument nor strictly applied. Preferred allocation, consisting in the practice of awarding extra priority points to previously registered organ donors who need transplants, is attractive in that it offers a potentially effective incentive while deviating less radically from entrenched practices than financial incentives. It is supported by the public and conforms to intuitions about justice and reciprocity. Moreover, it highlights moral features of the transplant community as a particular moral community within the greater medical community.


Subject(s)
Health Care Rationing/methods , Motivation , Tissue Donors , Tissue and Organ Procurement , Bioethics , Feasibility Studies , Humans , Organ Transplantation/ethics
13.
HEC Forum ; 19(1): 1-12, 2007 Mar.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-17601069
14.
Am J Bioeth ; 7(4): 83-5; discussion W7-9, 2007 Apr.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-17455009
15.
J Med Philos ; 31(3): 235-50, 2006 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16760102

ABSTRACT

Thomas Hobbes is one of the most ardent and thoroughgoing opponents of participatory democracy among Western political philosophers. Though Hobbes's alternative to participatory democracy-assent by subjects to rule by an absolute sovereign-no longer constitutes a viable political alternative for Westerners, his critique of participatory democracy is a potentially valuable source of insight about its liabilities. This essay elaborates five theses from Hobbes that stand as cogent warnings to those who embrace participatory democracy, especially those (such as most bioethicists) advocating for deliberative democracy based on a rational consensus model. In light of these warnings, the author suggests an alternative, modus vivendi approach to deliberative democracy that would radically alter the current practice of bioethics.


Subject(s)
Democracy , Ethicists/psychology , Moral Obligations , Philosophy , Politics , Humans
18.
Christ Bioeth ; 11(3): 317-31, 2005 Dec.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16423734

ABSTRACT

This essay contrasts the notions of charity employed by Traditional Christianity and by liberal cosmopolitan bioethics, arguing that: (1) bioethics attempts to reconstruct the notion of charity in a manner that is caustic to the Traditional Christian moral vision, (2) Christians are, on the whole, more charitable than proponents of bioethics' reconstructed view (even given the standards of the latter), and (3) the theistically oriented conception of charity employed by Traditional Christianity cannot be expressed in bioethics' purportedly neutral public vocabulary. The upshot is that, in the name of neutrality and pluralism, liberal cosmopolitan bioethicists seek to impose an impoverished moral vocabulary that reflects liberal cosmopolitan ideology while excluding input from Traditional Christianity and other non-liberal-humanistic moral visions.


Subject(s)
Bioethics , Charities/ethics , Christianity , Humanism , Religion , Secularism , Theology
20.
J Med Philos ; 29(4): 389-416, 2004 Aug.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-15370301

ABSTRACT

Were terrorists ever to effectively deploy weapons of mass destruction, medical practice would be quickly transformed. Many ordinary clinicians would be asked or required to treat unfamiliar yet serious medical conditions in a setting of overwhelming urgency and impossible odds. Clinical focus would shift from doing good things for a succession of individual patients to considering many patients at once, a change that could beget loss of trust and rapport with patients. Clinicians might also experience restrictions in personal liberties and appropriation of their property. The purpose of this essay is to develop a teleological framework for undertaking this transformation. In ordinary clinical medicine, the elusiveness of the individual telos (i.e.,the good for the individual) is acknowledged in procedures (such as social history taking,informed consent and outpatient scheduling) designed to protect patients' (and clinicians')prerogatives to interpret the telos for themselves. In mass casualty scenarios, on the other hand, the telos is standardized and regarded as an Immediate Object (usually as a state of affairs in which survival is maximized and permanent disability is minimized). Clinicians who provide mass casualty care will face a number of ethical challenges that can be negotiated by appealing to the political and ethical rationale, and limits, pertaining to the pursuit of aggregate survival as an Immediate Object.


Subject(s)
Emergency Medicine/ethics , Ethical Theory , Ethics, Medical , Health Policy , Social Responsibility , Terrorism , Bioterrorism , Humans , Physician-Patient Relations , Physicians/ethics , Rescue Work/ethics , United States
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