The costs and benefits of kindness for kids.

What do children think makes an act kind? Which kind acts are children likely to perform? Previous research with adults suggests that the kindness of acts depends largely on the benefit provided and to a lesser extent on the cost incurred, and that adults are more likely to perform low-cost, high-benefit kind acts. In the current study, children (9-12 years, n = 945) and teens (13-17 years, n = 939) rated the benefit, cost, kindness, and likelihood of performing 173 acts of kindness, and adults (18+ years, n = 891) rated how beneficial, costly, kind, and likely the acts would be for young people to perform. Among children and teens, benefit but not cost predicted the kindness of acts, and benefit positively predicted, but cost negatively predicted, performance (for "kindness quotients" of 61% and 65%, respectively). Among adults, benefit and cost predicted the kindness of acts, and cost, but not benefit, negatively predicted performance (for a kindness quotient of 59%). The results for children and teens are similar to those from previous research with adults; however, adults are more sensitive to cost when rating kindness, are less sensitive to benefit when rating performance by young people, and are less likely to think young people will perform acts of kindness overall. In practical terms, the results suggest that recommending cost-effective acts may be the best way to encourage children to be kinder.

Eliminativist induction cannot be a solution to psychology's crisis.

Integrative experiment design assumes that we can effectively design a space of factors that cause contextual variation. However, this is impossible to do so in a sufficiently objective way, resulting inevitably in observations laden with surrogate models. Consequently, integrative experiment design may even deepen the problem of incommensurability. In comparison, one-at-a-time approaches make much more tentative assumptions about the factors excluded from experiment design, hence still seem better suited to deal with incommensurability.

Not every dissatisfaction is the same: The impact of electoral regret, disappointment, and anger on subsequent electoral behavior.

We investigate varieties of dissatisfaction by examining how the similar, yet distinct emotions of regret, disappointment, and anger are related to electoral behavior. In a 2-wave longitudinal study conducted around the UK General Election of 2017 (N1 = 817, N2 = 768), we measured these emotions in response to 3 levels of electoral decision-making (individual party preference, individual electoral participation, and election results) and tested the relationship between these emotions and electoral behaviors. We find that party switching in 2017 is associated with regret about the party preference in 2015 and the regret about those election results, but not with other emotions. Similarly, we also find that the regret about party preference in 2017 is associated with future party switching intentions. Disappointment with the decision to vote in the 2015 General Election is negatively associated with voting in 2017; and the same is true for the anger about participants' party choice. These results suggest that distinct dissatisfaction-related emotions might have distinct consequences for electoral behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is Open Science Neoliberal?

The scientific-reform movement, frequently referred to as open science, has the potential to substantially reshape the nature of the scientific activity. For this reason, its sociopolitical antecedents and consequences deserve serious scholarly attention. In a recently formed literature that professes to meet this need, it has been widely argued that the movement is neoliberal. However, for two reasons it is hard to justify this widescale attribution: First, the critics mistakenly represent the movement as a monolithic structure, and second, the critics' arguments associating the movement with neoliberalism because of the movement's (a) preferential focus on methodological issues, (b) underlying philosophy of science, and (c) allegedly promarket ideological proclivities reflected in the methodology and science-policy proposals do not hold under closer scrutiny. These shortcomings show a lack of sufficient engagement with the reform literature. What is needed is more nuanced accounts of the sociopolitical underpinnings of scientific reform. To address this need, we propose a model for the analysis of reform proposals, which represents scientific methodology, axiology, science policy, and ideology as interconnected but relatively distinct domains, and thus allows for recognizing the divergent tendencies in the movement and the uniqueness of particular proposals.