The Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic Made People Feel Threatened, but Had a Limited Impact on Political Attitudes in the United States.

We investigated if the COVID-19 pandemic's onset caused changes in political attitudes. Influential theories predict that the pandemic's onset will cause people to adopt more conservative attitudes, more culturally conservative attitudes, or more extreme attitudes. We comprehensively tested the external validity of these predictions by estimating the causal effect of the pandemic's onset on 84 political attitudes and eight perceived threats using fine-grained repeated cross-sectional data (Study 1, N = 232,684) and panel data (Study 2, N = 552) collected in the United States. Although the pandemic's onset caused feelings of threat, the onset only caused limited attitude change (six conservative shifts, four extremity shifts, 12 liberal shifts, 62 no change). Prominent theories of threat and politics did not make accurate predictions for this major societal threat. Our results highlight the necessity of testing psychological theories' predictive powers in real-life circumstances.

Ideology Strength Versus Party Identity Strength: Ideology Strength Is the Key Predictor of Attitude Stability.

We investigate the relationship between attitude instability and both party identity strength and ideology strength. We test the explorative hypotheses that higher party identity strength (H1) and ideology strength (H2) predict more attitude stability using intensive longitudinal data collected in the United States every 2 weeks over 1 year (Study 1, N = 552) and in the Netherlands over 6 months (Study 2, N = 1,670). We found mixed support for H1: In the United States, there was no association between party identity strength and attitude stability. In the Netherlands, people with stronger party identity had more stable attitudes. We found stronger support for H2: Individuals with a stronger ideology than average had more stable attitudes in the United States and the Netherlands. The context-dependent nature of relations is discussed.

Affective Polarization and Political Belief Systems: The Role of Political Identity and the Content and Structure of Political Beliefs.

We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.

Conservatives' Moral Foundations Are More Densely Connected Than Liberals' Moral Foundations.

We use network psychometrics to map a subsection of moral belief systems predicted by moral foundations theory (MFT). This approach conceptualizes moral systems as networks, with moral beliefs represented as nodes connected by direct relations. As such, it advances a novel test of MFT's claim that liberals and conservatives have different systems of foundational moral values, which we test in three large datasets (NSample1 = 854; NSample2 = 679; NSample3 = 2,572), from two countries (the United States and New Zealand). Results supported our first hypothesis that liberals' moral systems show more segregation between individualizing and binding foundations than conservatives. Results showed only weak support for our second hypothesis, that this pattern would be more typical of higher educated than less educated liberals/conservatives. Findings support a systems approach to MFT and show the value of modeling moral belief systems as networks.

Identity Expression Through Collective Action: How Identification With a Politicized Group and Its Identity Contents Differently Motivated Identity-Expressive Collective Action in the U.S. 2016 Presidential Elections.

Although political action often requires activists to express who they are and what they stand for, little is known about the motivators of such identity expression. This research investigates how group identity content and identification with this content predict identity-expressive collective action in the U.S. 2016 presidential elections. We recruited a longitudinal community sample of U.S. party supporters (N = 426) mid-October (T1), beginning November (T2), and mid-November (T3). Participants listed words they associated with party campaigners, and self-reported their identification with this identity content and the politicized group. Supporting H1, politicized group identification longitudinally predicted increased frequency of collective action more strongly than did identification with specific identity content. Supporting H2, identification with specific identity content longitudinally predicted increased desires to express that content through collective action more strongly than politicized group identification. Implications for our understanding of identity expression and identity content in collective action are discussed.

The Association Between Threat and Politics Depends on the Type of Threat, the Political Domain, and the Country.

Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how six types of threat (e.g., economic, violence, and surveillance) are associated with multiple political beliefs (e.g., cultural, economic, and ideological identification) in 56 countries/territories. Multilevel models with individuals nested in countries revealed that the threat-political belief association depends on the type of threat, the type of political belief, and the country. Economic-related threats tended to be associated with more left-wing economic political beliefs and violence-related threats tended to be associated with more cultural right-wing beliefs, but there were exceptions to this pattern. Additional analyses revealed that the associations between threat and political beliefs were different across countries. However, our analyses identified few country characteristics that could account for these cross-country differences. Our findings revealed that political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but that the relationship is not simple.

The moral dimension of politicized identity: Exploring identity content during the 2012 Presidential Elections in the USA.

It is well known that politicized identities are especially good predictors of collective action, but very little is known about what these identities are. We propose that moral identity content plays a central role in politicized identities. We examined this among (un)politicized Americans in the 2012 US Presidential Elections. In a longitudinal community sample of US citizens (N = 760), we tracked personal (i.e., unique) and politicized (i.e., party activist) identity content: before, during, and after the election. We compared identity content of individuals who self-labelled as politicized (i.e., active party promoters) or unpoliticized (i.e., passive party supporters): (1) Democrats (n = 69) longitudinally and (2) Republicans (n = 69) cross-sectionally to examine three hypotheses: Moral identity content (e.g., trustworthy) would be more prominent in politicized (vs. unpoliticized) identities (H1); moral identity content overlapping politicized and personal identities predict seeing the self as politicized (H2) and engaging in party activism (H3). Results largely supported H1 and H2, but only weakly supported H3. We conclude that politicized identities are moralized identities that have a self-evaluative, but not strongly action-motivation, function. We discuss the implications of our findings and method for politicization research.

Achieving Harmony among Different Social Identities within the Self-Concept: The Consequences of Internalising a Group-Based Philosophy of Life.

It can be hard for individuals to manage multiple group identities within their self-concept (e.g., being a Christian and a woman). We examine how the inter-identity fit between potentially conflicting identities can become more harmonious through a self-defining group philosophy for life. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that holistic group identities (based in group philosophies for life that prescribe the behavior of their members in any situation, such as religion) become more strongly related to other identities in the self-concept (e.g., gender) when they are strongly self-defining (i.e., devotedly applied to daily life). In three studies we investigated the inter-identity fit between individuals' (highly holistic) religious identity and (less holistic) gender identity. Results provided converging support for our hypothesis across diverging methods (explicit questionnaires, more implicit associations, and a novel network analysis of group traits). We discuss the importance of understanding how some (i.e., holistic and self-defining) group identities may harmonize otherwise less harmonious group identities within one's self-concept.