Dispositional Factors Affecting Choices Surrounding the Purchase of Insurance and the Taking of Mitigating Measures Against Flooding.

This research investigated the role of dispositional factors in decisions to purchase insurance and to take mitigating measures against flooding. Two dispositional factors-risk aversion in the domain of losses and time discounting rate-were found to be predictors of the decision to acquire flood insurance. The observation of a relationship between experiment-based risk attitudes and the decision to insure oneself against flooding replicates a finding of Petrolia et al. The finding that impatience negatively impacts decisions to take out insurance against flooding is novel. However, support was not found for analogous hypotheses concerning relationships between the two dispositional variables and decisions to take mitigating measures. Evidently, factors other than individual risk aversion and time discounting rate play a crucial role in this behavior.

Are People Interested in Probabilities of Natural Disasters?

Previous research has demonstrated that in naturalistic risky decisions people tend to have little interest in receiving information about probabilities. The present research asked whether subjects search for and employ probabilistic information in situations that are representative of natural disasters: namely, situations where (1) they have no control over the occurrence of a negative event and (2) there might be huge losses of physical and human capital. Pseudo-realistic scenarios involving risky situations were presented to 116 experimental participants. Based on the active information search paradigm, subjects were given only a basic description of the situation and had to acquire additional information from the experimenter. In addition to the main task, the individual risk aversion of participants was measured. We demonstrate that in pseudo-naturalistic scenarios involving natural disasters people tend to show more interest in probabilities compared to scenarios with generally more controllable risks. Moreover, this interest increases with an increase in the importance of the situation to the decisionmaker. The importance of the situation also has a positive influence on the thoroughness of information search. The experiment detected no connection between individual risk aversion and information search.

Confounding dynamic risk taking propensity with a momentum prognostic strategy: the case of the Columbia Card Task (CCT).

Figner et al. (2009) developed the Columbia Card Task (CCT) to measure risk-taking attitudes. This tool consists of two versions: in the COLD version the decision maker needs to state in advance how many cards (out of 32) they want to turn over (so called static risk taking), in the HOT version they have the possibility of turning over all 32 cards one-by-one until they decide to finish (dynamic risk taking). We argue that the HOT version confounds an individual's willingness to accept risk with their beliefs in trend continuation vs. trend reversal in a prognostic task. In two experimental studies we show that people believing in trend continuation (momentum subjects) turn over more cards than those believing in trend reversal (contrarians) in the HOT version of the task. However, this is not the case in the COLD version. Thus, we provide evidence that, when considered as a dynamic risk propensity measure, the number of turned over cards in the HOT version of the CCT is a contaminated measure and reflects two phenomena: (1) risk preference and (2) the decision-maker's belief in trend continuation. We speculate that other dynamic risk taking measures can also be biased by a momentum strategy.

Alcohol reduces aversion to ambiguity.

Several years ago, Cohen et al. (1958) demonstrated that under the influence of alcohol drivers became more risk prone, although their risk perception remained unchanged. Research shows that ambiguity aversion is to some extent positively correlated with risk aversion, though not very highly (Camerer and Weber, 1992). The question addressed by the present research is whether alcohol reduces ambiguity aversion. Our research was conducted in a natural setting (a restaurant bar), where customers with differing levels of alcohol intoxication were offered a choice between a risky and an ambiguous lottery. We found that alcohol reduced ambiguity aversion and that the effect occurred in men but not women. We interpret these findings in terms of the risk-as-value hypothesis, according to which, people in Western culture tend to value risk, and suggest that alcohol consumption triggers adherence to socially and culturally valued patterns of conduct different for men and women.

Affective and cognitive factors influencing sensitivity to probabilistic information.

In study 1 different groups of female students were randomly assigned to one of four probabilistic information formats. Five different levels of probability of a genetic disease in an unborn child were presented to participants (within-subject factor). After the presentation of the probability level, participants were requested to indicate the acceptable level of pain they would tolerate to avoid the disease (in their unborn child), their subjective evaluation of the disease risk, and their subjective evaluation of being worried by this risk. The results of study 1 confirmed the hypothesis that an experience-based probability format decreases the subjective sense of worry about the disease, thus, presumably, weakening the tendency to overrate the probability of rare events. Study 2 showed that for the emotionally laden stimuli, the experience-based probability format resulted in higher sensitivity to probability variations than other formats of probabilistic information. These advantages of the experience-based probability format are interpreted in terms of two systems of information processing: the rational deliberative versus the affective experiential and the principle of stimulus-response compatibility.

When does information about probability count in choices under risk?

The question addressed in the present research is whether in naturalistic risky decision environments people are sensitive to information about the probability parameter. In Study 1, we showed that in naturalistic scenarios participants generally revealed little interest in obtaining information about the outcomes and probabilities. Moreover, participants asked fewer questions about probabilities for scenarios containing moral considerations. In Study 2, it was shown that, when supplied with information on probabilities, people could be sensitive to this information. This sensitivity depends on two factors. People were less sensitive to probabilities in scenarios perceived as containing ethical considerations. People were also less sensitive to probabilities when they were faced with a single-choice situation than when they were faced with a series of lotteries with different probabilities. This can be accounted for in terms of the evaluability principle.