Eliminativist induction cannot be a solution to psychology's crisis.

Integrative experiment design assumes that we can effectively design a space of factors that cause contextual variation. However, this is impossible to do so in a sufficiently objective way, resulting inevitably in observations laden with surrogate models. Consequently, integrative experiment design may even deepen the problem of incommensurability. In comparison, one-at-a-time approaches make much more tentative assumptions about the factors excluded from experiment design, hence still seem better suited to deal with incommensurability.

Is Open Science Neoliberal?

The scientific-reform movement, frequently referred to as open science, has the potential to substantially reshape the nature of the scientific activity. For this reason, its sociopolitical antecedents and consequences deserve serious scholarly attention. In a recently formed literature that professes to meet this need, it has been widely argued that the movement is neoliberal. However, for two reasons it is hard to justify this widescale attribution: First, the critics mistakenly represent the movement as a monolithic structure, and second, the critics' arguments associating the movement with neoliberalism because of the movement's (a) preferential focus on methodological issues, (b) underlying philosophy of science, and (c) allegedly promarket ideological proclivities reflected in the methodology and science-policy proposals do not hold under closer scrutiny. These shortcomings show a lack of sufficient engagement with the reform literature. What is needed is more nuanced accounts of the sociopolitical underpinnings of scientific reform. To address this need, we propose a model for the analysis of reform proposals, which represents scientific methodology, axiology, science policy, and ideology as interconnected but relatively distinct domains, and thus allows for recognizing the divergent tendencies in the movement and the uniqueness of particular proposals.

There is no generalizability crisis.

Falsificationist and confirmationist approaches provide two well-established ways of evaluating generalizability. Yarkoni rejects both and invents a third approach we call neo-operationalism. His proposal cannot work for the hypothetical concepts psychologists use, because the universe of operationalizations is impossible to define, and hypothetical concepts cannot be reduced to their operationalizations. We conclude that he is wrong in his generalizability-crisis diagnosis.