Cognitive neuroscience of human counterfactual reasoning.

Counterfactual reasoning is a hallmark of human thought, enabling the capacity to shift from perceiving the immediate environment to an alternative, imagined perspective. Mental representations of counterfactual possibilities (e.g., imagined past events or future outcomes not yet at hand) provide the basis for learning from past experience, enable planning and prediction, support creativity and insight, and give rise to emotions and social attributions (e.g., regret and blame). Yet remarkably little is known about the psychological and neural foundations of counterfactual reasoning. In this review, we survey recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicating that counterfactual thought depends on an integrative network of systems for affective processing, mental simulation, and cognitive control. We review evidence to elucidate how these mechanisms are systematically altered through psychiatric illness and neurological disease. We propose that counterfactual thinking depends on the coordination of multiple information processing systems that together enable adaptive behavior and goal-directed decision making and make recommendations for the study of counterfactual inference in health, aging, and disease.

The effect of selective head-neck cooling on physiological and cognitive functions in healthy volunteers.

In general, brain temperatures are elevated during physical sporting activities; therefore, reducing brain temperature shortly after a sports-related concussion (SRC) could be a promising intervention technique. The main objective of this study was to examine the effects of head and neck cooling on physiological and cognitive function in normal healthy volunteers. Twelve healthy volunteers underwent two different sessions of combined head and neck cooling, one session with a cold pack and one session with a room temperature pack. Physiological measurements included: systolic/diastolic blood pressure, pulse oximetry, heart rate, and sublingual and tympanic temperature. Cognitive assessment included: processing speed, executive function, and working memory tasks. Physiological measurements were taken pre-, mid- and post-cooling, while cognitive assessments were done before and after cooling. The order of the sessions was randomized. There was a significant decrease in tympanic temperature across both sessions; however more cooling occurred when the cold pack was in the device. There was no significant decrease in sublingual temperature across either session. The observed heart rates, pulse oximetry, systolic and diastolic blood pressure during the sessions were all within range of a normal healthy adult. Cognitive assessment remained stable across each session for both pre- and post-cooling. We propose that optimizing brain temperature management after brain injury using head and neck cooling technology may represent a sensible, practical, and effective strategy to potentially enhance recovery and perhaps minimize the subsequent short and long term consequences from SRC.

False belief and counterfactual reasoning in a social environment.

Behavioral studies indicate that theory of mind and counterfactual reasoning are strongly related cognitive processes. In a neuroimaging study, we explored the common and distinct regions underlying these inference processes. We directly compared false belief reasoning (inferring an agent's false belief about an object's location or content) and counterfactual reasoning (inferring what the object's location or content would be if an agent had acted differently), both in contrast with a baseline condition of conditional reasoning (inferring what the true location or content of an object is). Results indicate that these three types of reasoning about social scenarios are supported by activations in the mentalizing network (left temporo-parietal junction and precuneus) and the executive control network (bilateral prefrontal cortex [PFC] and right inferior parietal lobule). In addition, representing a false belief or counterfactual state (both not directly observable in the external world) recruits additional activity in the executive control network (left dorsolateral PFC and parietal lobe). The results further suggest that counterfactual reasoning is a more complex cognitive process than false belief reasoning, showing stronger activation of the dorsomedial, left dorsolateral PFC, cerebellum and left temporal cortex.

Unusual actions do not always trigger the mentalizing network.

Past fMRI research has demonstrated that to understand other people's behavior shown visually, the mirror network is strongly involved. However, the mentalizing network is also recruited when a visually presented action is unusual and/or when perceivers think explicitly about the intention. To further explore the conditions that trigger mentalizing activity, we replicated one of such studies (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008, Current Biology, 18, 454) under the minimal instruction to "view" pictures of unusual actions, without giving any "intention" instruction as in the original study. Contrary to earlier research, merely viewing unusual actions did not activate mentalizing areas. Instead, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex was activated. We conclude that unusual actions are not sufficient by themselves to trigger mentalizing. In order to activate the mentalizing network without an intention instruction, a richer action context informative of the implausibility of the action might be a prerequisite.

Brain activation related to the perception of minimal agency cues: the role of the mirror system.

Recent fMRI studies indicate that the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the mirror system are involved in analyzing goal-directed actions performed by non-human objects. However, these studies have some limitations: the animations showed moving shapes that resemble humans and human movement, or showed the interaction of two moving shapes rather than one alone. This may have prompted participants to assume a human agent instead of an object. To avoid this potential confound, in this study, animations showed a small circular shape (agent) jumping toward a bigger circular shape (goal) with an obstacle separating them. We manipulated agency of the small circular shape by showing its movements as self-propelled (Agent condition) or as launched by a lever mechanism (Non-agent condition). The small shape succeeded in avoiding an obstacle and reaching the goal object or failed to do so. Our results showed that goal-directed actions performed by an agentic shape recruited the mirror system (the inferior parietal lobe and the premotor cortex) in comparison with shapes that were launched. Success or failure to avoid the obstacle had no effect on these areas. These results complement and further extend previous findings indicating that the mirror system does not appear to be selective for biological actions and their goals, nor does it require the presence of a human, human body parts or human-made objects. Instead, it seems to play a general role in representing goal-directed actions of agents regardless of their form.

Counterfactual thinking: an fMRI study on changing the past for a better future.

Recent studies suggest that a brain network mainly associated with episodic memory has a more general function in imagining oneself in another time, place or perspective (e.g. episodic future thought, theory of mind, default mode). If this is true, counterfactual thinking (e.g. 'If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train.') should also activate this network. Present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explores the common and distinct neural activity of counterfactual and episodic thinking by directly comparing the imagining of upward counterfactuals (creating better outcomes for negative past events) with the re-experiencing of negative past events and the imagining of positive future events. Results confirm that episodic and counterfactual thinking share a common brain network, involving a core memory network (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal lobes) and prefrontal areas that might be related to mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex) and performance monitoring (right prefrontal cortex). In contrast to episodic past and future thinking, counterfactual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly and extensively, and additionally activates the bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex. We discuss these findings in view of recent fMRI evidence on the working of episodic memory and theory of mind.

Situation and person attributions under spontaneous and intentional instructions: an fMRI study.

This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research explores how observers make causal beliefs about an event in terms of the person or situation. Thirty-four participants read various short descriptions of social events that implied either the person or the situation as the cause. Half of them were explicitly instructed to judge whether the event was caused by something about the person or the situation (intentional inferences), whereas the other half was instructed simply to read the material carefully (spontaneous inferences). The results showed common activation in areas related to mentalizing, across all types of causes or instructions (posterior superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction, precuneus). However, the medial prefrontal cortex was activated only under spontaneous instructions, but not under intentional instruction. This suggests a bias toward person attributions (e.g. fundamental attribution bias). Complementary to this, intentional situation attributions activated a stronger and more extended network compared to intentional person attributions, suggesting that situation attributions require more controlled, extended and broader processing of the information.

Distinct recruitment of temporo-parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex in behavior understanding and trait identification.

It has been suggested that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is involved in inferring immediate goals and intentions from behaviors, whereas the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) integrates social information, such as traits, at a more abstract level. To explore the differential role of the TPJ and mPFC, participants read several verbal descriptions about an agent. Embedded in a factorial design, in one-half of the trials (behavior condition), the agent was engaged in a simple goal-directed behavior, whereas in the other half this description was absent. In another half of the trials (trait condition), the participants had to answer a question about a trait of the agent, whereas in the other half the question was about the agent's physical appearance. The results revealed that the dorsal mPFC was recruited when participants inferred the agent's trait, irrespective of a behavioral description. In contrast, the TPJ, posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), anterior intraparietal sulcus, and premotor cortex were activated when goal-directed behavioral information was presented, irrespective of a trait question. These findings confirm that in a social context, the TPJ (and pSTS) is activated for understanding goal-directed behaviors, whereas the mPFC is involved in processing traits.