Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study.

Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.

The longer-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on wellbeing and subjective cognitive functioning of older adults in Belgium.

In earlier survey research, we observed a severe impact of the first peak of the COVID-19 pandemic on the subjective wellbeing, sleep and activity of adults aged 65 years or older in Flanders, Belgium. The impact on subjective cognitive functioning, however, was limited. Since then, periods of lockdown and periods with less strict regulations alternated, but social distancing remained, especially for older adults. To study the longer-term impact of the pandemic on wellbeing and subjective cognitive functioning, we re-assessed the older adults from the first measurement moment (May-June 2020) in a second (June-July 2020) and third (December 2020) wave of the survey (n = 371, M = 72 years old, range 65-97 years old). Results indicated that wellbeing fluctuated with the severity of the pandemic. Results for self-reported cognitive functioning were mixed. While participants indicated a slightly better general subjective cognitive functioning at the end of the study, experienced problems with most cognitive subdomains significantly increased over time. The presence of depressive and anxiety symptoms were related to the longer-term impact of the pandemic on wellbeing and subjective cognitive functioning. Our study shows the long-lasting impact of the pandemic on the wellbeing and subjective cognitive functioning of older adults, without full recovery from the first wave.

Validity of the Empatica E4 wristband to estimate resting-state heart rate variability in a lab-based context.

Lab research might benefit from the advantages of wearable devices, such as their ease of use, to estimate pulse rate (PR) and pulse rate variability (PRV) as an equivalent for heart rate (HR) and heart rate variability. However, before implementing them in a lab context, the validity of the PR and PRV, also on ultra-short time scales (e.g., 30s), needs to be confirmed. We recorded heart activity simultaneously with an E4 wristband and an ECG device in a seated resting condition for 5 min. Our results showed that HR, RMSSD, SDNN and LF, but not HF, were validly estimated by the E4 wristband. Furthermore, the E4 wristband could validly estimate PR with recording lengths as short as 10s. RMSSD and SDNN were validly estimated using 30s or 120 s or an average of multiple short intervals (10s), while HF likely requires longer recording intervals. Based on this study, we formulated several recommendations for using the E4 wristband in a lab context.

Reactive and proactive cognitive control as underlying processes of number processing in children.

Cognitive control is crucial to resolve conflict in tasks such as the flanker task. Reactive control is used when conflict is rare, whereas proactive control is more efficient in situations where conflict is frequent. Macizo and Herrera (Psychological Research, 2013, Vol. 77, pp. 651-658) found that these two control processes can also underlie two-digit number comparison in adults. Specifically, they observed that the unit-decade compatibility effect decreased in a block containing many conflict trials as compared with a block containing few conflict trials (i.e., a list-wide proportion congruency effect). In the current study, we assessed whether this finding also applies to children (7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds). Participants performed a flanker task and a two-digit number comparison task. In both tasks, the proportion of conflict was manipulated (80% vs. 20%). Results from the flanker task showed a typical list-wide proportion congruency effect in reaction times in all participating age groups. In the number comparison task, we observed list-wide proportion congruency effects in both reaction times and error rates, which did not interact with age. Our findings support the assumption that children as young as 7 years can effectively use proactive and reactive control strategies. We showed that this effect is not limited to standardized artificial laboratory tasks, such as the flanker task, but also underlies more daily life tasks, such as the processing of Arabic numbers.

Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load.

The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.

Embodying Stressful Events: No Difference in Subjective Arousal and Neural Correlates Related to Immersion, Interoception, and Embodied Mentalization.

Repetitive thought about oneself, including one's emotions, can lead to both adaptive and maladaptive effects. Construal level of repetitive self-referential thought might moderate this. During interoception, which engages areas such as the insula, the anterior and/or posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the somatosensory cortex, concrete low level construal self-referential thought is applied, which has been shown to lead to more positive emotions after upsetting events. Contrarily, during immersion, related to neural activity in the default mode network (DMN), abstract high level construal self-referential thought is applied, which is linked to depression. The current study investigated whether the integration of concrete and abstract self-referential thought by means of embodied mentalization leads to less subjective arousal, decreased DMN activity and increased somatosensory activity as compared to immersion, and to more DMN activity as compared to interoception. In the fMRI scanner, participants imagined stressful events while adopting immersion, interoception or embodied mentalization. After each imagined stressful event, participants rated their subjective arousal and how difficult it was to apply the mode of self-referential thought. Results showed that participants felt that immersion was easier to apply than embodied mentalization. However, no differences in subjective arousal or neural activity were found between immersion, interoception and embodied mentalization. Possible reasons for this lack of significant differences are discussed.

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on wellbeing and cognitive functioning of older adults.

COVID-19 took a heavy toll on older adults. In Belgium, by the end of August, 93% of deaths due to COVID-19 were aged 65 or older. Similar trends were observed in other countries. As a consequence, older adults were identified as a group at risk, and strict governmental restrictions were imposed on them. This has caused concerns about their mental health. Using an online survey, this study established the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on adults aged 65 years or older, and which factors moderate this impact. Participants reported a significant decrease in activity level, sleep quality and wellbeing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Depression was strongly related to reported declines in activity level, sleep quality, wellbeing and cognitive functioning. Our study shows that the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the mental health of older adults. This implies that this group at risk requires attention of governments and healthcare.

The effect of cognitive effort on the sense of agency.

While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cognitive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our thoughts and actions (i.e., sense of agency). Previous studies have shown that cognitive effort can be both detrimental and facilitative for the experienced sense of agency. We hypothesized that the reason for these contradictory findings might lie in the use of differential time windows in which cognitive effort operates. The current study therefore examined the effect of cognitive effort exerted on the current trial, on the previous trial or across a block of trials on sense of agency, using implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2) measures of sense of agency. We showed that the exertion of more cognitive control on current trials led to a higher explicit sense of agency. This surprising result was contrasted to previous studies to establish potential reasons for this surprising finding and to formulate recommendations for future studies.

Behavioral and neural dynamics of cognitive control in the context of rumination.

Rumination is a characteristic feature of several clinical disorders (e.g., major depressive disorder, insomnia disorder). Emerging evidence suggests that a reduced flexibility in the balance between proactive and reactive control might be related to trait rumination. This study aimed to investigate the proactive-reactive control balance in the context of trait rumination. In the current study, we investigated behavioral performance and event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants were performing an AX- Continuous Performance Task, to evaluate whether a shift towards more reactive control (i.e., conflict monitoring and resolution) at the expense of proactive control (i.e., maintenance and updating of task-relevant information) is associated with increased trait rumination. Our behavioral results as well as our ERP results did not demonstrate that a shift towards more reactive control at the expense of proactive control was associated with increased trait rumination. Future research is needed to investigate the proactive-reactive control balance in the context of trait rumination. This study is the first to explore the recruitment dynamics of cognitive control using behavioral as well as electrophysiological measures in the context of rumination.

Cognitive Effort Modulates Connectivity between Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Task-Relevant Cortical Areas.

Investment of cognitive effort is required in everyday life and has received ample attention in recent neurocognitive frameworks. The neural mechanism of effort investment is thought to be structured hierarchically, with dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) at the highest level, recruiting task-specific upstream areas. In the current fMRI study, we tested whether dACC is generally active when effort demand is high across tasks with different stimuli, and whether connectivity between dACC and task-specific areas is increased depending on the task requirements and effort level at hand. For that purpose, a perceptual detection task was administered that required male and female human participants to detect either a face or a house in a noisy image. Effort demand was manipulated by adding little (low effort) or much (high effort) noise to the images. Results showed a network of dACC, anterior insula (AI), and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) to be more active when effort demand was high, independent of the performed task (face or house detection). Importantly, effort demand modulated functional connectivity between dACC and face-responsive or house-responsive perceptual areas, depending on the task at hand. This shows that dACC, AI, and IPS constitute a general effort-responsive network and suggests that the neural implementation of cognitive effort involves dACC-initiated sensitization of task-relevant areas.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Although cognitive effort is generally perceived as aversive, its investment is inevitable when navigating an increasingly complex society. In this study, we demonstrate how the human brain tailors the implementation of effort to the requirements of the task at hand. We show increased effort-related activity in a network of brain areas consisting of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), anterior insula, and intraparietal sulcus, independent of task specifics. Crucially, we also show that effort-induced functional connectivity between dACC and task-relevant areas tracks specific task demands. These results demonstrate how brain regions specialized to solve a task may be energized by dACC when effort demand is high.

The Interplay of Parent and Child Coping Responses in Understanding Child Functioning in the Context of Living With a Parent With or Without Chronic Pain.

OBJECTIVES: Pain disorders tend to run in families, and children of individuals with chronic pain have been found to report lower functioning. Drawing upon a social learning perspective, the current study examined how diverse maternal pain coping responses (ie, pain catastrophizing and distraction) may, via corresponding child pain coping responses, act as a vulnerability or protective factor for child functioning in the context of parental chronic pain (CP). METHODS: A cross-sectional study was conducted in mothers with CP and their pain-free child (N=100) and mothers without CP and their pain-free child (N=74). Moderated mediation analyses were performed to test whether associations between maternal coping responses and child functioning (ie, somatic symptoms, physical functioning, and psychosocial health) were mediated by corresponding child coping responses and whether these associations were moderated by the presence or absence of maternal CP. RESULTS: Maternal pain catastrophizing was indirectly related to more somatic symptoms, lower physical functioning, and lower psychosocial health in their child via child pain catastrophizing. Relationships were moderated by the presence or absence of maternal CP, such that mediated relationships were only found in mothers without CP and their child. No (in)direct relationships between maternal distraction, child distraction, and child functioning were observed. DISCUSSION: The current findings demonstrated that child functioning was associated with maternal and child pain catastrophizing, but only in children of mothers without CP. No evidence was found in support of maternal pain coping responses as vulnerability or protective factors in the context of parental CP.

Learning to fear pain after observing another's pain: An experimental study in schoolchildren.

BACKGROUND: Children of individuals with chronic pain have an increased vulnerability to experience pain problems, possibly through observation of pain in their parents. As pain-related fear (PRF) is a critical factor in the development and maintenance of chronic pain, the current experimental study examined the acquisition of PRF through observational learning and subsequent extinction after first-hand experience of the feared stimulus. METHODS: Healthy children (8-16 years) observed either their mother or a stranger performing two cold pressor tasks (CPT) filled with coloured water. In a differential conditioning procedure, one colour (CS+) was combined with genuine painful facial expressions and the other colour (CS-) with neutral facial expressions. Following this observation phase, children performed both CPTs (10°C) themselves. RESULTS: Children expected the CS+ to be more painful than the CS- and they reported being more afraid and hesitant to immerse in the CS+ compared to the CS-. Moreover, this fear was reflected in children's level of arousal in anticipation of CPT performance. This learned association extinguished after performing both CPTs. Effects were not moderated by whether the child observed their mother or a stranger, by the child's pain catastrophizing, trait PRF or trait anxiety. Remarkably, learning effects increased when the child perceived a larger difference between the model's painful and neutral facial expressions. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides evidence for observational learning of PRF and subsequent extinction in schoolchildren. This acquisition of PRF by observing parental pain may contribute to vulnerabilities in children of parents with chronic pain. SIGNIFICANCE: Children may acquire pain-related fear by observing pain in others and this learned fear can diminish after first-hand experience. Remarkably, observational learning did not depend on the children's relationship with the model, but it did depend on the intensity of pain that is perceived. A better understanding of the impact of observing (parental) pain may help clarify the intergenerational transmission of risk for pain and inform the development of preventive programs.

The Fear of Tinnitus Questionnaire: Toward a Reliable and Valid Means of Assessing Fear in Adults with Tinnitus.

OBJECTIVES: The purpose of this study was to assess the factor structure, reliability, and validity of the Fear of Tinnitus Questionnaire (FTQ); a brief self-report measure of people's fears about potential cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and social consequences of living with tinnitus. DESIGN: Five hundred eighty-eight Dutch-speaking adults with tinnitus completed an online battery of questionnaires measuring tinnitus-related distress, fear, catastrophizing, and quality of life. The sample was randomly split into two to perform exploratory and Bayesian confirmatory factor analyses. A subsample of participants (n = 144) completed the battery of questionnaires a second time after a 2-week interval to calculate test-retest reliability and conduct a Bland-Altman analysis. Convergent and concurrent validity of the FTQ was assessed with the complete data set and measures of tinnitus-related distress as the outcome. RESULTS: Exploratory factor analyses indicated that single- and three-factor FTQ models were both valid solutions. Posterior predictive p values for the Bayesian confirmatory factor analyses ranged between 0.51 and 0.53 indicating that the respective models were an excellent fit for the data. The FTQ showed excellent test-retest reliability (average value intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) = 0.92; 95% confidence interval, 0.89-0.95) and in the Bland-Altman analysis, satisfactory agreement between participants' scores after a 2-week interval. Furthermore, the FTQ demonstrated good internal reliability (α = 0.83, 95% confidence interval, 0.81-0.85) and added statistically significant amounts of variance to models predicting tinnitus-related distress and interference in daily life. CONCLUSIONS: The FTQ has good psychometric properties and can be used to assess people's fear of tinnitus in research or clinical settings. Further work to establish the reliability and validity should be conducted and include an examination of a version of the FTQ that uses Likert-type response scales which might offer improved sensitivity.

Recruitment dynamics of cognitive control in insomnia.

STUDY OBJECTIVES: Individuals with insomnia disorder (ID) commonly report complaints of cognitive control functioning. Conversely, both behavioral and neurological evidence supporting subjective cognitive control impairments in insomnia remain remarkably scarce and inconclusive. To investigate this discrepancy, the present study used next to behavioral measures, event-related potentials (ERPs) to assess proactive control and reactive control in insomnia. METHODS: Individuals with insomnia disorder (n = 18) and good sleeper controls (GSC; n = 15) completed the AX-continuous performance task, while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. This task required participants to maintain specific cue-information active to prepare an adequate response to a subsequent probe, which allowed us to measure participants' reliance on both proactive and reactive control. RESULTS: The results indicate that, although ID show a comparable level of performance as GSC, they show a reduced proactive engagement of cue-induced maintenance and response preparation processes (as reflected by the P3b and the contingent negative variation components). Moreover, in contrast to GSC, ID fail to engage reactive control (as indexed by the P3a component) to overcome invalid response tendencies. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides neurological evidence for impairments in cognitive control functioning in insomnia. As such, our study contributes to a better understanding of the discrepancy between the commonly reported cognitive impairments in insomnia and the scarce objective evidence supporting these cognitive complaints.

Context-dependent modulation of cognitive control involves different temporal profiles of fronto-parietal activity.

To efficiently deal with quickly changing task demands, we often need to organize our behaviour on different time scales. For example, to ignore irrelevant and select relevant information, cognitive control might be applied in reactive (short time scale) or proactive (long time scale) mode. These two control modes play a pivotal role in cognitive-neuroscientific theorizing but the temporal dissociation of the underlying neural mechanisms is not well established empirically. In this fMRI study, a cognitive control task was administered in contexts with mainly congruent (MC) and mainly incongruent (MI) trials to induce reactive and proactive control, respectively. Based on behavioural profiles, we expected cognitive control in the MC context to be characterized by transient activity (measured on-trial) in task-relevant areas. In the MI context, cognitive control was expected to be reflected in sustained activity (measured in the intertrial interval) in similar or different areas. Results show that in the MC context, on-trial transient activity (incongruent - congruent trials) was increased in fronto-parietal areas, compared to the MI context. These areas included dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS). In the MI context, sustained activity in similar fronto-parietal areas during the intertrial interval was increased, compared to the MC context. These results illuminate how context-dependent reactive and proactive control subtend the same brain areas but operate on different time scales.

Persistent modification of cognitive control through attention training.

An important aspect of cognitive control is to direct attention towards relevant information and away from distracting information. This attentional modulation is at the core of several influential frameworks, but its trainability and generalisability remain unclear. To address this issue, two groups of subjects were invited to the lab on three consecutive days. On Day 2, they performed an arrow priming task which trained them to adopt an attentional bias towards (prime-attended group) or away from (prime-diverted group) a potentially conflicting prime. Direct generalisation of the attention training was measured by assessing task performance on the same task without the attentional manipulation directly after training (Day 2) and the next day (Day 3), and comparing it to baseline (Day 1). Performance on this direct transfer task showed a difference in attentional modulation between groups directly after training that persisted the next day. No cross-task generalisation was found to two other tasks that were closely or more remotely related to the trained task. Together, these results are in accordance with cognitive control frameworks that limit attentional modulation to the specific features of the trained task.

Semisupervised category learning facilitates the development of automaticity.

In the human category of learning, learning is studied in a supervised, an unsupervised, or a semisupervised way. The rare human semisupervised category of learning studies all focus on early learning. However, the impact of the semisupervised category learning late in learning, when automaticity develops, is unknown. Therefore, in Experiment 1, all participants were first trained on the information-integration category structure for 2 days until they reached an expert level. Afterwards, half of the participants learned in a supervised way and the other half in a semisupervised way over two successive days. Both groups received an equal number of feedback trials. Finally, all participants took part in a test day where they were asked to respond as quickly as possible. Participants were significantly faster on this test in the semisupervised group than in the supervised group. This difference was not found on day 2, implying that the no-feedback trials in the semisupervised condition facilitated automaticity. Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the higher number of trials in the semisupervised condition of Experiment 1 caused the faster response times. We therefore created an almost supervised condition where participants almost always received feedback (95%) and an almost unsupervised condition where participants almost never received feedback (5%). All conditions now contained an equal number of trials to the semisupervised condition of Experiment 1. The results show that receiving feedback almost always or almost never led to slower response times than the semisupervised condition of Experiment 1. This confirms the advantage of semisupervised learning late in learning.

Absence without leave or leave without absence: Examining the interrelations among mind wandering, metacognition and cognitive control.

Despite the abundance of recent publications about mind wandering (i.e., off-task thought), its interconnection with metacognition and cognitive control has not yet been examined. In the current study, we hypothesized that these three constructs would show clear interrelations. Metacognitive capacity was predicted to correlate positively with cognitive control ability, which in turn was predicted to be positively related to resistance to mind wandering during sustained attention. Moreover, it was expected that participants with good metacognitive capacity would be better at the subjective recognition of behaviorally present mind wandering. Three tasks were used: The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) to measure mind wandering, a perceptual decision task with confidence ratings to measure metacognitive efficiency, and a conflict task to measure cognitive control. Structural Equation Modelling was used to test the interrelations among the three constructs. As expected, metacognitive efficiency was positively related to cognitive control ability. Surprisingly, there was a negative relation between metacognitive efficiency and the degree to which subjective mind wandering reports tracked the behavioral index of mind wandering. No relation was found between cognitive control and behavioral mind wandering. The results of the current work are the first to shed light on the interrelations among these three constructs.

Avoiding the conflict: Metacognitive awareness drives the selection of low-demand contexts.

Previous research attempted to explain how humans strategically adapt behavior in order to achieve successful task performance. Recently, it has been suggested that 1 potential strategy is to avoid tasks that are too demanding. Here, we report 3 experiments that investigate the empirically neglected role of metacognitive awareness in this process. In these experiments, participants could freely choose between performing a task in either a high-demand or a low-demand context. Using subliminal priming, we ensured that participants were not aware of the visual stimuli creating these different demand contexts. Our results showed that participants who noticed a difference in task difficulty (i.e., metacognitive aware participants) developed a clear preference for the low-demand context. In contrast, participants who experienced no difference in task difficulty (i.e., metacognitive unaware participants) based their choices on variables unrelated to cognitive demand (e.g., the color or location associated with a context), and did not develop a preference for the low-demand context. Crucially, this pattern was found despite identical task performance in both metacognitive awareness groups. A multiple regression approach confirmed that metacognitive awareness was the main factor driving the preference for low-demand contexts. These results argue for an important role of metacognitive awareness in the strategic avoidance of demanding tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record