ABSTRACT
Although people who endorse conspiracy theories related to medicine often have negative attitudes toward particular health care measures and may even shun the healthcare system in general, conspiracy theories have received rather meager attention in bioethics literature. Consequently, and given that conspiracy theorizing appears rather prevalent, it has been maintained that there is significant need for bioethics debate over how to deal with conspiracy theories. While the proposals have typically focused on the effects that unwarranted conspiracy theories have in the public health context, Nathan Stout's recent argument concentrates on the impacts that such theories have at the individual level of clinical decision-making. In this article, I maintain that duly acknowledging the impacts of conspiracy theories that raise Stout's concern does not require bioethics debate over the proper response to the influence of conspiracy theories in healthcare. Having evaluated two possible objections, I conclude by briefly clarifying the purported import of the response to Stout.
Subject(s)
Clinical Decision-Making , Public Health , HumansABSTRACT
Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person's approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described-henceforth referred to as the question whether self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous-would not appear to have received due consideration. This article takes a step towards remedying the shortage. I start by explicating the main points of departure of its argument. In the subsequent sections of the article, I consider several possible reasons for deeming self-validating neuroenhancement incompatible with autonomy. On the basis of the consideration, I propose that self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous.
Subject(s)
Biomedical Enhancement/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Personality , Self Concept , Humans , Philosophy, MedicalABSTRACT
In the end-of-life context, alleviation of the suffering of a distressed patient is usually seen as a, if not the, central goal for the medical personnel treating her. Yet it has also been argued that suffering should be seen as a part of good dying. More precisely, it has been maintained that alleviating a dying patient's suffering can make her unable to take care of practical end-of-life matters, deprive her of an opportunity to ask questions about and find meaning in and for her existence, and detach her from reality. In this article, I argue that the aims referred to either do not support suffering or are better served by alleviating it. When the aims would be equally well served by enduring suffering and relieving it, the latter appears to be the preferable option, given that the distress a patient experiences has no positive intrinsic value. Indeed, as the suffering can be very distressing, it may not be worth bearing even if that was the best way to achieve the aims: the distress can sometimes be bad enough to outbalance the worth of achieving the goals. Having considered an objection to the effect that a patient can have a self-regarding moral duty to endure the distress she faces at the end of life, I conclude that the burden of proof is on the side of those who maintain that the suffering experienced at the end of life ought to be endured as a part of dying well.
Subject(s)
Attitude to Death , Goals , Life , Moral Obligations , Palliative Care , Stress, Psychological/therapy , Terminal Care , Death , Ethics, Clinical , Humans , Palliative Care/ethics , Social Values , Stress, Psychological/psychology , Terminal Care/ethicsABSTRACT
By issuing an advance treatment directive, an autonomous person can formally express what kinds of treatment she wishes and does not wish to receive in case she becomes ill or injured and unable to autonomously decide about her treatment. While many jurisdictions and medical associations endorse them, advance treatment directives have also been criticized. According to an important criticism, when a person irreversibly loses her autonomy what she formerly autonomously desired ceases to be of (central) importance in deciding about her treatment. The medical ethical debate regarding different possible ways of solving the problem on which the criticism is based has grown exceedingly intricate. Instead of assessing the developments made in the debate so far, I present a thought experiment-built around a suicide case-which suggests that the problem is not as intractable as it has generally been deemed to be.
Subject(s)
Advance Directives/psychology , Dissent and Disputes/legislation & jurisprudence , Personal Autonomy , Treatment Refusal/psychology , Advance Directives/ethics , Humans , Treatment Refusal/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
The view that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be made available for terminal patients only is typically warranted by reference to the risks that the procedures are seen to involve. Though they would appear to involve similar risks, the commonly endorsed end-of-life practices referred to as passive euthanasia are available also for non-terminal patients. In this article, I assess whether there is good reason to believe that the risks in question would be bigger in the case of voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide than in that of passive euthanasia. I propose that there is not. On that basis, I suggest that limiting access to voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide to terminal patients only is not consistent with accepting the existing practices of passive euthanasia.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Euthanasia, Passive , Euthanasia/ethics , Physicians/psychology , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Euthanasia, Active , HumansABSTRACT
It is commonly accepted that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be allowed, if at all, only in the cases of patients whose conditions are incurable. Yet, there are different understandings of when a patient's condition is incurable. In this article, I consider two understandings of the notion of an incurable condition that can be found in the recent debate on physician-assisted dying. According to one of them, a condition is incurable when it is known that there is no cure for it. According to the other, a condition is incurable when no cure is known to exist for it. I propose two criteria for assessing the conceptions and maintain that, in light of the criteria, the latter is more plausible than the former.
Subject(s)
Advance Directives/ethics , Clinical Decision-Making/ethics , Medical Futility , Suicide, Assisted , Value of Life , Ethics, Medical , Humans , Medical Futility/ethics , Patient Advocacy , Personal Autonomy , Physician-Patient Relations , Right to Die/ethics , Suicide, Assisted/ethicsABSTRACT
Several authors have recently suggested that the suffering caused by mental illness could provide moral grounds for physician-assisted dying. Yet they typically require that psychiatric-assisted dying could come to question in the cases of autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients only. Given that also non-autonomous psychiatric patients can sometimes suffer unbearably, this limitation appears questionable. In this article, I maintain that restricting psychiatric-assisted dying to autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients would not be compatible with endorsing certain end-of-life practices commonly accepted in current medical ethics and law, practices often referred to as 'passive euthanasia'.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia, Passive/ethics , Mental Competency , Mental Disorders , Physicians/ethics , Psychiatry/ethics , Stress, Psychological , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Ethics, Medical , Humans , Mental Competency/psychology , Mental Disorders/psychology , Morals , Personal Autonomy , Psychiatry/standards , Psychiatry/trends , Stress, Psychological/psychologyABSTRACT
It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects-objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies-can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.
Subject(s)
Human Rights , Intellectual Property , Morals , Ownership , Human Rights/economics , Humans , Ownership/ethicsSubject(s)
Attitude of Health Personnel , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/legislation & jurisprudence , Palliative Care/ethics , Palliative Care/methods , Physician's Role , Quality of Life , Stress, Psychological , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , HumansABSTRACT
In this article, I assess the position that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) ought not to be accepted in the cases of persons who suffer existentially but who have no medical condition, because existential questions do not fall within the domain of physicians' professional expertise. I maintain that VE and PAS based on suffering arising from medical conditions involves existential issues relevantly similar to those confronted in connection with existential suffering. On that basis I conclude that if VE and PAS based on suffering arising from medical conditions is taken to fall within the domain of medical expertise, it is not consistent to use the view that physicians' professional expertise does not extend to existential questions as a reason for denying requests for VE and PAS from persons who suffer existentially but have no medical condition.
Subject(s)
Attitude of Health Personnel , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/legislation & jurisprudence , Palliative Care/ethics , Palliative Care/methods , Physician's Role , Quality of Life , Stress, Psychological , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Disease , Ethical Analysis , Ethics, Medical , Humans , Mental Competency , Wounds and InjuriesABSTRACT
It has been argued that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are morally wrong. Yet, a gravely suffering patient might insist that he has a moral right to the procedures even if they were morally wrong. There are also philosophers who maintain that an agent can have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. In this article, I assess the view that a suffering patient can have a moral right to VE and PAS despite the moral wrongness of the procedures in light of the main argument for a moral right to do wrong found in recent philosophical literature. I maintain that the argument does not provide adequate support for such a right to VE and PAS.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Right to Die/ethics , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Bioethical Issues , Humans , Pain , Patient Rights , Personal Autonomy , Philosophy, MedicalABSTRACT
In contemporary Western biomedical ethics, informed consent practices are commonly justified in terms of the intrinsic value of patient autonomy. James Stacey Taylor maintains that this conception of the moral grounding of medical informed consent is mistaken. On the basis of his reasoning to that effect, Taylor argues that medical informed consent is justified by the instrumental value of personal autonomy. In this article, I examine whether Taylor's justification of medical informed consent is plausible.
Subject(s)
Informed Consent/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Professional-Patient Relations/ethics , Ethical Analysis , History, 21st Century , HumansABSTRACT
In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly assess whether considerations pertaining to respecting the patient's autonomy could still require obedience to the desire expressed in her advance directive and arrive at a negative answer.
Subject(s)
Advance Directive Adherence , Ethics, Medical , Persistent Vegetative State , Personal Autonomy , Advance Directive Adherence/psychology , Decision Making , HumansABSTRACT
It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making. This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some uses in the collective level and that when it is not appropriate the decision power a concerned party ought to have in connection with an arrangement should be made relative to the interest she has at stake in it. It concludes that the objection examined does not undermine collective informed consent.
Subject(s)
Decision Making, Organizational , Decision Making/ethics , Group Processes , Informed Consent/ethics , Policy Making , Humans , Politics , Power, PsychologicalABSTRACT
Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no expertise to be had. In this paper, I assess this criticism of the use of ethics committees and ethics consultants. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to reject the possibility of ethical expertise.
Subject(s)
Ethics Committees/ethics , Ethics , Ethicists , HumansABSTRACT
Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist.
Subject(s)
Ethics Consultation/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Professional Autonomy , HumansABSTRACT
In a recent issue of this journal, David Silver and Gerald Dworkin discuss the physicians' role in execution by lethal injection. Dworkin concludes that discussion by stating that, at that point, he is unable to think of an acceptable set of moral principles to support the view that it is illegitimate for physicians to participate in execution by lethal injection that would not rule out certain other plausible moral judgements, namely that euthanasia is under certain conditions legitimate and that organ-donation surgery is sometimes permissible. This article draws attention to some problems in the views of Silver and Dworkin and suggests moral principles which support the three moral views just mentioned.
Subject(s)
Capital Punishment/methods , Ethics, Medical , Goals , Physician's Role , Prisoners/psychology , Tissue and Organ Procurement , HumansABSTRACT
It is often accepted that we may legitimately speak about voluntary euthanasia only in cases of persons who are suffering because they are incurably injured or have an incurable disease. This article argues that when we consider the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia, we have no good reason to concentrate only on persons who are ill or injured and suffering.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Morals , Stress, Psychological/psychology , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/psychology , Humans , Male , Severity of Illness IndexABSTRACT
This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patients' autonomy has value over and beyond its instrumental value in promoting the patients' wellbeing. It argues that this view should be rejected and concludes that patients' autonomy should be taken to have only instrumental value in medicine.
Subject(s)
Ethics, Medical , Patient Participation/psychology , Patient Rights/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Philosophy, Medical , Decision Making/ethics , HumansABSTRACT
It is plausible that what possible courses of action patients may legitimately expect their physicians to take is ultimately determined by what medicine as a profession is supposed to do and, consequently, that we can determine the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the basis of identifying the proper goals of medicine. This article examines the main ways of defining the proper goals of medicine found in the recent bioethics literature and argues that they cannot provide a clear answer to the question of whether or not voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are morally acceptable. It is suggested that to find a plausible answer to this question and to complete the task of defining the proper goals of medicine, we must determine what is the best philosophical theory about the nature of prudential value.