Weep and get more: When and why sadness expression is effective in negotiations.

Although recently some research has been accumulated on emotional expressions in negotiations, there is little research on whether expressing sadness could have any effect in negotiations. We propose that sadness expressions can increase the expressers' ability to claim value in negotiations because they make recipients experience greater other-concern for the expresser. However, only when the social situation provides recipients with reasons to experience concern for the expresser in the first place, will recipients act on their other-concern and, eventually, concede more to a sad expresser. Three experiments tested this proposition by examining face-to-face, actual negotiations (in which participants interacted with each other). In all 3 experiments, recipients conceded more to a sad expresser when, but only when, features of the social situation provided reasons to experience other-concern for the expresser, namely (a) when recipients perceived the expresser as low power (Experiment 1), (b) when recipients anticipated a future interaction (Experiment 1), (c) when recipients construed the relationship as collaborative in nature (Experiment 2), or (d) when recipients believed that it was inappropriate to blame others (Experiment 3). All 3 experiments showed that the positive effect of sadness expression was mediated by the recipients' greater other-concern. These findings extend previous research on emotional expressions in negotiations by emphasizing a distinct psychological mechanism. Implications for our understanding of sadness, negotiations, and emotions are discussed.

Good things come to those who wait: late first offers facilitate creative agreements in negotiation.

Although previous research has shown that making the first offer leads to a distributive advantage in negotiations, the current research explored how the timing of first offers affects the creativity of negotiation agreements. We hypothesized that making the first offer later rather than earlier in the negotiation would facilitate the discovery of creative agreements that better meet the parties' underlying interests. Experiment 1 demonstrated that compared with early first offers, late first offers facilitated creative agreements that better met the parties' underlying interests. Experiments 2a and 2b controlled for the duration of the negotiation and conceptually replicated this effect. The last two studies also demonstrated that the beneficial effect of late first offers was mediated by greater information exchange. Thus, negotiators need to consider the timing of first offers to fully capitalize on the first offer advantage. Implications for our understanding of creativity, motivated information exchange, and timing in negotiations are discussed.

Assigned experts with competitive goals withhold information in group decision making.

Expertise assignment has been proposed to improve unshared information pooling in group decision making. The current research revises this view by hypothesizing that expertise assignment is beneficial when group members have cooperative goals, but is detrimental when group members have competitive goals. Three-person groups were confronted with a hidden-profile task. Members were either assigned experts or not and were instructed to either cooperate or compete with other members. The results confirmed that expertise decreased unshared information pooling and repetitions in competition, while the reverse was found in cooperation. This interaction effect was mediated by self-other difference in perceived competence. Thus, expertise favours or hinders information sharing in group decision making as a function of members' cooperative or competitive goals.