Revisiting multi-organ transplantation in the setting of scarcity.

In the setting of organ scarcity, the ethics of multi-organ transplantation (MOT) deserve new examination. MOT offers substantial benefits to certain recipients, including avoiding serial surgeries. However, MOT candidates in the United States commonly receive priority for their nonprimary organ over many individuals who need that organ, which may undermine equity. The absence of standard criteria for MOT eligibility also enables large and unfair regional variation in MOT, such as simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation. Unfortunately, MOT may also undermine utility (optimal patient and graft survival) in circumstances where providing multiple organs to one person fails to achieve the greater collective benefit attained by providing transplants to multiple people. Policy reforms should include the adoption of minimal clinical criteria for MOT candidacy with the attendant goal of decreasing regional variation in MOT. In the future, these minimal criteria can be revised to accommodate new research about which patients derive the most benefit from MOT. Incentives to perform MOT should also be reduced, such as by including MOT outcomes in center-specific reports. These reforms run the risk that the transplant community could be perceived as abandoning MOT candidates, but offer an opportunity to align transplant practice and ethical principles.

Equal Opportunity Supplemented by Fair Innings: equity and efficiency in allocating deceased donor kidneys.

For 7 years, the Kidney Transplantation Committee of the United Network for Organ Sharing/Organ Procurement Transplantation Network has attempted to revise the kidney allocation algorithm for adults (≥18 years) in end-stage renal disease awaiting deceased donor kidney transplants. Changes to the kidney allocation system must conform to the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) which clearly states that allocation must take into account both efficiency (graft and person survival) and equity (fair distribution). In this article, we evaluate three allocation models: the current system, age-matching and a two-step model that we call "Equal Opportunity Supplemented by Fair Innings (EOFI)". We discuss the different conceptions of efficiency and equity employed by each model and evaluate whether EOFI could actually achieve the NOTA criteria of balancing equity and efficiency given current conditions of growing scarcity and donor-candidate age mismatch.

White coat ceremonies: a second opinion.

A "white coat" ceremony functions as a rite of passage for students entering medical school. This comment provides a second option in response to the earlier, more enthusiastic, discussion of the ceremony by Raanan Gillon. While these ceremonies may serve important sociological functions, they raise three serious problems: whether the professional oath or "affirmation of professional commitment" taken in this setting has any legitimacy, how a sponsor of such a ceremony would know which oath or affirmation to administer, and what the moral implications of this "bonding process" are. I argue that the initiation oath is morally meaningless if students are not aware of its content in advance, that different students ought to commit to different oaths, and that bonding of students to the medical profession necessarily separates them from identification with lay people who will be their patients.

The impossibility of a morality internal to medicine.

After distinguishing two different meanings of the notion of a 'morality internal to medicine' and considering a hypothetical case of a society that relied on its surgeons to 'eunuchize' priest/cantors to permit them to play an important religious/cultural role, this paper examines three reasons why morality cannot be derived from reflection on the ends of the practice of medicine: (1) there exist many medical roles and these have different ends or purposes, (2) even within any given medical role, there exists multiple, sometimes conflicting ends, and, most critically, (3) the ends of any practice such as medicine must come from outside the practice, that is, from the basic ends or purposes of human living. The paper concludes by considering whether these ends external to medicine are universally part of the moral reality or whether they are socially constructed. The paper argues that, even if various cultural accounts of the common, universal morality are 'socially constructed,' they may, nevertheless, be reflections, however, imperfect, of a more universal common morality that should be thought of as real. Therefore, the morality of medicine must come from a more fundamental morality external to medicine. That external morality will be socially constructed, but may nevertheless reflect an underlying common morality.

Doctor does not know best: why in the new century physicians must stop trying to benefit patients.

While twentieth-century medical ethics has focused on the duty of physicians to benefit their patients, the next century will see that duty challenged in three ways. First, we will increasingly recognize that it is unrealistic to expect physicians to be able to determine what will benefit their patients. Either they limit their attention to medical well-being when total well-being is the proper end of the patient or they strive for total well-being, which takes them beyond their expertise. Even within the medical sphere, they have no basis for choosing among the proper medical goals for medicine. Also, there are many plausible strategies for relating predicted benefits to harms, and physicians cannot be expert in picking among these strategies. Second, increasingly plausible ethical systems recognize that in some cases, patient benefit must be sacrificed to protect patient rights including the right to the truth, to have promises kept, to have autonomy respected, and to not be killed. Third, ethics of the next century will increasingly recognize that some patient benefits must be sacrificed to fulfill duties to others - either the duty to serve the interests of others or other duties such as keeping promises, telling the truth, and, particularly, promoting justice. Physicians in the twenty-first century will be seen as having a new, more limited duty to assist the patient in pursuing the patient's understanding of the patient's interest within the constraints of deontological ethical principles and externally imposed duties to promote justice. The result will be a duty to be loyal to the consumer of health care with the recognition that often this will mean that the physician is not permitted to pursue the physician's understanding of the patient's well-being.

The place of care in ethical theory.

The concept of care and a related ethical theory of care have emerged as increasingly important in biomedical ethics. This essay outlines a series of questions about the conceptualization of care and its place in ethical theory. First, it considers the possibility that care should be conceptualized as an alternative principle of right action; then as a virtue, a cluster of virtues, or as a synonym for virtue theory. The implications for various interpretations of the debate of the relation of care and justice are then explored, suggesting three possible meanings for that contrast. Next, the possibility that care theorists are taking up the debate over the relation between principles and cases is considered. Finally, it is suggested that care theorists may be pressing for consideration of an entirely new question in moral theory: the assessment of the normative appropriateness of relationships. Issues needing to be addressed in an ethic of relationships are suggested.

Egalitarian and maximin theories of justice: directed donation of organs for transplant.

It is common to interpret Rawls's maximin theory of justice as egalitarian. Compared to utilitarian theories, this may be true. However, in special cases practices that distribute resources so as to benefit the worst off actually increase the inequality between the worst off and some who are better off. In these cases the Rawlsian maximin parts company with what is here called true egalitarianism. A policy question requiring a distinction between maximin and "true egalitarian" allocations has arisen in the arena of organ transplantation. This case is examined here as a venue for differentiating maximin and true egalitarian theories. Directed donation is the name given to donations of organs restricted to a particular social group. For example, the family of a member of the Ku Klux Klan donated his organs on the provision that they go only to members of the Caucasian race. While such donations appear to be discriminatory, if certain plausible assumptions are made, they satisfy the maximin criterion. They selectively advantage the recipient of the organs without harming anyone (assuming the organs would otherwise go unused). Moreover, everyone who is lower on the waiting list (who, thereby, could be considered worse off) is advantaged by moving up on the waiting list. This paper examines how maximin and more truly egalitarian theories handle this case arguing that, to the extent that directed donation is unethical, the best account of that conclusion is that an egalitarian principle of justice is to be preferred to the maximin.