ABSTRACT
This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the ontology of impairment, in part social and in part not. The analysis is based on the division between two categories of facts concerning the world we live in: "brute" and institutional facts. Brute facts are those that require no human institution for their existence. To state a brute fact requires naturally the institution of language, but the fact stated is not the same as the statement of it. For example, regardless of any human institution or opinion, the presence of an extra chromosome 21 is a brute fact, and despite of people's constructions or deconstructions, this fact remains. As for the lives of people with extra chromosome 21, the social reality and human institutions enter the picture. The social and moral status of these people is never a matter of brute fact.
Subject(s)
Disability Evaluation , Disabled Persons/psychology , Communication , Humans , Psycholinguistics/ethics , Quality of Health Care/ethics , Socioeconomic FactorsSubject(s)
Disability Evaluation , Disabled Persons , Humans , Philosophy , Public Policy , Science , Value of LifeABSTRACT
This paper discusses whether prospective parents ought to find out about their genetic constitution for reproductive reasons. It is argued that ignoring genetic information can be in line with responsible parenthood or perhaps even recommendable. This is because parenthood is essentially an unconditional project in which parents ought to commit themselves to nurturing any kind of child. Besides, the traditional reasons offered for the unfortunateness of impairments and the tragic fate of families with disabled children are not convincing. Other morally problematic outcomes of genetics, such as discrimination against individuals with impairments, and limiting free parental decision making, are also considered.
Subject(s)
Decision Making , Disabled Children , Genetic Counseling , Genetic Testing , Moral Obligations , Parents/psychology , Child , Coercion , Family/psychology , Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice , Humans , Social ResponsibilitySubject(s)
Abortion, Eugenic/ethics , Moral Obligations , Bioethics , Disabled Children , Female , Humans , Infant, Newborn , Intention , Ownership , Parents , Pregnancy , Value of Life , Women's RightsABSTRACT
This article presents moral philosophical arguments regarding life-saving medical treatment that may be more available to infants without disabilities than to infants with intellectual disabilities. The ideas are that children with disabilities are a burden to their families and to society and that a happy life may not be attainable for these children and their families. I argue that human well-being is not based merely on individual characteristics, but is a result of the individual's relation to other people. Further, children with disabilities are not inevitably a burden to their families or society. Accordingly, intellectual disability is not a sufficient reason for withholding life-saving treatment.
