The graded and dichotomous nature of visual awareness.

Is our visual experience of the world graded or dichotomous? Opposite pre-theoretical intuitions apply in different cases. For instance, when looking at a scene, one has a distinct sense that our experience has a graded character: one cannot say that there is no experience of contents that fall outside the focus of attention, but one cannot say that there is full awareness of such contents either. By contrast, when performing a visual detection task, our sense of having perceived the stimulus or not exhibits a more dichotomous character. Such issues have recently been the object of intense debate because different theoretical frameworks make different predictions about the graded versus dichotomous character of consciousness. Here, we review both relevant empirical findings as well as the associated theories (i.e. local recurrent processing versus global neural workspace theory). Next, we attempt to reconcile such contradictory theories by suggesting that level of processing is an often-ignored but highly relevant dimension through which we can cast a novel look at existing empirical findings. Thus, using a range of different stimuli, tasks and subjective scales, we show that processing low-level, non-semantic content results in graded visual experience, whereas processing high-level semantic content is experienced in a more dichotomous manner. We close by comparing our perspective with existing proposals, focusing in particular on the partial awareness hypothesis.

Disentangling conscious and unconscious processing: a subjective trial-based assessment approach.

The most common method for assessing similarities and differences between conscious and unconscious processing is to compare the effects of unconscious (perceptually weak) stimuli, with conscious (perceptually strong) stimuli. Awareness of these stimuli is then assessed by objective performance on prime identification tasks. While this approach has proven extremely fruitful in furthering our understanding of unconscious cognition, it also suffers from some critical problems. We present an alternative methodology for comparing conscious and unconscious cognition. We used a priming version of a Stroop paradigm and after each trial, participants gave a subjective rating of the degree to which they were aware of the prime. Based on this trial-by-trial awareness assessment, conscious, uncertain, and unconscious trials were separated. Crucially, in all these conditions, the primes have identical perceptual strength. Significant priming was observed for all conditions, but the effects for conscious trials were significantly stronger, and no difference was observed between uncertain and unconscious trials. Thus, awareness of the prime has a large impact on congruency effects, even when signal strength is controlled for.

Repeating a strongly masked stimulus increases priming and awareness.

Previous studies [Marcel, A. J. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15(2), 197-237; Wentura, D., & Frings, C. (2005). Repeated masked category primes interfere with related exemplars: New evidence for negative semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(1), 108-120] suggested that repeatedly presenting a masked stimulus improves priming without increasing perceptual awareness. However, neural theories of consciousness predict the opposite: Increasing bottom-up strength in such a paradigm should also result in increasing availability to awareness. Here, we tested this prediction by manipulating the number of repetitions of a strongly masked digit. Our results do not replicate the dissociation observed in previous studies and are instead suggestive that repeating an unconscious and attended masked stimulus enables the progressive emergence of perceptual awareness.

The validity of d' measures.

Subliminal perception occurs when prime stimuli that participants claim not to be aware of nevertheless influence subsequent processing of a target. This claim, however, critically depends on correct methods to assess prime awareness. Typically, d' ("d prime") tasks administered after a priming task are used to establish that people are unable to discriminate between different primes. Here, we show that such d' tasks are influenced by the nature of the target, by attentional factors, and by the delay between stimulus presentation and response. Our results suggest that the standard d' task is not a straightforward measure of prime visibility. We discuss the implications of our findings for subliminal perception research.

Switch performance in peripherally and centrally triggered saccades.

A common hypothesis is that the switch cost measured when switching between prosaccades and antisaccades mainly reflects the inhibition of the saccadic system after the execution of an antisaccade, which requires the inhibition of a gaze response. The present study further tested this hypothesis by comparing switch performance between peripherally triggered saccades and centrally triggered saccades with the latter type of saccades not requiring inhibition of a gaze response. For peripherally triggered saccades, a switch cost was present for prosaccades but not for antisaccades. For centrally triggered saccades, a switch cost was present both for prosaccades and for antisaccades. The difference between both saccade tasks further supports the hypothesis that the switch performance observed for peripherally triggered saccades is related to the inhibition of a gaze response that is required when executing a peripherally triggered antisaccade and the persisting inhibition in the saccadic system this entails. Furthermore, the switch costs observed for centrally triggered saccades indicate that more general processes besides the persisting inhibition in the saccadic system, such as reconfiguration and interference control, also contribute to the switch performance in saccades.