Bloodstream infection and ventilator-associated pneumonia in patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) supported by extracorporeal membrane oxygenation.

OBJECTIVE: Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) has been widely used in the care of patients with respiratory failure from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We characterized bloodstream infections (BSIs) and ventilator-associated pneumonias (VAPs) in COVID-19 patients supported with ECMO, and we investigated their impact on patient outcomes. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study from March 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021. SETTING: Academic tertiary-care referral center. PATIENTS: Consecutive adult patients admitted for COVID-19 who received ECMO. METHODS: We identified BSIs and VAPs and described their epidemiology and microbiology. Cumulative antimicrobial use and the specific management of BSIs were determined. Multivariate time-dependent Cox proportional hazards models were constructed to evaluate the impact of BSIs and VAPs on mortality, controlling for age, receipt of COVID-19-specific therapeutics, and new renal replacement therapy. RESULTS: We identified 136 patients who received ECMO for COVID-19 pneumonia during the study period. BSIs and VAPs occurred in 81 patients (59.6%) and 93 patients (68.4%), respectively. The incidence of BSIs was 29.5 per 1,000 ECMO days and increased with duration of ECMO cannulation. Enterococci, Enterobacterales, and Staphylococcus aureus were the most common causes of BSIs, whereas S. aureus, Klebsiella species, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa comprised the majority of VAPs. Mean antibiotic use comprised 1,031 days of therapy per 1,000 ECMO days (SD, 496). We did not detect an association between BSIs or VAPs and mortality. CONCLUSIONS: BSIs and VAPs are common in COVID-19 ECMO-supported patients. Efforts to optimize their diagnosis, prevention, and management should be prioritized.

Five years of Experience using Front-Line Ownership to Improve Healthcare Quality and Safety.

Front-line ownership (FLO) is a complexity science-based approach to leading change initiatives that is built upon a foundation of Positive Deviance and the use of Liberating Structures to engage others. In this paper, we outline the use of FLO in four successful patient safety or quality improvement projects in four countries. While the underlying principles guiding the use of FLO were the same for each of these projects, project goals, the types of roles involved and how the projects evolved, spread and were sustained, varied considerably between settings. Allowing for local variability while following consistent overarching simple rules is central to the FLO approach and we believe the key reason why it has met with success. While many parts of healthcare delivery require increased standardization, approaches that allow teams to develop implementation strategies based on their unique local situations, will likely meet with greater success than those that attempt to standardize implementation in addition to practice.

Healthcare Quality Improvement Requires Many Approaches.

It is a pleasure to respond to the commentaries and we thank the authors for the thought, time and effort they so obviously put into their writing. We are excited that documenting our experience has resulted in such a wide range of opinion.

Longitudinal Multicenter Analysis of Outcomes After Cessation of Control Measures for Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococci.

OBJECTIVE To assess clinically relevant outcomes after complete cessation of control measures for vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE). DESIGN Quasi-experimental ecological study over 3.5 years. METHODS All VRE screening and isolation practices at 4 large academic hospitals in Ontario, Canada, were stopped on July 1, 2012. In total, 618 anonymized abstracted charts of patients with VRE-positive clinical isolates identified between July 1, 2010, and December 31, 2013, were reviewed to determine whether the case was a true VRE infection, a VRE colonization or contaminant, or a true VRE bacteremia. All deaths within 30 days of the last VRE infection were also reviewed to determine whether the death was fully or partially attributable to VRE. All-cause mortality was evaluated over the study period. Generalized estimating equation methods were used to cluster outcome rates within hospitals, and negative binomial models were created for each outcome. RESULTS The incidence rate ratio (IRR) for VRE infections was 0.59 and the associated P value was .34. For VRE bacteremias, the IRR was 0.54 and P=.38; for all-cause mortality the IRR was 0.70 and P=.66; and for VRE attributable death, the IRR was 0.35 and P=.49. VRE control measures were not significantly associated with any of the outcomes. Rates of all outcomes appeared to increase during the 18-month period after cessation of VRE control measures, but none reached statistical significance. CONCLUSION Clinically significant VRE outcomes remain rare. Cessation of all control measures for VRE had no significant attributable adverse clinical impact. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2016;1-7.

Public health measures to control the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto.

BACKGROUND: Toronto was the site of North America's largest outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). An understanding of the patterns of transmission and the effects on public health in relation to control measures that were taken will help health officials prepare for any future outbreaks. METHODS: We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared. RESULTS: Toronto Public Health investigated 2132 potential cases of SARS, identified 23,103 contacts of SARS patients as requiring quarantine, and logged 316,615 calls on its SARS hotline. In Toronto, 225 residents met the case definition of SARS, and all but 3 travel-related cases were linked to the index patient, from Hong Kong. SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of Toronto's acute care hospitals. Unrecognized SARS among in-patients with underlying illness caused a resurgence, or a second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally controlled through active surveillance of hospitalized patients. In response to the control measures of Toronto Public Health, the number of persons who were exposed to SARS in nonhospital and nonhousehold settings dropped from 20 (13 percent) before the control measures were instituted (phase 1) to 0 afterward (phase 2). The number of patients who were exposed while in a hospital ward rose from 25 (17 percent) in phase 1 to 68 (88 percent) in phase 2, and the number exposed while in the intensive care unit dropped from 13 (9 percent) in phase 1 to 0 in phase 2. Community spread (the length of the chains of transmission outside of hospital settings) was significantly reduced in phase 2 of the outbreak (P<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.