Keep Your Scanners Peeled: Gaze Behavior as a Measure of Automation Trust During Highly Automated Driving.

OBJECTIVE: The feasibility of measuring drivers' automation trust via gaze behavior during highly automated driving was assessed with eye tracking and validated with self-reported automation trust in a driving simulator study. BACKGROUND: Earlier research from other domains indicates that drivers' automation trust might be inferred from gaze behavior, such as monitoring frequency. METHOD: The gaze behavior and self-reported automation trust of 35 participants attending to a visually demanding non-driving-related task (NDRT) during highly automated driving was evaluated. The relationship between dispositional, situational, and learned automation trust with gaze behavior was compared. RESULTS: Overall, there was a consistent relationship between drivers' automation trust and gaze behavior. Participants reporting higher automation trust tended to monitor the automation less frequently. Further analyses revealed that higher automation trust was associated with lower monitoring frequency of the automation during NDRTs, and an increase in trust over the experimental session was connected with a decrease in monitoring frequency. CONCLUSION: We suggest that (a) the current results indicate a negative relationship between drivers' self-reported automation trust and monitoring frequency, (b) gaze behavior provides a more direct measure of automation trust than other behavioral measures, and (c) with further refinement, drivers' automation trust during highly automated driving might be inferred from gaze behavior. APPLICATION: Potential applications of this research include the estimation of drivers' automation trust and reliance during highly automated driving.

When remembering causes forgetting: retrieval-induced forgetting as recovery failure.

Retrieval practice on a subset of previously learned material can cause forgetting of the unpracticed material and make it inaccessible to consciousness. Such inaccessibility may arise because the material is no longer sampled from the set of to-be-recalled items, or, though sampled, its representation is not complete enough to be recovered into consciousness. In 2 experiments, it was examined whether retrieval-induced forgetting reflects a sampling or recovery failure by studying the time course of cued recall in this type of situation. Although retrieval practice reduced recall totals of the unpracticed items, in both experiments, the forgetting was not accompanied by an effect on the items' response latencies. This pattern of results is consistent with the view that inhibited items are successfully sampled but, because of a reduction in their activation level, do not exceed the recovery threshold.