Symbolic distancing in sharing situations restrains children's economic behavior and potentially also their inequity aversion.

We examined whether representing a resource non-symbolically (i.e., as stickers) or symbolically (i.e., as tokens that could be exchanged for stickers) affected kindergartner's decisions in an Ultimatum/Inequity Game (N = 93). The game involved distribution offers, made by a fictitious child, that were either fair (i.e., same quantity for each child, i.e., 3:3) or disadvantageously unfair (i.e., less for the target child than for the fictitious child, i.e., 2:4 or 1:5). Children had to decide whether to accept or reject the offers. In the latter case, none of the children would get anything of the resource. Children rejected unfair offers more frequently than fair offers, and they rejected the offers involving the symbolic resource more frequently than offers involving the non-symbolic resource, which applied to a similar degree to fair and unfair offers. However, exploratory follow-up analyses of children's reactions to unfair offers revealed that children rejected the more unfair offer (i.e., 1:5) more frequently than the less unfair offer (i.e., 2:4) when the resource was represented non-symbolically instead of symbolically. The results suggest that the symbolic representation of a resource evokes economically less rational behavior in children and diminished their potential gain. Moreover, symbolic representations might level out children's differentiation of differently unfair offers. These findings are discussed in light of the subjective value approach and the Construal Level Theory.

Giving Is Nicer than Taking: Preschoolers Reciprocate Based on the Social Intentions of the Distributor.

Recent research has found that even preschoolers give more resources to others who have previously given resources to them, but the psychological bases of this reciprocity are unknown. In our study, a puppet distributed resources between herself and a child by taking some from a pile in front of the child or else by giving some from a pile in front of herself. Although the resulting distributions were identical, three- and five-year-olds reciprocated less generously when the puppet had taken rather than given resources. This suggests that children's judgments about resource distribution are more about the social intentions of the distributor and the social framing of the distributional act than about the amount of resources obtained. In order to rule out that the differences in the children's reciprocal behavior were merely due to experiencing gains and losses, we conducted a follow-up study. Here, three- and-five year olds won or lost resources in a lottery draw and could then freely give or take resources to/from a puppet, respectively. In this study, they did not respond differently after winning vs. losing resources.

Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game.

Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This "tragedy of the commons" has been demonstrated experimentally in adults with the public goods game. Contributions to a public good decline over time due to free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about how children behave when confronted with this social dilemma. Forty-eight preschoolers were tested using a novel non-verbal procedure and simplified choices more appropriate to their age than standard economic approaches. The rate of cooperation was initially very low and rose in the second round for the girls only. Children were affected by their previous outcome, as they free rode more after experiencing a lower outcome compared to the other group members.