ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: To compare the short-term effects on acid base, electrolyte status and urine output of a single fluid bolus of saline to that of the balanced solution Plasmalyte® in critically ill patients. METHODS: Prospective, randomized, controlled trial. Adult patients (≥ 18 years) admitted to the ICU receiving a fluid bolus were randomized to receive 1 L of saline (NaCl 0.9%, Baxter) or a balanced fluid [Plasmalyte® (Baxter)]. Blood samples and urine output were collected just before (T0), just after (T1), 2 h after (T2) (only for urinary output) and three hours after termination of the fluid bolus (T4). The effect of fluid boluses on serum chloride, apparent strong ion difference, base excess, urinary output and blood pressure or vasopressor need were analyzed. MAIN RESULTS: Patients who received a 1 L saline fluid bolus had a significant increase in serum chloride (1.60; 95% CI 1.10 to 2.10; P < 0.001) and short-term decrease in apparent strong ion difference (- 1.85; 95% CI - 2.71 to - 0.99; P < 0.001) and base excess (- 0.90; 95% CI - 1.31 to - 0.50; P < 0.001). We observed a 17% increase in patients developing hyperchloremia in the saline group (0.17; 95% CI 0.05 to 0.29; P = 0.005). No significant difference in urinary output, blood pressure or vasopressor need was observed in either group. CONCLUSION: Even a single, small bolus of saline, administered to critically ill patients, causes a significant increase in chloride concentration and a decrease in apparent strong ion difference and base excess, and an increase in the number of patients developing hyperchloremia. No difference in effect on urinary output, blood pressure or vasopressor need was observed between the two groups. EUDRACT NUMBER: 2014-001005-41; date of registration: 28/10/2014. LOCAL EC APPROVAL: EC project number 2014/038.
ABSTRACT
We expand on Della Croce's ambition to interpret "epistemic injustice" as a specification of non-maleficence in the use of the influential four-principle framework. This is an alluring line of thought for conceptual, moral, and heuristic reasons. Although it is commendable, Della Croce's attempt remains tentative. So does our critique of it. Yet, we take on the challenge to critically address two interrelated points. First, we broaden the analysis to include deliberations about hermeneutical injustice. We argue that, if due consideration of epistemic injustice is to require more than negative ethical obligations in medicine, dimensions of hermeneutical injustice should be explored as an avenue to arrive at such positive duties. Second, and relatedly, we argue that this may encompass moral responsibilities beyond the individual level, that is: positive obligations to take action on a structural level. Building on Dotson's concept of "contributory injustice" and Scheman's concept of "perceptual autonomy," we suggest that the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutical justice may provide additional content not only to negative prohibitions of action (i.e. non-maleficence) but also to positive requirements of action, like respecting patient autonomy.
