Egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment underlies social inferences about known others varying in similarity and familiarity.

How do people infer the content of another person's mind? One documented strategy-at least when inferring the minds of strangers-entails anchoring on the content of one's own mind and serially adjusting away from this egocentric anchor. Yet, many social inferences concern known others in existing social relationships. In eight experiments with four sets of stimuli, we tested whether an egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism underlies social inferences about known targets, and whether it varies based on the target's similarity and familiarity to oneself. In Experiments 1-7, participants (Ntotal = 4,790) rated themselves and a known target on various characteristics (e.g., preferences, habits, traits), and response times for the target ratings were recorded. An integrative data analysis revealed that, consistent with egocentric anchoring-and-adjustment, the more discrepant the target ratings were from participants' self ratings, the longer participants took to provide target ratings. Importantly, this pattern of anchoring-and-adjustment was stronger for similar (vs. dissimilar) and familiar (vs. unfamiliar) targets, but it emerged in all experimental conditions. Experiment 8 (N = 549) suggested that these results were unlikely to be explained solely by a memory search process. We discuss implications for anchoring-and-adjustment as a mechanism underlying social inferences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Summarized attribute preferences have unique antecedents and consequences.

People have ideas about the attributes (i.e., traits or characteristics that vary along a dimension) that they like in others (e.g., "I like intelligence in a romantic partner"), and these ideas about liking are called summarized attribute preferences (Ledgerwood et al., 2018). But where do summarized preferences come from, and what do they predict? Across four studies, we examined how people form summarized attribute preferences and whether they predict situation selection. We showed participants a series of photographs of faces and assessed both their experienced liking for an attribute (or functional attribute preference) as well as their inference about how much they liked the attribute in the abstract (their summarized attribute preference). Our results suggest that summarized attribute preferences-despite being (weakly) grounded in functional attribute preferences-were affected by incidental aspects of the context in which people learn about them (i.e., the overall likeability of the pool of faces). Furthermore, we observed a double dissociation in the predictive validity of summarized and functional attribute preferences: Whereas summarized attribute preferences predicted situation selection at a distance (e.g., whether to join a new dating website based on a description of it), functional attribute preferences predicted situation selection with experience (e.g., whether to join a new dating website after sampling it). We discuss theoretical and methodological implications for the interdisciplinary science of human evaluation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Evaluations of empathizers depend on the target of empathy.

Psychological research on empathy typically focuses on understanding its effects on empathizers and empathic targets. Little is known, however, about the effects of empathy beyond its dyadic context. Taking an extradyadic perspective, we examined how third-party observers evaluate empathizers. Seven experiments documented that observers' evaluations of empathizers depend on the target of empathy. Empathizers (vs. nonempathizers) of a stressful experience were respected/liked more when the empathic target was positive (e.g., children's hospital worker), but not when the target was negative (e.g., White supremacist; Experiments 1 and 2). Empathizers were respected/liked more when responding to a positive target who disclosed a positive experience (i.e., a personal accomplishment), but less when responding to a negative target who disclosed a positive experience (Experiment 3). These effects were partly, but not solely, attributable to the positivity of empathic responses (Experiment 4). Expressing empathy (vs. condemnation) toward a negative target resulted in less respect/liking when the disclosed experience was linked to the source of target valence (i.e., stress from White supremacist job; Experiments 5 through 7), but more respect/liking when the experience was unrelated to the source of target valence (i.e., stress from cancer; Experiment 7). Overall, empathizers were viewed as warmer, but to a lesser extent when responding to a negative target. These findings highlight the importance of considering the extradyadic impact of empathy and suggest that although people are often encouraged to empathize with disliked others, they are not always favored for doing so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Achieving local and global shared realities: distance guides alignment to specific or general social influences.

Humans routinely navigate a multitude of potential social influences, ranging from specific individual's opinions to general social norms and group values. Whereas specific social influences afford opportunities to achieve shared inner states with particular individuals, general social influences afford opportunities to achieve shared inner states with broader groups. We review recent theory and evidence examining how people tune into different kinds of social influence in the service of shared reality. We argue that the distance of an attitude object (e.g. how far away it is in time or space) systematically influences what kind of social influence informs people's attitudes. As an attitude object grows more distant, people's attitudes increasingly align with general (vs. specific) social influences.