Age-related changes in controllable and uncontrollable processes underlying evaluative conditioning: A comparison between children ages 7 to 11 and young adults.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus (CS) consecutive to its repeated pairing with a valent unconditioned stimulus (US). We relied on a multinomial processing tree model to compare the processes underlying EC in middle-aged children (n = 57, Mage = 8.65, range = 6.94-11.03; 31 females) and young adults (n = 57, Mage = 19.16, range = 17.60-23.60; 53 females). We found that controllable and uncontrollable valence transfer processes concurrently contributed to EC in adults and provided initial evidence that they are already present in children. Moreover, the experiment revealed that both types of processes are weaker in children than in adults and that controllable processes are stronger in older children than in younger ones. These findings suggest that both controllable and uncontrollable processes already underlie EC in middle-aged children but that they continue to mature after childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Distinguishing the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge in evaluative conditioning.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus (CS) subsequent to its repeated pairing with a valent stimulus (US). Two studies that bring new light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC were conducted. We developed an innovative method motivated by higher order and integration theories of consciousness to distinguish between the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge about the pairings. On each trial of the awareness test, participants had to indicate the valence of the US associated with a given CS and to make a 'structural knowledge attribution' by reporting the basis of their response. Valence identification accuracy was used to evaluate knowledge while the knowledge attribution was used to measure the conscious status of knowledge. Memory attribution indicated conscious knowledge about the pairings while feeling-based and random attributions indicated unconscious knowledge. A meta-analysis of the two studies revealed that valence identification accuracy was above chance level for memory and feeling-based attributions but not for the random attribution. EC was found in the three attributions. While EC effect size was medium for the memory attribution it was small for feeling-based and random attributions. Moreover, Experiment 2 included a delayed test. EC was still present 24 h after the conditioning took place. The results obtained for memory and feeling-based attributions suggest that both conscious and unconscious knowledge may underlie EC. The results obtained for random attribution suggest that EC may also occur without any knowledge of US valence.

On the memory processes underlying conscious deliberation in complex decision making: the role of verbatim and gist memory.

Studies showed that a distraction period improves complex decision making relative to a conscious deliberation period or an immediate choice. Although this counterintuitive finding was replicated several times, many other studies failed to find any beneficial effect of distraction and some even showed situations in which conscious deliberation was more effective. We suggest that studies showing a conscious thought advantage share several features that may have fostered the encoding and the retrieval of precise verbatim representations of the choice alternatives. The effectiveness of conscious deliberation could thus depend on the availability of verbatim memory. To test this hypothesis, we varied the availability of verbatim memory for the attributes of various equivalent alternatives by introducing, for half of the participants, a time delay between the presentation of the alternatives and of a fictitious client request that provides a normative criterion to evaluate them. Verbatim memory declined, whereas gist memory increased in the delay relative to the no delay condition. Moreover, there was a detrimental effect of delay in the deliberation condition but not in the distraction and the immediate decision conditions. Both verbatim memory and decision quality after deliberation were affected by the introduction of a delay which suggests that verbatim memory underlies conscious thought effectiveness.

The role of gist and verbatim memory in complex decision making: Explaining the unconscious-thought effect.

Previous research showed that the unconscious-thought effect, which refers to an improvement in complex decision making following a distraction period, was moderated by the presentation format of pieces of information about different options. The aim of the current study was to replicate this finding and further examine the memory representations underlying decision making following a distraction or a deliberation period. Results showed that, when the information was presented blocked per option, participants were better able to differentiate the best option from the others after a distraction period than immediately after the information presentation or after a deliberation period. In addition, distracted participants retrieved more gist representations of the options when the information was presented per option. By contrast, participants were better able to differentiate the best option from the others after a deliberation period when the information was presented per attribute. Participants who deliberated also retrieved more verbatim representations when the information was presented per attribute. Finally, mediation analyses indicated that the accuracy of the evaluations of the options depends on gist memory when distracted but on verbatim memory when deliberating. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of distraction or deliberation depends on the memory representations of the different options. (PsycINFO Database Record

Information presentation format moderates the unconscious-thought effect: The role of recollection.

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision-making. In two experiments using the unconscious-thought paradigm, we investigated the effect of presentation format of decision information (i) on memory for decision-relevant information and (ii) on the quality of decisions made after distraction, conscious deliberation or immediately. We used the process-dissociation procedure to measure recollection and familiarity. The two studies showed that presenting information blocked per criterion led participants to recollect more decision-relevant details compared to a presentation by option. Moreover, a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies provided strong evidence that conscious deliberation resulted in better decisions when the information was presented blocked per criterion and substantial evidence that distraction improved decision quality when the information was presented blocked per option. Finally, Study 2 revealed that the recollection of decision-relevant details mediated the effect of presentation format on decision quality in the deliberation condition. This suggests that recollection contributes to conscious deliberation efficacy.

The effect of the cognitive demands of the distraction task on unconscious thought.

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision making. Recent studies suggest that this effect is more likely to occur with low- than high-demanding distraction tasks. We discuss implications of these findings for Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) claim that evidence is lacking for the intervention of unconscious processes in complex decision making.

Gist memory in the unconscious-thought effect.

The unconscious-thought effect (UTE) occurs when people are better able to make complex decisions after a period of distraction rather than immediately or after a period of conscious deliberation. This finding has often been interpreted as evidence of unconscious thinking. In two experiments, we provided the first evidence that the UTE is accompanied by enhanced memory for the gist of decision-relevant attributes and demonstrated that the cognitive demands of a distraction task moderate its effect on decision making and gist memory. It was only following a low-demand distraction task that participants chose the best alternative more often and displayed enhanced gist memory for decision-relevant attributes. These findings suggest that the UTE occurs only if cognitive resources are available and that it is accompanied by enhanced organization of information in memory, as shown by the increase in gist memory.

"Split them!" smaller item sizes of cookies lead to a decrease in energy intake in children.

OBJECTIVE: Examine the influence of altering the size of snack food (ie, small vs large cookies) on short-term energy intake. METHODS: First- and sixth-graders (n = 77) participated in a between-subjects experimental design. All participants were offered the same gram weight of cookies during an afternoon tea at their school. For half of the participants, food was cut in 2 to make the small item size. Food intake (number of cookies, gram weight, and energy intake) was examined using ANOVA. RESULTS: Decreasing the item size of food led to a decrease of 25% in gram weight intake, corresponding to 68 kcal. Appetitive ratings and subject and food characteristics had no moderating effect. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: Reducing the item size of food could prove a useful dietary prevention strategy based on decreased consumption, aimed at countering obesity-promoting eating behaviors favored by the easy availability of large food portions.

Smaller food item sizes of snack foods influence reduced portions and caloric intake in young adults.

Studies considering the impact of food-size variations on consumption have predominantly focused on portion size, whereas very little research has investigated variations in food-item size, especially at snacking occasions, and results have been contradictory. This study evaluated the effect of altering the size of food items (ie, small vs large candies) of equal-size food portions on short-term energy intake while snacking. The study used a between-subjects design (n=33) in a randomized experiment conducted in spring 2008. In a psychology laboratory (separate cubicles), participants (undergraduate psychology students, 29 of 33 female, mean age 20.3±2 years, mean body mass index 21.7±3.7) were offered unlimited consumption of candies while participating in an unrelated computerized experiment. For half of the subjects, items were cut in two to make the small food-item size. Food intake (weight in grams, kilocalories, and number of food items) was examined using analysis of variance. Results showed that decreasing the item size of candies led participants to decrease by half their gram weight intake, resulting in an energy intake decrease of 60 kcal compared to the other group. Appetite ratings and subject and food characteristics had no moderating effect. A cognitive bias could explain why people tend to consider that one unit of food (eg, 10 candies) is the appropriate amount to consume, regardless of the size of the food items in the unit. This study suggests a simple dietary strategy, decreasing food-item size without having to alter the portion size offered, may reduce energy intake at snacking occasions.